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SUMMARY
The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented growth in the complexity and
variety of information, as partially driven by the advances in the following three ar-
eas: first, advanced sensing and monitoring technologies; second, pervasive network
connectivity and ubiquitous computing platform; and third, social media and web
2.0 technologies. We are now facing data coming from multiple sources and featuring
rich context information. For example, operators today have at their disposal myriad
measures (e.g., NetFlow, SNMP, “syslog”) collected from all routers of large-scale en-
terprise networks. In contrast, the existing analytical tools are lagging way behind this
astonishing growth in the complexity and variety of data. For example, even though
analyzing routing data holds the promise for exposing important network failures,
this promise is largely unfulfilled due to the complex, noisy and voluminous nature of
the data. The lack of general design models and formal methods to effectively weave
context-rich information from multiple sources motivates this thesis.
More specifically, in this thesis we focus on two grand challenges facing system
designers and operators. First, how to fuse information from multiple autonomous,
yet correlated sources and to provide consistent views of underlying phenomena?
Second, how to respect externally imposed constraints (privacy concerns in particular)
without compromising the efficacy of analysis?
In the first scenario, the correlation (e.g., dependency) among the data sources is
usually reflected in the collected data in the form of spatial and/or temporal relevance.
For example, the sympotoms caused by a given network failure typically demonstrate
significant patterns in terms of where and when they are observed. This motivates us
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to design data analytical frameworks that can effectively incorporate the relationships
of underlying data sources.
In the second scenario, due to the possible sensitive nature of the data, the data
sources expect the entire process of data collection, processing and dissemination to
provide sufficient privacy protection of their contributed data, even though the ex-
pected level of protection may vary from one source to another. This essentially raises
the question of how to ensure privacy protection (e.g., via information sanitization),
meanwhile guaranteeing the utility of the information for intended purposes.
To address the first challenge, we apply a general correlation network model to
capture the relationships among data sources, and propose Network-Aware Analysis
(NAA), a library of novel inference models, to capture (i) how the correlation of
the underlying sources is reflected as the spatial and/or temporal relevance of the
collected data, and (ii) how to track causality in the data caused by the dependency
of the data sources. We have also developed a set of space-time efficient algorithms
to address (i) how to correlate relevant data and (ii) how to forecast future data.
To address the second challenge, we further extend the concept of correlation net-
work to encode the semantic (possibly virtual) dependencies and constraints among
entities in question (e.g., medical records). We show through a set of concrete cases
that correlation networks convey significant utility for intended applications, and
meanwhile are often used as the steppingstone by adversaries to perform inference at-
tacks. Using correlation networks as the pivot for analyzing privacy-utility trade-offs,
we propose Privacy-Aware Analysis (PAA), a general design paradigm of constructing
analytical solutions with theoretical backing for both privacy and utility.
The general design models and formal methods shown in this thesis can help
improve existing data analytical systems by making them more capable of weaving
local observations (from multiple sources) into globally consistent pictures, and more




Several tremendous trends are dominating today’s computing environments: first,
the emergence of advanced sensing and monitoring technologies that enable users to
record and collect varied types of information in closed and open environments; sec-
ond, the development of pervasive network connectivity and ubiquitous computing
platforms that enable users to send and receive their intended information virtually
at anytime from anywhere; and third, the popularity of social media and web 2.0
technologies that enable such information to be accessible in a virtually real-time
manner. With these technology advancements, we are now facing astronomical size
of data that come from multiple autonomous, yet correlated sources and feature rich
context information, which spurs the need of building large-scale multi-source data
analytical systems. Examples include network monitoring systems, mobile computing
infrastructures and social networking platforms. Such systems hold the promise of
supporting critical decision making by fusing information from different sources and
providing consistent, multi-scale views of underlying phenomena. Today this promise
remains largely unfulfilled, because building and operating massive multi-source an-
alytical systems still face a multitude of challenges, including
• Designing system architectures that support storing and processing large-volume
data from multiple sources.
• Developing models and algorithms that exploit information from all the sources.
• Deploying and tuning multi-source analytical systems in real applications.
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1.1 Motivation
This thesis in particular focuses on addressing the data-centric challenges facing sys-
tem designers and operators; that is, developing models and algorithms that fully use
data from all the sources to understand the underlying phenomena.
In conventional data management and mining models, data are typically the first-
class citizen and are usually handled independent of the context wherein they are
generated or collected. For example, in transactional data mining with the objective
of finding popular purchase patterns among the population, transaction records are
typically processed irrespective of the corresponding customers.
In contrast, multi-source data analysis requires treating the rich context also as a
first-class citizen and understanding data and context in an integrated manner. The
context information influences data analysis in two aspects. First, the correlation
among the data sources is usually reflected in the data in the form of spatial and/or
temporal relevance, which makes it necessary to account for the relationships of the
sources in order to interpret the data. Second, each autonomous source may have
specific constraints (e.g., privacy concern), which poses the question of how to re-
spect such constraints without compromising the efficacy of analysis. For example,
with the emergency of social media, it is now feasible to collect transactional data
associated with customer information (which is possibly sensitive) and their social
relationships; incorporating such context information in analyzing transactional data
leads to understanding social-community-specific purchase patterns.
The challenge however lies in the complexity of context information and the lack
of general design models to effectively fuse context-rich information from multiple
sources. Systems designers and operators in different domains have developed a
plethora of solutions relying on varied methodologies and heuristics; nevertheless
it is typically difficult if not impossible to transfer or reuse the solutions developed
for one context to another (even similar) one. For instance, as will be discussed in
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Chapter 6, the privacy protection mechanisms proposed for sensitive census data is
inadequate to address the vulnerability of sensitive location data.
1.2 Contributions: Common Design Philosophy
This thesis aims at developing a set of general design models and formal methods that
can help address the difficulties above. In particular we focus on two grand research
challenges, namely, (i) how to exploit information from multiple autonomous, yet
correlated sources and to provide consistent views of global phenomena? and further,
(ii) how to respect externally imposed constraints (privacy concerns, in particular)
without compromising the efficacy of analysis?
1.2.1 Network-Aware Analysis
To address the first challenge, we apply a general correlation network model to capture
the relationships (e.g., dependency, reference, inheritance) among the data sources,
and propose Network-Aware Analysis (NAA), a library of novel inference models, to
capture (i) how the relationships of the underlying sources is reflected as the spatial
and/or temporal relevance of the collected data, and (ii) how to track causality in
the data caused by the dependency of the data sources. We have also developed a
set of space-time efficient algorithms to correlate relevant data and to even forecast
future data. A wide range of applications can be benefited from our work: it can help
diagnose failure in communication networks in a scalable manner, spot anomalous
email communication without in-depth inspection, perform effective recommendation
for online resources, and improve efficiency of mobile paging operation.
1.2.2 Privacy-Aware Analysis
For the second challenge, regarding privacy as one concrete constraint imposed by
data sources, we consider the question of how to ensure privacy protection (e.g., via
information sanitization), meanwhile guaranteeing the utility of the information for
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intended purposes. We extend the correlation network model to encode the semantic
(possibly virtual) dependencies and constraints among entities in question (e.g., med-
ical records, transaction patterns, mobile clients). We show through a set of domain-
specific cases that correlation networks convey significant utility for intended appli-
cations, and meanwhile are often used as the steppingstone by adversaries to perform
inference attacks. Using correlation network as the pivot for analyzing privacy-utility
trade-offs, we propose Privacy-Aware Analysis (PAA), a general design paradigm for
constructing analytical solutions with theoretical backing for both privacy and utility.
1.3 Contributions: Concrete Case Studies
The methodology followed by this thesis is “from practice, to theory and back to
practice”. We start with examining concrete contexts in representative applications,
for network-aware analysis, ranging from communication network (diagnosing network
faults) to social network (modeling social influence), and for privacy-aware analysis,
ranging from sensitive data dissemination (medical data publishing) to sensitive data
mining (transaction data mining) and (location)-sensitive data management (mobile
location based service). We focus on extracting the process of coupling data and
context analysis into unified theoretical models, and then develop and deploy practical
solutions under the guidance of these design models. In the following we detail our
contributions in each specific case.
1.3.1 Network-Aware Correlation Reasoning
Modern communication networks generate massive volume of operational event data,
e.g., alarm, alert and metrics, which can be used by a network management system
(NMS) to diagnose potential faults. We introduce a new class of indexable network
signatures that encode temporal evolution of events generated by a network fault
as well as topological relationships among the nodes where these events occur. We
present an efficient learning algorithm to extract such signatures from noisy historical
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event data, and with the help of novel space-time indexing structures, we show how
to perform efficient, online signature matching. We also point out potential appli-
cations of such signatures for many different types of networks including social and
information networks.
1.3.2 Network-Aware Causality Tracking
Social influence, the phenomenon that the actions of a user induce similar behaviors
among his/her friends via social ties, exists prevailingly in socially networked sys-
tems. We identify the importance of understanding and modeling social influence
at a microscopic scale (i.e., at the granularity of individual users, actions and time-
stamps), and propose a microscopic social-influence model wherein: users’ actions are
modeled as interactions between social network (formed by users) and object network
(formed by targets of actions); actions of a user influence his/her friends in a dynamic,
network-wise manner (dependent on both social and object networks). We develop a
set of novel inference tools that enable to answer questions of the form: how may an
occurred interaction trigger another? More importantly, when and where may a new
interaction be observed?
1.3.3 Privacy-Aware Data Dissemination
A prominent problem in privacy-preserving data dissemination is to prevent adver-
saries from inferring the sensitive information of a victim, even in an approximate
sense (e.g., the victim is inferred to associate with several diseases with high chance).
We systematically study the problem of protecting proximity privacy in a data model-
neutral manner, and develop a general proximity privacy theory centering around the
correlation network of individuals’ sensitive information, independent of concrete data
models (e.g., categorical or numerical). This definition of proximity privacy subsumes
a number of state-of-the-art privacy principles; efficient anonynimization algorithms
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are developed that guarantee privacy protection while preserving utility for data anal-
ysis in a best-effort manner.
1.3.4 Privacy-Aware Data Mining
The state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving data mining research focuses on the ques-
tion “can mining be run over sanitized datasets?”; our work instead is among the
first that systematically answers the question “can mining over sanitized datasets be
safe and risk free?”. We expose the output privacy risk, namely that mining output
(models/patterns) may leak sensitive information regarding input raw data (espe-
cially when the output is partially, continuously released, e.g., in the case of stream
mining), even though the input data is sanitized. Centering around the correlation
network of mining output, we propose a novel proactive countermeasure based on ran-
dom perturbation, which provides theoretically guaranteed privacy protection, strikes
balance among multiple dimensions of output utility, and requires fairly limited com-
putational resources.
1.3.5 Privacy-Aware (Location) Data Management
Location-dependent data management tasks impose specific requirements regarding
privacy protection, data utility and system performance. For example, how might the
user obtain quality-guaranteed location-based services without exposing her private,
exact position information? Meanwhile, how could the privacy protection mechanism
incur no disincentive, e.g., excessive computation or communication cost, for any ser-
vice providers or mobile users to participate in such a scheme? We study location
privacy issues in real-life mobile services deployed over roads wherein mobiles’ loca-
tions are correlated by underlying road networks. Constructed atop this correlation
model, our solution explores the inherent trade-offs among location privacy, service
execution performance, and quality of delivered service, and strikes a best possible
balance among these factors.
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1.4 Roadmap
The rest of this thesis will be organized as a series of chapters, each one dedicated
to a specific topic within the scopes of network-aware and privacy-aware data ana-
lytics. Each chapter will be organized in the following format. The introduction part
gives background information, introduces the problem setting, and summarizes our
solution; the main part detailes our contributions; and the related work part surveys
relevant literature.
More specifically, Chapter 2 and 3 are dedicated to network-aware data analytics.
Chapter 2 presents Meta, the first proposal that leverages topological and temporal
relevance of network monitoring data to perform scalable, yet robust correlation rea-
soning. Chapter 3 presents µSI, a novel inference framework that tracks and predicts
social influence at a microscopic level.
Furthermore, Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are dedicated to privacy-aware data analytics.
Chapter 4 presents xColor, a general data anonymization model for sensitive data
dissemination. Chapter 5 presents Butterfly, a light-weight countermeasure that
can effectively eliminate privacy breaches in (stream) mining output without explicitly
detecting them, and meanwhile minimizing the loss of output accuracy. Chapter 6
presents xStar, a robust and scalable location privatization framework for mobile
services deployed over road networks, which achieves the best balance among privacy
protection, system overhead and service quality.
This thesis is concluded in Chapter 7.
1.5 Bibliographic Notes
Material from Chapter 2 appears in papers co-authored with Mudhakar Srivatsa,
Dakshi Agrawal and Ling Liu [133, 134]. An early version of some material from
Chapter 3 appears in a paper co-authored with Mudhakar Srivatsa, Dakshi Agrawal
and Ling Liu [135]. Material from Chapter 4 appears in a paper co-authored with
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Shicong Meng, Bhuvan Bamba, Ling Liu and Calton Pu [132] and a paper co-authored
with Ling Liu [130]. Material of Chapter 5 appears in papers co-authored with Ling







The motif of networks is ubiquitous in our lives [19]. In its simplest form, a network
can be modeled as a graph where the vertices of the graph represent network entities
and the edges represent pairwise interactions between network entities. It turns out
that the simple, local, pairwise interactions between network entities can give rise to
complex, interesting global phenomena [19]. Models of such global phenomena as a
function of local interactions is one of the key issues being investigated in the area
of networks. In this work, we propose a new class of models suitable for learning,
indexing, and diagnosing a wide range of network phenomena while focusing on faults
in the communication networks to exemplify our techniques.
Large communication networks have hundreds of thousands of network entities,
and they are typically managed by a centralized network management system (NMS)
that collects (local) monitoring data from network entities to diagnose network faults.
When a fault occurs at a network entity, it tends to influence the “neighboring”
entities. Consequently, faults often results in a large burst of messages being sent to
the NMS from the affected entities. Each message contains a timestamp, an identifier
of the affected device, and a type that signifies an event at the affected device1. The
goal of NMS is to correlate the events occurring in the network, identify the root-cause
fault event(s), suppress dependent events, and discard routine operational events.
1Henceforth, we will use the words “message” and “event” interchangeably, while ignoring the
semantic distinction that events occur at network entities resulting in messages that are received by





























Figure 1: Illustration of the main architecture of Meta.
A key challenge faced by today’s NMS is that of scalability. All widely deployed
NMSes maintain a cache of “unresolved” events, and as each new event arrives, they
use a rule-based mechanism to correlate the incoming event with all cached events
to suppress dependent events and retain only the (unfixed) root-cause events in the
cache. The resulting computation complexity is quadratic in network size since the
number of unresolved events in the cache as well as event arrival rate is typically
proportional to the network size.
Events triggered by a fault are typically generated by a small, constant-size subset2
of nodes that are topologically related to the faulty node. Thus, each event arriving
at the NMS only needs to be correlated with a small, constant-size subset of events
in the cache, yielding a linear complexity of event correlation. Intuitively, achieving
the linear complexity would require data structures that encode and exploit network
topology. In this chapter, we propose a framework Meta (Monitoring network Events
with Topology Assistance) that, to the best of our knowledge, is the first proposal to
utilize topologically-aware event patterns to perform scalable network fault diagnosis.
The remainder of this chapter will be organized as follows. Section 2.2 formalizes
the problem of network fault diagnosis; Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 describe in de-
tail the offline learning and the online matching components of Meta, respectively
2The size of this subset depends on the degree distribution, etc., of the network and is independent
of the size of the network.
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(see Figure 1). An empirical analysis of our approach is presented in Section 2.5.
Section 2.6 discusses related work.
2.2 Problem Formulation
This section introduces fundamental concepts and notations used in the chapter, and
formalizes the problem of online network fault detection and localization.
Definition 1 (Network). A network is modeled as a graph G = (V,E) with V rep-
resenting the set of nodes, each corresponding to a network entity3, and E representing
the set of edges over V, each corresponding to a network link.
Definition 2 (NMS/Agent/Sink). A network management system (NMS)
consists of a set of monitoring agents and a sink. The agents are deployed on
various network entities to collect monitoring data, and send them to the sink which
is responsible for diagnosing potential faults.
Definition 3 (Network Event). Each event x is a tuple of the form x = ⟨e, v, t⟩,
where e represents the event type, v the network node generating the event, and t the
timestamp of the event.
In the rest of this chapter, we use ex, vx, and tx to denote the type, entity, and
timestamp of an event x, respectively.
Definition 4 (Event Stream). We model the event stream as a sequence of events,
(x1, . . . , xn), where xn is the most recent event. Real-time fault diagnosis focuses on
events occurring within a time window of length ω, i.e., an event subsequence (xi,
xi+1, . . ., xn), with txn − txi ≤ ω and txn − txi−1 > ω.
Now we are ready to formally define the problem of real-time network fault de-
tection and diagnosis:
3Without ambiguity, in the following we use “entity” and “node” interchangeably.
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Problem Definition 1. For each time-window, by analyzing the events occurring
within the window and exploiting network topological information, detect potential
faults (if any) and identify the fault types and failed entities.
2.3 Offline Learning
In this section, we describe in detail our method of distilling the essential features of
network faults manifested in network events and composing them into compact, in-
dexable fault signatures. The signatures are designed to capture two critical aspects of
network phenomena, namely, the temporal evolution of fault-triggered events, and the
topological relationship of nodes associated with fault-triggered events. Furthermore,
signatures are universal for a class of networks; that is, signatures learnt using data
from one network instance can be used to diagnose faults in other network instances
in the same class.
The feature learning process can be roughly divided into three phases. First,
from the noisy historical data, we identify event subsets that correspond to network
faults (with high probability) to train our feature extractor. Second, we extract tem-
poral patterns embedded in the training data by extending the classical expectation
maximization (EM) framework. Third, we combine the discovered temporal patterns
with the topological information available to form compact fault signatures that are
amenable to efficient indexing and matching. The details of the three phases are
presented in Section 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3, respectively.
2.3.1 Preparation of Training Data
For the purposes of training fault signatures, it is necessary to separate events caused
by faults and those triggered by regular network operations. In Meta, this step is
achieved by applying three filters, interval filter, support filter, and periodicity filter
to events generated by each node.
Interval Filter
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Typically, the operational events caused by network faults occur in “bursts”. The
interval filter segments the event sequence generated by each node into a series of
“event bursts”.
Definition 5 (Event Burst). An event burst is an ordered sequence of events
wherein two successive events are separated by no more than δ time units.
As will be discussed in Section 2.5, an appropriate value for the parameter δ (typ-
ically a few milliseconds for communication networks) can be obtained by analyzing
the distribution of inter-arrival time of events in a historical dataset. Since events in
a burst occur within a very small time window, we arbitrarily define the timestamp
of an event burst as the timestamp of its first event.
Support Filter
Given a set of event bursts B generated by a node, support filter treats each burst
s ∈ B as a set and ignores the temporal ordering of events. Without ambiguity, we
use s to denote both the event burst and its corresponding event set. We have the
following definition.
Definition 6 (Support). Given a set of event bursts B, the support of an event
set s, sup(s), is the number of bursts in B with event sets identical to s.
To make implementation resilient against noise, we consider two event sets si and
sj identical if their Jaccard similarity coefficient,
∣si∩sj ∣
∣si∪sj ∣
, is close to 1.
Support filter separates fault-triggered and regular event bursts at a node by
exploiting differences in their support. Specifically, it selects the subset of bursts in
B with support within a range [λ, λ], since event sets with extremely low support
are usually the noise component while over-frequent event sets typically correspond
to regular network operations occurring at the node.
Periodicity Filter
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The goal of the periodicity filter is to further reject event sets that occur periodically4
since periodic event sets typically correspond to regular network operations, e.g.,
heartbeat messages.
Definition 7 (Periodicity). Let ts0, . . ., t
s
k be the timestamps when the event set s




i−1 denote the interval between the (i−1)-th and i-th occurrences.






where ds = ∑ki=1 dsi /k denotes the average interval. We reject an event set s if prd(s)
< γ.
2.3.2 Modeling of Event Bursts
Taking the event bursts B at a node (after the filtering of the first phase as input),
this phase utilizes Markov chains to model B and produces a set of chainsMC as the
summarization of event bursts at a node. Markovian properties have been verified
to be common in network operational events, e.g., [100, 111]. However, note that
while we use Markov chains to model event bursts, we do not claim its optimality. It
is worth emphasizing that our framework is flexible enough to support many other
models that can be used to summarize events at a node.
We adopt a mixture model that contains multiple Markov chains MC = {ck}Kk=1.
We assume that each event burst is independently generated by one specific chain.
Each chain c ∈ MC describes one type of sequential behaviors; thus, the mixture
model is able to capture diverse behaviors embedded in event bursts.
Now we proceed to describing the structure of the mixture model. Without ambi-
guity, let B represent the collection of event bursts after initial filtering, and let Σ =
4A failed entity may also periodically generate failure events (e.g., syslog messages, ping fails,
etc.); however, the NMS eliminates such duplicate failure events from the event stream using a
standard process known as de-duplication before passing them to the diagnosis engine.
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{ei}Mi=1 represent the event types that appear in B. All chains inMC share the same
structure: in a chain ck, for each event ei ∈ Σ, there is a corresponding state ok,i; each
state ok,i is associated with an initial probability θIk,i, indicating the probability that
a burst starts with ei; each state ok,i can transit to all other states ok,j (including to
the state ok,i itself) with certain transition probability θTk,i,j; there is a special ending
state ok,0 for which all transition probabilities are zero. In the mixture model, each
chain ck is associated with a prior probability πk, which satisfies ∑Kk=1 πk = 1.
Let π = {πk}Kk=1, θIk = {θIk,i}Mi=1, and θTk = {θTk,i,j}Mi=1,j=0; the parameter space of
this mixture model is represented as θ = (π,{θIk, θTk }Kk=1). Given an event burst s =
(es1, es2, . . . , esL), the likelihood that chain ck generates s is given by:











Meanwhile, the posterior probability that ck generated s can be calculated as:
prob(ck∣s, θ) = πk ⋅ like(s∣ck, θ)∑Kk′=1 πk′ ⋅ like(s∣ck′ , θ)
The optimal setting of the parameters θ and the number of chains K remain to be
determined. In the following, we first discuss how to determine θ that maximizes the




where prob(θ) is a prior distribution over θ and like(B∣θ) represents the likelihood of
observing the whole set of event bursts B under this model: ∏s∈B (∑Kk=1 πk ⋅ like(s∣ck, θ)).
Unfortunately, no closed-form solutions exist for such maxima. Here, as sketched in
Algorithm 1, an expectation maximization (EM) [36] algorithm can be used to iter-
atively search for the maxima (in the pseudo code below, Q denotes the objective
function over the posterior distribution using current parameter estimation θold).
Now, we discuss how to set K. Essentially, by controlling the number of chains,
K determines the complexity of the mixture model. Here, we apply the Akaike’s
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Algorithm 1: Modeling event bursts
Input: event bursts B, number of chains K
Output: parameter setting θ∗
initialize θold;1
while not converged yet do2
compute Q(θ, θold) = ∑s∈B∑Kk=1 prob(ck∣s, θold) log[πk ⋅ like(s∣ck, θ)] + log(θ) ;3
compute θnew = argmaxθQ(θ, θold);4
set θold = θnew;5
return θ∗ = θnew;6
information criterion [8, 100] to select K. Specifically, the information criterion of
the mixture model is given by: aic(θ) = 2∣θ∣ - 2 log[like(B∣θ)], where ∣θ∣ is the number
of parameters to be estimated. The setting of K leading to a minimum aic(θ) is
considered as optimal.
2.3.3 Incorporation of Topological Dependency
A novel feature that significantly distinguishes Meta from existing solutions lies in
its incorporation of network topology information in learning and matching faults.
In this chapter, we consider the following set of relationships, {selfing, neighboring,
containing/contained, down/up-streaming, tunneling}, with brief descriptions listed
in Table 1. Note that the relationships down/up-streaming are referred from the
perspective of the sink, i.e., u is at v’s down-stream side if the route from the sink
to u contains v. In the following, we use R = {SE,NE,CN/CD,DS/US,TN} to
denote this set of topological relationships. Each relationship r ∈ R is associated
with an inverse counterpart r̄, e.g., ‘down-streaming’ to ‘up-streaming’, ‘contained’
to ‘containing’, etc. Given a node v, we refer to the set of network nodes with a
specific relationship r to v as a topo-set, denoted by Nr(v).
Intuitively, we construct our fault signature based on the following two fundamen-
tal observations. (1) Typically, when a fault occurs at a root-cause node u, symptom
events may be triggered in affected nodes that are topologically related to u. (2)
The triggered event burst at an affected node v differs depending on the topological
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Table 1: Topological relationships and descriptions.
relationship description
selfing u and itself
neighboring u and v are directly connected
containing/contained
u/v contains v/u as a sub-component
(e.g., a router and its interfaces)
down/up-streaming
u is at v’s down/up-stream side
(route from sink to u/v contains v/u)
tunneling
u is on a tunnel (a special type of
network connection) with v as one end
relationship between u and v. For example, in an Internet Protocol (IP) network if
v is a direct neighbor of u (neighboring), the failure of u may lead to the event burst
of (“OSPF Interface Down”, “OSPF Neighbor Down”) at v; while if u is on a tunnel
with v as one end (tunneling), the failure of u may cause the event burst of (“Failed
Connection Attempt”, “Open Tunnel Failure”) at v. Therefore,
Definition 8 (Fault Signature). For a specific type of fault f , we define its sig-
nature sig(f) as a series of tuples ⟨c, r,prob(c∣f, r)⟩, where c ∈ MC, r ∈ R, and
prob(c∣f, r) is the probability of observing an event burst with temporal pattern c at
an affected node that has the topological relationship r with the root-cause node where
the fault f occurs.
To learn fault signatures from historical data, we make the following assumptions:
each event burst s ∈ B (observed at a node v) has been classified into a Markov chain
cv, and represented as a pair (v, cv); the number of fault types ∣F ∣ is known and
all faults are reflected in the historical data; the time-window size ω is set as the
maximum delay between observing the first and the last event bursts triggered by a
single fault.
Algorithm 2 sketches our solution. (i) The event bursts B are first divided into
subsets, each within a time-window less than ω, i.e., the event bursts in the same
subset are possibly triggered by a single fault. (ii) In every subset, for each involved
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node v, one identifies the topological relationship r∗v that leads to the minimum non-
empty intersection of all the topo-sets, i.e., the set of candidate causes. Note that
the principle of minimum explanation is applied here. (iii) All the tuples ⟨v, r∗v , cv⟩ in
a subset Bi are then used to compute a potential signature Si (a ∣R∣ × ∣MC∣ matrix).
(iv) A K-means (with K = ∣F ∣) clustering algorithm is applied to the set {Si}; the
centers of the clusters are regarded as the signatures for the ∣F ∣ faults.
Algorithm 2: Learning fault signature
Input: event bursts B, window-size ω, number of fault types ∣F ∣
Output: ∣F ∣ fault signatures
divide B into a set of subsets {Bi} according to ω;1
for each subset Bi do2
// apply the principle of minimum explanation
compute {r∗v}(v,cv)∈Bi = argminrv ∣⋂(v,cv)∈BiNrv(v)∣;3










apply K-means clustering to {Si} with K = ∣F ∣;6
set fault signatures as the cluster centers;7
2.4 Online Matching
The online matching component of Meta attempts to detect and localize faults as
follows: (1) the incoming events are aggregated into event bursts, and for each burst s
occurring at an affect node v, the probability prob(c∣s) is calculated for all c ∈MC; (2)
topologically-aware fault signatures are used to compute the probability prob(f ∣r̄, v ←
s) that the faulty node incurred the fault f and has a topological relationship r to the
affected node v. If this probability is greater than a certain threshold, then ⟨f, v, r̄⟩ is
termed an evidence that points to the set of all nodes with relationship r to v as the
set containing the faulty node; (3) all collected evidences within a short time window
are used to narrow down the set of nodes that include the faulty node.
We need four main data structures to accomplish the online matching: a buffer
for aggregating incoming events into event bursts and to compute probability of a
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temporal model generating an event burst; an index of fault signatures to compute
evidences; and an index of network topological dependency and a signature matching
tree to enable efficient fault localization. Due to the space constraint, we will only
describe the latter three data structures.
2.4.1 Indexing Fault Signature
To support efficient model-to-fault lookup, we devise an inverted fault signature struc-
ture Is which maintains the association between models and possible faults. Recall
that the signature of a fault f is a series of tuples of the form {⟨c, r,prob(c∣f, r)⟩}c∈MC,
where c and r represent a chain and a topological relationship, respectively, and
prob(c∣f, r) is the probability of observing c at a node with topological relationship
r to the faulty node. Corresponding to each signature, we create an entry in Is:
{⟨f, r̄,prob(f ∣r̄, c)⟩}c∈MC, where r̄ is the inverse relationship of r, and prob(f ∣r̄, c) is
the posterior probability that f occurs at a node with topological relationship r̄ to a
given node observing c. Its computation is given by:
prob(f ∣r̄, c) = prob(c∣f, r) ⋅ prob(f)∑f ′∈F prob(c∣f ′, r) ⋅ prob(f ′)
where the prior probability of the occurrence of f , prob(f), can be derived from the
overall statistics of network faults.
Now, the posterior probability that a fault f occurs at certain node with relation-
ship r to a node v which observes an event burst s can be calculated as follows:
prob(f ∣r̄, v ← s) = ∑
c∈MC
prob(f ∣r̄, c) ⋅ prob(c∣s)
For each f and v (with event burst s), we select the set of topological relationships
Rv that satisfies prob(f ∣r̄, v ← s) ≥ κ (r̄ ∈ Rv). We term such a triple ⟨f, v,Rv⟩ as an
evidence.
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2.4.2 Indexing Network Topology
While the incorporation of network topological information significantly boosts the
precision of fault diagnosis, such improvement incurs extra computation cost in terms
of 1) storing the topological information, and 2) correlating event bursts according
to their underlying topological relationships. Here, we introduce novel space-efficient
indexing structures for topological correlation.
As will be shown Section 2.4.3, a key operation heavily involved in the fault local-
ization is computing the intersection of two topo-sets, e.g., joining the down-streaming
neighbors of one node and the direct neighbors of another; therefore, for each index-
ing structure, we are particularly interested in analyzing its storage demand and the
cost of retrieving (constructing) a topo-set from it. Here, we assume network config-
urations to be static, and consider incremental maintenance of indices for evolving
networks as one direction for our further research. Due to space limitations, we focus
our discussion on building indices for up/down-streaming and tunneling relationships.
Up-Streaming/Down-Streaming
A näıve solution that stores the up/down-streaming nei-ghbors for each network en-
tity, results in O(1) retrieval cost and totally O(∣V∣2) storage cost. We construct
our indexing structure based on the following two observations: (1) the shortest path
routes from the sink to all the nodes form a spanning tree rooted at the sink, i.e.,
a tree cover of G [4]; (2) the diameter φ of a typical management domain (as ob-
served in four large enterprise networks) is about 3-7 hops. Therefore, in this setting,
the set of up-streaming neighbors (utmost φ) of a node can be directly cached. We
then traverse the routing tree in a level-order (breadth-first) assigning each node a
traversal-order number. The down-streaming neighbors of a given node u can be
summarized as φ intervals, {[li, ri]}φi=1, where li (ri) denotes the order number of its
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Figure 2: Index of up/down-streaming neighbors.
Clearly, this indexing structure requires O(∣φ ⋅ V∣) space; maintaining a mapping
(sorted on traversal-order number) that projects traversal-order numbers to node-
identifiers, this scheme achieves retrieval cost of O(φ), since the neighbors on the
same level can be retrieved in one consecutive chunk.
Tunneling
For tunneling relationship, we are interested in retrieving the set of nodes on tunnels
with a given node u as one end, or, reformulated as: given two nodes u and v, what
set of nodes are on the tunnel (if any) connecting u and v?
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the tunnels follow approximately
shortest paths (e.g., OSPF and IGP routing [68]); hence, the problem is cast as
indexing a set of shortest paths. Our solution is constructed atop the notion of hop
cover of a collection of paths [29].
Definition 9 (Hop/Hop Cover). Let G = (V,E) be a graph and P be the set of
shortest paths we intend to index. A hop is a tuple (p,u), where p is a shortest path
with u as one end. A collection of hops H is said to be a hop cover of P if for any
P ∈ P, there is a subset of H such that P is a concatenation of these hops.
We construct the collection of hops as follows: starting from an arbitrary path
P1 ∈ P, we incrementally add in paths P2, P3, . . . from P; the intersected segments
between Pi and previous ones P1, . . . , Pi−1 break paths into disjoint hops, or divide
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existing hops into smaller ones; we collect the set of hops after inserting all paths
of P as H. A moment of reflection shows that (1) two paths can have at most one
intersected segment and (2) the set of hops are invariant of the insertion order of
paths.
Within this setting, the space-time tradeoff is achieved by caching a subset of H
and leaving uncached hops to online computation; therefore, we are interested in se-
lecting the optimal subset H∗ ⊆ H that leads to the minimum overall cost as follows.
For a hop h, let len(h) be its length and sup(h) be the number of paths in P that con-
tain h as a component. For simplicity, we model storage cost costspace(h) = α ⋅ len(h)
and computation cost costtime(h) = β ⋅ len(h). Assuming that all the paths are queries
with equivalent frequency, the overall cost of caching a subset H′ of H can be modeled
as: cost(H′) = ∑h∈H′ costspace(h) + ∑h∈H∖H′ sup(h)⋅costtime(h); and the optimal sub-
set H∗ leads to the minimum overall cost: H∗ = argminH′ cost(H′). Clearly, in this
model, a hop h should be cached if and only if its storage cost exceeds its computation
cost with respect to all the paths, formally: costspace(h) > sup(h)⋅costtime(h).
2.4.3 Correlating Relevant Evidences
With the help of the network topology index, in each evidence ⟨f, v,Rv⟩, (v,Rv)
can be replaced with the corresponding topo-sets ⋃r∈Rv Nr(v) (NRv(v) for short).
Two evidences ⟨f,NRu(u)⟩ and ⟨f ′,NRv(v)⟩ are considered relevant if (1) f = f ′, (2)
NRu(u)∩NRv(v) ≠ ∅, and (3) they are within a time-window of size ω. This concept
can be generalized to multiple evidences.
While it is straightforward to check conditions (1) and (3), computing the intersec-
tion of NRu(u) and NRv(v) is expensive: even if both sets are stored in a hash-table,
the complexity is O(min{∣NRu(u)∣, ∣NRv(v)∣}). Moreover, following the näıve pair-
wise comparison paradigm, each incoming evidence is compared with all existing ones
to detect relevance, and thus scales poorly with the network event rate.
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We devise a novel structure, signature matching tree Ts, which enables efficient
correlation of relevant evidences. Our design follows the one-pass clustering philoso-
phy, [58, 150], which endows Ts with high throughput and scalability.
Basic Structures and Operations
Ts is a hierarchical structure, with the highest level containing ∣F ∣ buckets, each
corresponding to one fault f ∈ F . Within each bucket is a height-balanced tree T fs ,
into which evidences of the form ⟨f,NRv(v)⟩ are inserted. Each leaf of T fs corresponds
to a cluster of relevant evidences; each non-leaf represents the union of all the clusters
in its subtree.
For each leaf (cluster) C containing a set of evidences, we maintain the intersection
of their topo-sets, called its aggregation, ρ(C) = ⋂⟨f,NRv (v)⟩∈C NRv(v). For each non-
leaf (super cluster) SC, we maintain the union of the aggregations of the clusters in
its subtree, ρ(SC) = ⋃C∈SC ρ(C).
The signature matching tree supports two basic operations, insertion and deletion.
In an insertion operation, a newly coming evidence ⟨f,NRv(v)⟩ recursively descends
down T fs by testing NRv(v) ∩ ρ(SC) for each non-leaf SC encountered, until being
clustered into an appropriate leaf that can absorb it; if no such leaf exists, a new one
is created which solely contains this evidence; it then updates the aggregations of the
nodes on the path from the leaf to the root of T fs . Those evidences with timestamps
out of the current time-window are considered as expired. In a deletion operation,
expired evidences are removed from the tree, and the aggregations of the nodes on
the paths from the affected leaves to the root are updated in a bottom-up manner.
Optimizations
Two expensive operations involved in the signature matching tree are (1) testing
the intersection of the topo-sets of an evidence and the aggregation of a (non-)leaf,
and (2) updating the aggregations of the affected (non-)leaves when deleting expired
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evidences. Here, we introduce two-folded optimizations to ameliorate these two op-
erations.
Filtering-and-Refining
Instead of performing direct comparison of two sets, we follow a filtering-then-refining
paradigm: in the filtering phase, we perform fast check to determine if the intersection
is non-empty, which may contain false positive results, but no false negative ones; in
the refining phase, we make the real comparison. To this end, for each evidence
⟨f,NRv(v)⟩, we maintain its bloom filter encoding, bf[NRv(v)]; for each leaf C, we
maintain the bloom filter encoding of its aggregation, bf[ρ(C)]; while for each non-
leaf SC, a counting filter [43] encoding (to support efficient update) of its aggregation,
cf[ρ(SC)], is maintained. Therefore, the intersection of NRv(v) and ρ(SC) (or ρ(C))
can be easily pre-tested using bf[NRv(v)] ∩ cf[ρ(SC)] (or bf[NRv(v)] ∩ bf[ρ(C)]).
Slotted-Aggregations
To ameliorate the impact of frequent deletions of expired evidences over updating
the aggregations of (non-)leaves, we introduce the slotted-aggregates mechanism [7].
Assuming that the sliding window size is ω, a slot cache maintains the aggregations
in m slots, the ith slot corresponding to the evidences with timestamp falling in the
ith sub-window of size ω/m time units. Now, the deletion of expired evidence affects
at most one slot, and the aggregations in all remaining slots can be reused.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
This section presents an empirical evaluation of Meta by using it in the context of
communication networks. The experiments are specifically designed to center around
the following metrics: (1) the efficacy of the signature model in capturing real network-
faults, (2) the effectiveness of online matching in detecting and localizing network
faults, and (3) its space and time complexity. We start with describing the datasets
and the setup of the experiments.
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2.5.1 Experimental Setting
We used two datasets collected from real-life communication networks to evaluate
the learning and matching components of Meta. The first dataset is an archive of
SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) trap messages collected from a large
enterprise network (7 ASes, 32 IGP networks, 871 subnets, 1,268 VPN tunnels, 2,068
main nodes, 18,747 interfaces and 192,000 entities) over several days in 2007; this
dataset is used to extract fault signatures. Event attributes of interest to us are listed
in Table 2. The second dataset is a European backbone network consisting of 2,383
network nodes (spans 7 countries, 11 ASes and over 100,000 entities). We generate
a synthetic event stream for this network (with tuneable failure rate) to quantify the
efficacy and scalability of the online matching component.
Table 2: Format of the network event data.
Attribute Description
IPaddress address where the agent resides
PeerIPaddress address of the master peer (if any)
Event-Count sequence number of the event
specific-trap enterprise specific snmp trap type
RawCaptureTimeStamp time-stamp of the trap message
A majority of the algorithms are implemented using Java. All the experiments
are conducted on a Linux workstation running 1.6GHz Pentium IV and 1G memory.
2.5.2 Experimental Results
Offline Learning Component
In this set of experiments, we studied the effectiveness of our methodology in all three
phases of the learning component of Meta: preparation of training data, modeling
of event bursts, and incorporation of topological information.
Preparing Training Data
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The first set of experiments studied the distribution of timestamp intervals, frequency,
and periodicity of event sets to demonstrate the effectiveness of interval filter, support
filter, and periodicity filter, respectively.








































Figure 3: Length of event bursts with respect to the maximum timestamp interval.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of interval size δ on the average length of event
bursts. It is clear that the average length increases significantly as the interval grows,
e.g., 50 events for δ = 8ms; meanwhile, a wider interval also enlarges the length
deviation of the event bursts. We are interested in an optimal setting of δ that filters
spurious event bursts. In our implementation, we used the following heuristic: in the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of intervals, find the interval value with the
largest derivate, i.e., the one resulting in the most significant change of the number
of event bursts. For example, in the CDF plotted in Figure 3, we selected δ = 1ms
as the optimal setting.
The normalized histogram of event sets with respect to support (in log scale) is
depicted in Figure 4, which approximately follows a power law distribution. It is
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Figure 4: Distribution of frequencies of event sets.
observe that more than 60% event sets have fairly low support, e.g., below 5, which,
as we confirmed by examining the definition of traps, are mainly caused by infrequent
network operations, e.g., the event set {3} represents “the cisco NetReg server has
started on the host from which this notification is sent”, or certain non-recurrent
faults, which are of modest interest for our purposes of leveraging existing diagnosis
efforts. Meanwhile, the event sets with significantly higher support than others are
typically due to regular network operations, e.g., the event set {102, 104} which
appears with support 348 indicates “data from the remote side is available for the
TDM channel”.












Figure 5: Normalized histogram of the periodicity of event sets.
The distribution of the periodicity of event sets is illustrated in Figure 5. Observe
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Figure 6: Occurrences of two sample event sets.
that most of the event sets demonstrate low deviation of occurrence intervals, i.e., they
are resulted from normal network operations. We randomly selected two event sets
{28, 102, 104, 130} and {79, 124} with periodicity 0.43, and 1.09 (lower periodicity⇒
more regular), respectively, and examined their implications. Figure 6 compares their
occurrences. From the descriptions of the traps as shown in Table 3, it is confirmed
that the event set {79, 124} indicates potential network faults, while the event set
{28, 102, 104, 130} is caused by regular network operations, e.g., link mode sniffing.
Modeling of Event Bursts
We verified the Markovian assumption on event bursts using the event burst length
histogram metric. More specifically, by running Monte Carlo simulation, we derived
the histogram of event burst length from the learned Markov model, and compared
it against that extracted from the real data.
The upper plot of Figure 7 illustrates the comparison of these two histograms
(normalization is applied). It is clear that the distribution of the model-generated
data fits that of the underlying data fairly tightly. Furthermore, we analyzed the dis-
tribution of individual events for real data and model generated data, respectively. As
shown in the lower plot of Figure 7, these two distributions demonstrate strong con-
sistency, which empirically proves that our learning model can capture the essential
features of the real data.
Incorporation of Topological Dependency
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Figure 7: Histograms of lengths of event bursts and individual events in real event
data and model generated data.
Now, we proceed to verifying the imperative need of incorporating topologically cor-
related nodes in detecting and localizing network faults. Figure 8 illustrates the
fractions of fault-triggered events reported at network nodes in different categories:
the fault node itself (SE), and nodes with specific relationships (neighboring - NE,
down-streaming - DS, up-streaming - US, and tunneling - TN) to the fault one using
event data collected from real enterprise networks. Note that Enterprise 3 is a small-
scale network where no VPN tunnels are deployed. Observe that the fault node itself
reports only 18-29% of overall events, while those topologically correlated nodes take
up to an overwhelming 71-82%.
Online Matching Component
In evaluating the online matching component of Meta, we first generate synthetic
event data for a European backbone network using the features of the real-life event
data extracted in the previous phase, including 1) the temporal models for generating
event bursts as symptoms of network faults, 2) the topological correlations for select-
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Figure 8: Fractions of fault-triggered events reported at fault nodes (SE) and nodes
with specific relationships to fault ones (NE, DS, US, TN) in four real enterprise
networks. The network sizes are listed as follows. Enterprise 1: 2514 nodes, Enterprise
2: 3200 nodes, Enterprise 3: 141 nodes, Enterprise 4: 12,444 nodes.
Table 4: Setting of parameters for synthesizing network event data.
Parameter Value
number of fault types 50
number of event types 42
significant chains 16
fault occurrence rate 0.02 ∼ 0.1
candidate size 3 ∼ 7
individual events (type), and 4) the frequencies and periodicities of event sets. By
controlling failure rates, we simulate network environments under both well-regulated
and unstable conditions. The setting of major parameters is listed in Table 4.
Accuracy of Fault Diagnosis
This set of experiments evaluated the effectiveness of the Meta framework in de-
tecting potential network faults by analyzing streaming network event data. We aim
at achieving fault detection and localization in a unified framework; therefore, we
consider that a fault is successfully diagnosed only if the fault type is correctly deter-
mined and the fault node is localized with sufficient accuracy (in our implementation,
we require that for every detected fault, the system suggest no more than D poten-
tial fault nodes (candidate size)). We refer to a successfully diagnosed fault as a hit.
Viewing fault diagnosis as an information retrieval task, we measure the exactness
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Moreover, we measured the impact of topological information on fault diagnosis.
We construct a baseline approach that is agnostic to topology information as follows:
it has access to complete knowledge associating network faults with the observed
symptoms, but has no possession of topological information. Given a symptom, the
baseline approach attempts to identify the minimum set of faults that may trigger
these symptoms; we regard it as a hit if the fault type suggested by the baseline
approach is correct.
We measured the performance of Meta and the baseline approach under varying
configuration of fault occurrence rate and topological correlations. The fault oc-
currence rate indicates the frequency of network faults (resulting in abnormal event
bursts) relative to regular network operations (leading to normal event bursts); the
configuration of topological correlation refers to the fractions of fault-triggered events
observed at nodes with various topological relationships to the faulty node, e.g., SE,
NE, DS, US, etc. Here, we adopt four different configurations as observed in real
enterprise networks (shown in Figure 8).
Figure 9 compares the accuracy of fault diagnosis by Meta and the baseline ap-
proach. We make the following observations: (1) Meta achieves steady precision
and recall scores under all the four configurations; the accuracy of the baseline ap-
proach is strongly correlated with the fraction of SE (fault node itself) events − even
under configuration 3 (29% SE events), its recall (0.6) is substantially lower that of
Meta (0.85). (2) The recall of Meta increases significantly as we increase D, for
example, under configuration 2, the recall score of Meta grows from 0.65 to 0.84 as
the candidate size D varies from 3 to 7. (3) The precision of Meta also increases
as the candidate size D grows, which at the first glance may seem to contradict the
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Figure 9: Accuracy of fault diagnosis by Meta (with candidate size D = 3, 5, and
7, respectively) and baseline approach with respect to fault occurrence rate and con-
figuration of topological correlations.
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META w/ opt 1
META w/ opt 1, 2
Figure 10: Average processing time (ns) per event with respect to fault occurrence
rate, where opt1 and opt2 refer to the filtering-then-refining and the slotted aggrega-
tion strategies, respectively.
inverse relationship between precision and recall typically observed in information re-
trieval systems; however, this can be explained by the fact that a larger D essentially
provides more leeway in identifying the fault node.
Efficiency of Execution
This set of experiments are designed to measure the scalability of the fault diagnosis in
Meta. Specifically, we evaluate the average processing time of each incoming event,
under varying condition of fault occurrence rate, with and without the multi-folded
optimizations introduced in Section 2.4.3. Here, the fault occurrence rate refers to
the fraction of event bursts caused by network faults.
Figure 10 shows the average processing time per event by three variants of Meta
(the basic version, the one with the filtering-then-refining strategy, and the one with
both optimization strategies) as the fault occurrence rate varies. We can obtain the
following observations. (i) The processing cost of the basic Meta grows approxi-
mately linearly with the fault rate. (ii) The multi-folded optimizations significantly
boost system performance, and the processing cost of both optimized variants of
Meta manifest sub-linear growth rate with respect to the fault rate. (iii) The cost
saving achieved by the optimization strategies demonstrates an increasing trend as
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the fault occurrence rate grows, which can be explained by the fact that a higher
fault rate results in a greater number of evidences being fed to the diagnosis engine,
thus resulting in superior performance gains.
2.6 Related Work
For anomaly detection, a plethora of work has been done that uses analysis of low-
level metric data, e.g., traffic or routing data, for anomaly detection. For example,
in [45], BGP update messages are clustered along three dimensions, time, prefix, and
views to detect network disruptions; in [82, 64], multivariate analysis is applied to
model normal network traffic and detect deviations; in [148], a wavelet-based cluster-
ing algorithm is used to detect abnormal routing behavior. Nevertheless, targeting
static analysis of low level metric data, these techniques are not suitable for real-time
analysis of high-level event stream. Meanwhile, anomaly detection using historical
data has also been an important topic for computing systems in general [30, 146],
whose application to networked systems, however, is not clear.
Another line of research is specifically dedicated to fault localization from a set
of observations or symptoms (detailed survey in [116]). The existing solutions can
be categorized roughly as expert-system techniques and graph-theoretic techniques.
The first category of approaches attempt to imitate the knowledge of domain experts,
with examples including rule-based systems, e.g., [140], cased-based systems, e.g.,
[88], and model-based systems, e.g., [105]. The graph-theoretic techniques rely on
a graphical model of the system, which describes the propagation for each specific
fault, with examples including dependency graph [74], codebook technique [145], and
belief-network [110]. These techniques suffer from two main drawbacks: first, they
require accurate dependency information amongst network entities, which is usually
not available for large scale enterprise networks; second, fault inference typically
involves complicated computation and scales poorly with network size and complexity.
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In contrast, our approach only requires elementary topological information and fault
signatures to support matching over high-volume event data.
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CHAPTER III
MUSI: NETWORK-AWARE CAUSALITY TRACKING
3.1 Introduction
Cascading behavior, diffusion and propagation of ideas, innovations, and information
are fundamental processes taking place in socially networked systems [53, 75]. It is
well recognized that social influence is one complex and subtle force that governs
these dynamics [9, 114]: the actions of a user may induce his/her friends to behave
in a similar way via their social connections. Interpreting a user’s behavior in the
context of his/her friends and correlating the actions of socially connected users is
thus of tremendous interests from both analysis and design perspectives.
Recently social influence analysis has attracted intensive research interests, with
examples such as differentiating the effects of social correlation (e.g., homophily and
confounding) and social influence on users’ activities [9], verifying the existence of
correlation between personal behavior and social connection [114], estimating the
influence strength of social ties [141], and inferring influence channels for implicit
networks [55]. Most of these studies, however, focus on general, macro-level influence
phenomena, irrespective of concrete users, actions or time-stamps.
Equally important is understanding and modeling social influence at mi-
croscopic scale (i.e., at the level of individual users, actions, and time-stamps),
which may carry significant benefits for a range of applications, such as
• Information filtering. With the advance of Web 2.0 technologies and social me-
dia applications, the amount of information received by normal users can easily
go beyond their processing capacities, e.g., an average Twitter1 user receives
1http://twitter.com
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over 93 tweets per day. Understanding at individual level how the browsing
behaviors of users sharing common interests affect each other may facilitate
personalized recommendation to effectively filter uninteresting information and
deliver high-quality information in time.
• Mobile phone-call service. Recent studies on human mobility and phone call
patterns [59, 115] have revealed strong correlation between geographical and
social distance of individuals, e.g., users tend to call friends (one type of social
influence) within geographically close areas. Modeling such influence at the
level of individual users and locations offers valuable insight into characterizing
user mobility and creating caller-callee profiles, which may significantly improve
the efficiency of locating mobile users and devices (i.e., paging [147] operation).
• Targeted advertising. Through “word of mouth” and product comparison, a
user’s purchase of a product may trigger his/her friend to buy a functionally
similar product, but with more personally favorable or ongoing fashion features.
Clearly, accounting for the influence at the scale of particular users and time-
stamps is crucial for developing successful advertisement strategy.
Not surprisingly, modeling microscopic social influence is in general a difficult
task, featuring a series of unique challenges, including (i) the model should be able to
account for the distinct characteristics of individual users, actions, and time-stamps,
as well as their complex interconnections; (ii) it should support application-specific,
micro-level influence mechanisms, e.g., how one action induces another concretely;
(iii) it should provide scalable inference tools that enable to track the influence of
occurred actions and predict the occurrence of new actions. None of these challenges
are trivial. Consider challenge (iii) for example: given that we target the level of
individual users and actions, we need to consider all the potential actions by all the


























Figure 11: Social and object networks.
for large user or action space.
This work, to the best of our knowledge, represents the first attempt to model
microscopic social influence at the granularity of individual users, actions, and time-
stamps.
For the first challenge, we define a fairly general influence model that replicates
all individual users and actions. We model actions as dynamic interactions between
social network (formed by individual users) and object network (formed by targets of
actions, e.g., blogs). An example is shown in Figure 11. In contrast of alternative
models such as bipartite or heterogenous network [120], our model exhibits features
desirable for our purpose: it fully captures individual users and actions as well as
their interconnections; also, actions are represented as temporary inter-network con-
nections, which reflect their dynamic nature.
For the second challenge, we propose a novel heat field over product network
(HFPN) model to encode the concrete influence mechanism. Loosely speaking, in
the product [67] of social and object networks, each node represents one potential
action, while each edge represents the “influence channels” between two actions. The
influence is modeled as “heat” that flows through such channels. The flexibility of
this model lies in the potentially unlimited number of ways to specify the influence
channels, and the influence flow rates.
For the third challenge, we develop a complete library of inference operations
38
Figure 12: FEA (note the denser mesh around objects of interest).
that capacitate to continuously track the state of heat field in HFPN model, update
the state once new actions are observed, and predict where and when new actions
may occur. We carefully address the computational challenges for inference over
HFPN model by drawing analogies to Finite Element Analysis (FEA). FEA has been
successfully applied to numerically solve propagation models in physical systems,
e.g., weather simulation, car frontal crash, etc. Its key idea is to vary the precision of
numerical methods over the physical domain (see example in Figure 12). In this work,
we present solutions that dynamically identify sub-domains of interest (over the entire
space of potential actions), as guided by the prediction operation, and dynamically
vary the precision of influence estimation around sub-domains of interest.
We entitle this complete framework of tracking, updating and predicting social
influence as µSI. To evaluate its efficacy, we conduct an empirical evaluation of µSI
in two seemingly disparate applications using real-life datasets. In the context of so-
cial tagging service (e.g., Del.icio.us2), we perform resource recommendation based on
the prediction of µSI, which demonstrates significant improvement over conventional
solutions (e.g., collaborative filtering) in terms of accuracy and freshness of recom-
mendation. In the context of mobile phone call service, we apply µSI to improve
the efficiency of paging operation by narrowing down the number of potential cells
associated with call recipients. It is shown that µSI enhances the state-of-the-art
callee profile-based approach [147] by reducing 25% of signaling traffic.
2http://delicious.com/
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
fundamental concepts and building blocks of µSI; a library of inference operations
are presented in Section 3.3, in which we also formalize the complete framework of
µSI; Section 3.4 details scalable implementation of µSI, followed by its empirical
evaluation in Section 3.5; Section 3.6 surveys relevant literature.
3.2 Fundamentals
In this section we present the construction of the cornerstones of µSI. We start with
introducing the fundamental concepts used throughout the paper.
3.2.1 Preliminaries
We consider two types of entities. For simplicity of presentation, we use “users” (sub-
jects of actions, e.g., Internet users) and “objects” (targets of actions, e.g., weblogs)
to refer to them. We first formalize the concept of interaction3.
Definition 10 (Interaction/Action). An interaction (or action) is a tempo-
rary (say, occur at time t) association between a user u and an object v, denoted by
φ(u, v, t).
Examples of interactions include Internet users reading weblogs, customers pur-
chasing products, and mobile users connecting to base stations. Next we introduce
the concept of network.
Definition 11 (Network). A network is modeled as a (directed) graph G = (V,E)
where V and E represent a set of entities and their interconnections, respectively.
Each e ∈ E may be further associated with weight w(e) specifying the strength of such
interconnection.
The interconnections in social and object networks however may convey signifi-
cantly different meanings. In social network, an interconnection between two users
3Without ambiguity, in following we use the terms “interaction” and “action” interchangeably.
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indicates their social tie, which is the channel of social influence; while in object
network, an interconnection between two objects indicates their proximity in certain
sense, e.g., semantic similarity for two weblogs (as reflected in their reference to each
other), geographical closeness for two cellular towers. Interestingly, such proximity
may also become the channel via which one interaction influences another. For ex-
ample, after reading one weblog, a user may further read another relevant one by
following their reference.
We are interested in understanding and modeling the influence of interaction
φ(u, v, t) on triggering4 another (potential) interaction φ(u′, v′, t′) (t < t′) as trans-
ferred via the social and object networks.
3.2.2 Building Blocks
To model the influence of occurred interaction {φ} on triggering (potential) interac-
tions {φ′}, we essentially need to describe (i) how the influence of {φ} is passed to
{φ′}, (ii) how much influence of {φ} is exerted over {φ′}, and (iii) how the accumu-
lated influence at {φ′} triggers their occurrence.
Block 1: Product Network Model
The structures of both social and object networks constrain the locality of the influ-
ence between interactions, i.e., interaction φ = (u, v, t) tends to affect “neighboring”
users of u or objects of v.
Example 1. In Figure 11, assume G0 as an online social network and G1 as a blo-
gosphere. After reading weblog v0, u0 may further read v1 if interested in the topic
covered by v0. Meanwhile, knowing that u0 reads v0, u1 may also be interested in
reading it.
However, as we have revealed in Section 3.1, the concrete “influence channels”
4Strictly speaking, the influence of φ over φ′ can also be negative, i.e., suppressing its occurrence,
which can be typically modeled using signed edges [87].
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Figure 13: Examples of product networks.
can be highly application-specific; the influence may spread over a single network or
over both networks simultaneously, or may feature fairly different spread speed within
two networks. Instead of attempting for a one-size-fit-all model, we enable a class of
influence channel instantiations based on the concept of product network.
Definition 12 (Product Network). For two networks G0 = (V0,E0) and G1 =
(V1,E1), their product network is defined as a graph G× = (V×,E×) such that node
φ = (u, v) ∈ V× if u ∈ V0, v ∈ V1, while the existence of edge φi − φj ((ui, vi) − (uj, vj))
can be specified by any logical statements in terms of ui − uj, vi − vj, ui = uj, and
vi = vj, with examples including
• Cartesian product (G◻), if (ui = uj and vi−vj ∈ E1) or (ui−uj ∈ E0 and vi = vj);
• Tensor product (G⊗), if ui − uj ∈ E0 and vi − vj ∈ E1;
• Lexicographical product (G○), if ui − uj ∈ E0 or (u0 = u1 and vi − vj ∈ E1);
• Normal product (G⊠), if (ui = uj and vi − vj ∈ E1) or (ui − uj ∈ E0 and vi = vj)
or (ui − uj ∈ E0 and vi − vj ∈ E1.
In the product of two networks G0 and G1, each node φ = (u, v) essentially cor-
responds to a (potential) interaction between u ∈ G0 and v ∈ G1, while each edge
specifies an influence channel between two interactions. The flexibility of the spec-
ification of edges allows application-dependent instantiation, as shown in the next
example.
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Example 2. Figure 13 shows a subset of possible product networks corresponding
to the two sub-networks {u0, u1} ⊂ G0 and {v0, v1, v2} ⊂ G1 in Figure 11. In par-
ticular, the lexicographical product emphasizes the propagation of influence within
the first network G0, and allows interaction φ = (u, v) to affect all the interactions
“neighboring” to u in G0.
The next question is how to determine the weight wij of edge φi −φj ∈ E×. As we
will show shortly, the weight wij essentially specifies the influence spread rate from φi
to φj. In general it can be an arbitrary function of the attributes of all involved nodes
{ui, uj , vi, vj} and edges {ui − uj, vi − vj}. To make our model concise, in this paper
we set wij based on the weight w0ij and w
1
ij of corresponding edges ui − uj and vi − vj
(or nodes) in G0 and G1. We use tensor product and normal product as examples to
show this.
For tensor product network G⊗, a natural way of doing so is to set wij = w0ijw
1
ij;
intuitively, we assume that the influence spread rate between two neighboring inter-
actions φi = (ui, vi) and φj = (uj, vj) is proportional to the similarity of ui and uj, and
that between vi and vj . In the matrix form, the weight matrix W =W0 ⊗W1, where
⊗ is the tensor operator. While for product networks that allow “stationary walk”
in either one of the networks (e.g., in Cartesian product G◻, ui and uj or vi and vj
can be equivalent), we need to determine the weight of self-loop, e.g., ui − ui. If no
further information is available, we may use a non-informative setting, say “1”. In
the matrix form, the weight matrix is specified as W =W0 ⊗ I + I ⊗W1 where I is an
identify matrix. If networks G0 and G1 allow self-loops, one can replace the diagonal
elements of I with the weight of corresponding self-loops.
Block 2: Heat Field with Update Model
Heat diffusion [79] is a physical phenomenon wherein heat flows from position with
high temperature to that with low temperature. We observe that the heat diffusion
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model is a natural way to describe the spread of influence of occurred interactions to
other (potential) interactions. Using this model, occurred interactions can be con-
sidered as heat sources featuring high temperature, and their influence is modeled as
heat that flows to other (potential) interactions (featuring low temperature) through
the underlying geometric structure of product network; the accumulated heat at a
potential interaction indicate its tendency to happen; different initial heat sources
(occurred interactions) or geometric structures (influence channels) determine differ-
ent heat distributions. Heat kernel is used to quantify the amount of heat one point
receives from another in a medium.
Over a known geometric manifold, the heat flows throughout a manifold with
initial condition can be described by the second order differential equation: ∂f(x,t)
∂t
−
∆f(x, t) = 0, where f(x, t) is the heat at position x at time t, and ∆f is the Laplace-
Beltrami operator on a function f . The heat diffusion over a network can be con-
sidered as an approximation to the diffusion on the manifold. While the discussion
can be readily generalized to the case of directed or probabilistic networks, for ease
of presentation, here we consider the product network as an undirected graph.
Let fi(t) denote the heat at node5 φi at time t. During a tiny time period [t, t+∆t],
we consider two types of heat movement.
• The heat node φi receives from or transfers to its neighbor φj through edge (in-
fluence channel) φi −φj, T (i, j, t,∆t) over a period ∆t. Intuitively, T (i, j, t,∆t)
should be proportional to the heat difference (fj(t) − fi(t)), the elapsed time
∆t, and the weight wij of edge φi −φj (which specifies the influence spread rate
over φi − φj).
• The heat at φi diffuses to the surrounding media outside the network, D(i, t,∆t),
which captures the intuition that the influence tends to decay with time, even
5In the context of product network, we consider the terms “node” and “interaction”
interchangeable.
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without being transferred to other interactions. We have the assumption that
D(i, t,∆t) should be proportional to the heat fi(t) and elapsed time ∆t.
Combing the two components above, we can formulate the heat change at a node
φi at time t as follows:
fi(t +∆t) − fi(t) = ∑
φi−φj∈E×
αwij[fj(t) − fi(t)]∆t − βfi(t)∆t
where α and β denote the diffusion rate inside and outside the network, respectively.
Expressed in a matrix form, the equation above is formulated as:
f(t +∆t) − f(t) = [α(W −D) − βI]f(t)∆t (1)
where W is the weight matrix of the product network (which is symmetric due
to the undirectionality of the network), the diagonal matrix D is defined as Dii =
∑φi−φj∈E×Wij , and I represents an identify matrix. Let H =W −D. In the limit that
∆t → 0, we have df(t)dt = (αH − βI)f(t), which has the closed-form solution as:
f(t) = et(αH−βI)f(0)
Here, the matrix exponential eM of a matrix M is defined as eM = I +M +M2/2! +
M3/3! + . . .. We name the heat distribution over the network as a heat field (HF).
It is noticed that this is a time-invariant system, i.e., for f(t1) = f(t2), we have
f(t1 + ∆t) = f(t2 + ∆t). Therefore, in a sequel, this system can be incrementally
computed, i.e., for any given t1, t2 > 0, we have f(t1 + t2) = et2(αH−βI)f(t1). Based on
this nice property, we can readily incorporate the mechanism of update in our model:
Definition 13 (Heat Diffusion with Update). Under initial configuration f(0),
the heat field f(⋅) evolves over time. An update at time t interrupts the heat field f(t)
and replaces it with a (possibly arbitrary) configuration f∗, i.e., starting from t, the
system evolves with f∗ as the initial condition.
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We entitle the combination of product network and heat diffusion with update
models as heat field over product network (HFPN). Using HFPN, we can continu-
ously track the heat distribution over the product network; for newly occurred inter-
actions, we consider them as new heat sources, and update the heat field accordingly.
In general the initial heat should be set according to the influence capacity of the
corresponding user or object (e.g., users who have more friends tend to have more
capacity). In this paper, without loss of generality, we assume that each new heat
source is initiated with one unit of heat.
Block 3: Invocation Model
Interactions observed at time t function as new sources that inject influence into
the product network and potentially trigger some other interactions at a future time
(t +∆t). In this model, the accumulated influence at a node φi ∈ G× at given time
(t+∆t) indicates the potential that the corresponding interaction occurs at (t+∆t).
Yet, we need an invocation model that describes how the accumulated influence at
φi actually triggers its occurrence.
Definition 14 (Invocation Model). The heat at a node φi indicates the potential
of the corresponding interaction to be activated. We assume that with heat as fi(t),
φi is activated with probability g(fi(t)− λ), where λ is a threshold. The function g(⋅)
has the property that g(x) = 0 if x ≤ 0, and is non-decreasing as x increases.
One example instantiation of g(⋅) could be g(x) = 1−e−γx1x>0 , where 1(⋅) represents
an indicator function, and γ is a parameter controlling the increasing rate. The
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Figure 14: Operations of µSI.
3.3 Tracking, Updating, Predicting
Atop the heat field over product network and invocation models, we are now ready to
construct the complete framework of µSI, which enables to track, update and predict
interactions between social and object networks G0 and G1.
3.3.1 A Complete Framework
Starting with a heat field of the product network G× of G0 and G1 at time 0, f(0) = 0,
µSI capacitates us to perform the following three operations:
• Track. Given the estimation of heat field f(told) at the time told when the latest
interaction is observed, we estimate the current heat field f(tnow);
• Update. For an interaction φ that is observed at the current time tnow, we
update the estimation of heat field f(tnow) accordingly;
• Predict. Based on the estimation regarding current heat field f(tnow), we predict
the heat field state f̂(tnew)6 at a future time tnew.
The relationships between operations above are illustrated in Figure 14. Equipped
with the three operations, we are able to query the state of heat field at arbitrary
time-stamp7.
6We use f̂ and f to distinguish the estimates using predicting and tracking, respectively.
7Note that essentially we can also derive a “Backtrack” operation that takes current state f(tnow)
as input, and estimates the heat field ∆t ago: f̄(tnow −∆t).
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Next we discuss how to implement these operations using the HFPN model. The
implementation of Track and Update is fairly straightforward. Specifically, for track-
ing, given previous state f(told), the current heat field can be estimated as f(tnow) =
e(tnow−told)(αH−βI)f(told); for updating, given an observed interaction φi = (ui, vi, tnow),
we consider it as a new heat source, and update fi(tnow) = 1.
We now focus our discussion on the Predict operation. It essentially takes as in-
put the current state f(tnow), and attempts to estimate the state at a future time
tnew. The difficulty lies in taking account of those interactions that may occur
during the time interval (tnow, tnew]. These potential interactions (invocation) may
make the actual result significantly deviate from the invocation-agnostic prediction
e(tnew−tnow)(αH−βI)f(tnow).
3.3.2 More on Prediction
A näıve solution would be a Monte Carlo simulation scheme: one divides the time axis
into a sequence of high-resolution “time-ticks” of length δt: at the (i+1)-th time-tick,
estimate f(t+(i+1)δt) based on the simulation result of f(t+ iδt) (essentially a track-
ing operation); for an interaction φi with heat above λ, activate it with probability
according to g(fi(t + (i + 1)δt) − λ) in the invocation model (essentially a sampling
operation). While intuitive and faithful to the invocation mechanism, this scheme
suffers scalability issues especially when the network scale is large or the granularity
of time-tick is small, because it involves the tracking and sampling (possibly for all
potential interactions) operations at each time-tick. We consider this scheme as the
baseline solution in comparison.
We attempt to construct a scheme that provides flexible trade-off between the
number of tracking and sampling operations, and the quality of simulation results.
We start with defining the concept of activation window.
Definition 15 (Activation Window). For given threshold λ and interaction φi, a
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time interval [ts, te] is called an activation window of φi if (i) fi(t) > λ for t ∈ (ts, te)
and (ii) /∃ [t′s, t′e] ⊃ [ts, te] has such property. The peak value maxt fi(t) (t ∈ [ts, te])
is called the window height, and ts and te are the starting and ending bounds of the
window.
Clearly, according to the invocation model, inside each activation window, the
potential interaction obtains the opportunity to be activated. A model faithful to
the exact simulation should guarantee that such opportunities are fully respected.
We therefore strive for the following objective: each interaction is ensured with high
probability one activation opportunity during each of its windows, while the probability
is positively correlated with the height of the window. This is similar to Finite Element
Analysis in spirit.
Based on this approximation, we propose a “lazy-probing” scheme that allows to
skip state estimation during a “safe window” without denying the activation oppor-
tunity for qualified interactions. To do so, we first need to understand the maximum
length of such safe window. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that each oc-
curred interaction is initiated with one unit of heat, and the weights of all the edges
are uniformly set as one. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. At time t, for an interaction φi with current heat f (f < λ), degree d,
the ending bound te of its next activation window with height h must satisfy:
te − t ≥ 1
αd + β ln
αd − (αd + β)f(αd − (αd + β)h)(λ + 1 − h) (2)
Proof. Assume that the next appearing activation window has height h. We divide
the time interval [t, te] into two phases, charge and discharge. Let ∆tc and ∆td be
their length. In the charge phase, the heat of φ increases; after reaching the expected
height h, it enters the discharge phase, and the heat drops below λ. These concepts
are illustrated in Figure 15. We intend to find the lower bounds of ∆tc and ∆td.














































Figure 15: Charge and discharge phases of an activation window, and length of safe
window with respect to window height h (default setting: α = 0.2, β = 0.05, λ = 0.5,
f = 0.3, h = 0.8, d = 2).
First notice that the lower bound of ∆tc is achieved when all of neighboring
interactions have maximum possible heat “1”. In this case, the heat equation for
the charge phase can be written as dfidt = αd(1 − fi) − βfi, with initial condition





αd−(αd+β)h . Meanwhile, the lower bound of ∆td is achieved when φi
receives no heat, but diffuses its heat to neighboring nodes and the media. We have
the corresponding heat equation as dfidt = −(α + β)fi, with initial condition fi(0) = h
and end condition fi(∆td) = λ. Solving the equation gives us: ∆td ≥ 1αd+β ln 1λ+1−h .
Combining these two inequalities leads to Eq.(2). The overall behavior of (∆tc +∆d)
with respect to window height h is illustrated in the right plot of Figure 15, which
shows approximately linear correlation.
Based on Theorem 1, we introduce our lazy-probing prediction scheme, as sketched
in Algorithm 3. At each examined time-stamp t′, we attempt to activate each inter-
action φi with heat above threshold λ according to probability g(f̂i(t′)−λ) (line 5-7);
for each interaction with heat below λ, we estimate the maximum skippable interval
according to Eq.(2) (line 8-9); the minimum of all such skippable intervals is consid-
ered as the global skippable interval ∆t, and the state estimation is updated for time
(t′ +∆t) (line 10). This process repeats until t′ = tnew.
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In the scheme above, one key parameter is the expected height h of the activa-
tion window, which controls the heat intensity required to guarantee an activation
chance. Next we discuss how to select a proper h. We consider the two proba-
bilities, the activation probability, prob(c∣h) (c is binary variable, with “1” indicat-
ing the occurrence), and the initial distribution of h, prob(h) (which can be typ-
ically estimated using historical data). We are interested in the posterior proba-
bility prob(h∣c) ∝ prob(c∣h)prob(h); that is, given that an interaction is activated,
what is the probability that its window height is h. One may select the threshold
h∗ = argmaxh ∫ 1h prob(x∣c = 1)dx ∫ hλ prob(x) ln((αd − (αd + β)h)(λ + 1 − h))dx, where
the first term corresponds to the range of heights that are guaranteed an activation
chance, and the second term is proportional to the average skipped interval, d̄ rep-
resents the average incoming degree, and κ (κ > 0) is a parameter controlling the
trade-off.
Algorithm 3: Lazy-probing prediction.
Input: current time tnow, current state f(tnow), future time tnew, activation
threshold λ, activation window height h
Output: estimated future state f̂(tnew)
t′ ← tnow, f̂(t′)← f(tnow);1
while t′ < tnew do2
∆t ← tnew − t′;3
foreach φi ∈ V× do4
if f̂i(t′) ≥ λ then5
// sampling (activation trial)
if i is not activated then6
set f̂i(t′) = 1 with prob. g(f̂i(t′) − λ);7
else8







f̂(t′ +∆t)← e∆t(αH−βI) f̂(t′);10
t′ ← t′ +∆t;11
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3.4 Computational Implementation
In this section, we detail the computational implementation of µSI. As we have re-
vealed in Section 3.3, the operations of µSI are constructed atop the model of heat
field, with equation f(t +∆t) = e∆t(αH−βI)f(t) as its cornerstone. Directly evaluating
this model, however, features prohibitive computational complexity: (i) the strict
computation of matrix exponential involves an infinite sequence of matrix multipli-
cations; (ii) for two networks both of cardinality n, the matrix H (corresponding to
the product of the networks) is at the scale of n4; (iii) furthermore, the tracking and
predicting operations require to evaluate the equation for varying time interval ∆t
and initial condition f(t).
In what follows, we expose possible solutions that can simplify the computation by
(i) fully exploiting the structural properties of product network and (ii) intelligently
caching and reusing invariant intermediate results. We start our discussion with the
properties of matrix exponential.
3.4.1 Matrix Exponential
The exponential of matrix M , eM , is defined as an infinite sequence: eM = I +M +
M2/2!+M3/3!+ . . .. Clearly, this formation is not amenable to an efficient implemen-
tation. In general, we may resort to a discrete approximation: eM ≈ (I +M/N)N ,
where N is the number of iterations that controls the error ∣∣(I +M/N)N −eM ∣∣; while
for a set of special cases of M , closed-form solutions exist.
Property 2. If M is a diagonal matrix, with the i-th diagonal element as mi, eM is
also a diagonal matrix, with the i-th diagonal element as emi.
Property 3. If M is a nilpotent matrix (i.e., M q = 0 for some integer q), then eM is
a finite sequence: eM = I+M+M2/2!+. . .+M q−1/(q−1)!. In this case, the computation
of eM can be implemented in an incremental manner: starting from the q-th entry,
let X0 =
1
q!M , Xi+1 = (Xi + 1(q−i−1)!)M , Xq = (Xq−1 + I)M , and eM =Xq.
52
Property 4. If M = X + Y , and X and Y are commutable, i.e., XY = Y X, then
eM = eXeY .
Following we will identify the structural features of product network matrix, and
exploit the properties above to speed up the computation.
3.4.2 Heat Field Equation
Now we look at the concrete heat diffusion equation in our model. We target the
following equation, assuming that f(t) is given:
f(t +∆t) = e∆t(αH−βI)f(t)
where H = W −D, W denotes the weight matrix of product network G× = (V×,E×),
and D is a diagonal matrix with the i-th diagonal element as the sum of the i-th
row of W , i.e., Dii =∑φi−φj∈E×Wij. Due to the space constraint, more specifically, we
consider G× as an undirected graph. In this case, we have the equation as f(t+∆t) =
e∆tαW−∆t(αD+βI)f(t). Clearly, the two matrices ∆tαW and −∆t(αD + βI) are com-
mutable; the heat equation is therefore calculated as: f(t+∆t) = e−∆t(αD+βI)e∆tαW f(t).
While the computation of e−∆t(α+β) (which is diagonal) is straightforward based on
Property 2, we focus our discussion on the computation of e∆tαW f(t).
Recall that in our setting W corresponds to the product of two networks. Let
Wi (i = 0,1) represent the weight matrices of corresponding component networks.
Conceivably, the computational complexity of heat equation depends on the concrete
formation of W in terms of {Wi}. Recall the types of product network as defined
in Section 3.2.2, which can be categorized as two classes, namely, Kronecker product
and Kronecker sum. The Kronecker product of two matrices M0 (of size m-by-n)
and M1 (of size p-by-q) is a mp-by-nq block matrix M0 ⊗M1 with the i-th row,
j-th column block as [M0]ijM1. Meanwhile, the Kronecker sum of M0 and M1 is
defined as M0 ⊕M1 =M0 ⊗ I + I ⊗M1. Cartesian and Normal products belong to the
class of Kronecker sum, Tensor product belongs to the class of Kronecker product,
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while Lexicographical product belongs to the mixture of the two classes. Hence, we
use Cartesian and Tensor products as examples to show how we can simplify the
computation of heat diffusion equation.
For Cartesian product, the weight matrix W is defined as a Kronecker sum W =
W0 ⊗ I + I ⊗W1. The matrix exponential of Kronecker sum has the following nice
property.
Property 5. For matrices M0 and M1, the exponential of their Kronecker sum sat-
isfies eM0⊕M1 = eM0 ⊗ eM1.
We therefore have the following transformation:
e∆tαW = e∆tαW0 ⊗ e∆tαW1
Now, the challenge lies in computing the matrix-vector multiplication e∆tαW0⊗e∆tαW1f .
According to the definition of Kronecker product, directly computing it requires O(n4)
time for matrices ∣Mi∣ = n2 (i = 0,1). Let m = vec(M) denote the vectorization of
matrix M formed by stacking the columns of M into a single column vector m, and
M = dvec(m) be the inverse operation (here, we omit the dimension restriction on
M). We have the next property.
Property 6. For three (multiplication compatible) matrices M (0), M (1), and X, the
following vectorization property holds: (M0 ⊗M1)vec(X) = vec(M1XMT0 ).
Clearly, the matrix-vector multiplication can be computed in O(n3) time for ∣Mi∣ =
n2 (i = 0,1). Especially, when M0 and M1 are sparse (which is typically the case),
it can be more efficient: if there are O(n) non-significant entries in M0 and M1, the
computation takes only O(n2) time.
Summarizing the discussion above, for Cartesian product network, we have the
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following transformation of heat field equation:
f(t +∆t) = e∆t(αH−βI)f(t)
= e−∆t(αD+β)Ie∆tαW f(t)
= e−∆t(αD+βI)e∆tαW0 ⊗ e∆tαW1f(t)
= e−∆t(αD+βI)vec(e∆tαW1dvec(f(t))e∆tαWT0 )
Now let us consider the case of Tensor product. In this case, the weight matrix
W is given as a Kronecker product W =W0⊗W1. We introduce the Jordan canonical
form [52].
Property 7. Let PiJiP −1i be the non-trivial Jordan canonical form of matrix Wi
(i = 0,1). The exponential of Kronecker product of W0 and W1, eW0⊗W1, satisfies
eW0⊗W1 = (P0 ⊗P1)eJ0⊗J1(P −10 ⊗P −11 )
Here J0 and J1 are block diagonal matrices (say, with r and s blocks, respectively).
Let J
[j]










where λi,j is the j-th eigenvalue of Wi. The matrix J = J0⊗J1 is also a block diagonal







































where mi is the dimension of the i-th block of W0.
In general the Jordan form is sensitive to numerical rounding [52]; fortunately,
we can typically represent the elements of the matrices W0 and W1 using integers by
scaling the parameters α and β (more details in Section 3.5).
Note that each block J
[j]
1 is the sum of a diagonal and a nilpotent matrices; the
computation of its exponential is fairly straightforward, using Property 2, 3 and 4.
One therefore only needs to compute rs small-scale matrix exponentials. Also, it is





1 . Therefore, all the intermediate results, e.g., the matrix decompositions, are
reusable for different ∆t (details in Section 3.4.3).
The complete procedure of estimating f(t +∆t) is summarized in Algorithm 4.
We repeatedly apply Property 6 in computing matrix-vector multiplication (line 2,
4). The only exception is the matrix e∆tαJ0⊗J1 , which in general cannot be further
decomposed into Kronecker product. It is, however, a block diagonal matrix, which
implies that e∆tαJ0⊗J1f can be typically computed in O(n3) for ∣Wi∣ = n2 (i = 0,1).
The overall complexity is thus O(n3) (not including computing Jordan canonical
form, which is one-time cost).
Algorithm 4: Estimation of f(t +∆t) (Tensor product).
Input: previous state f(t), elapsed time ∆t, weight matrices W0,W1
Output: current state f(t +∆t)
// Jordan canonical form (reusable)
PiJiP
−1
i ←Wi (i = 0,1);1
// apply Property 6
f ← vec(P −11 dvec(f(t))P −1T0 );2
f ← e∆tαJ0⊗J1f ;3
// apply Property 6 again
f ← vec(P1dvec(f)P T0 );4
f(t +∆t) ← e−∆t(αD+βI)f ;5
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3.4.3 Optimization for Time Axis
It is noticed that in the heat field equation for given f(t), α and β, f(t + ∆t) is
essentially a function of ∆t.
Clearly, if the time dimension can be discretized into time-ticks δt, one can essen-
tially cache the intermediate results e∆t(αH−βI) for ∆t = δt, 2δt, . . ., and reuse them
in state estimation. In following we use κ(i) to denote the “kernel” eiδt(αH−βI). The
saving of computation, however, comes at the expense of storage: it is noted that
κ(⋅) is a matrix of size n4; storing κ(i) for i from 1 to m requires O(mn4) space. We
introduce two optimization strategies to strike a balance between computation and
storage costs.
Geometric Increment
Instead of storing κ(i) for all i’s from 1 to m, we may selectively cache a subset of
i’s, and leave the rest of κ(i)’s to online computation.
Recall that the formation of κ(⋅) is a matrix exponential, we have the following
“linearity” property: κ(i1 + i2) = κ(i1)κ(i2). Hence, we may store κ(i) in a geometric
manner, i.e., i = 20,21, . . . ,2log2m (assuming m is an exponential of 2). Clearly, within
this model, only O(logmn4) space is required (which will be further reduced in the
next step of optimization).
Now consider computing f(t + kδt) = κ(k)f(t) where k ∈ [1,m], which can be
essentially transformed as the multiplication of less than log2m matrices κ(⋅) and
vector f(t). More formally, we define an indicator function h(k, i) = 1k/2i−1%2=1 (integer
division/module); that is, it returns 1 if the i-th bit (in increasing order of magnitude)
of k is 1 or 0 otherwise. We have
f(t + kδt) = [log2m∏
i=1
((1 − h(k, i))I + h(k, i)κ(2i))] f(t)
It may seem at the first glance that the cost of computing the matrix multiplication
of κ(⋅) (of size n4) and vector may dwarf that of directly evaluating κ(k) (which
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involves matrix exponential). Next we introduce the second optimization strategy,
partial materialization. Instead of caching an entire matrix exponential, we may only
need to cache its core part, which, in conjunction of geometric increment, leads to a
both space and computation efficient scheme.
Partial Materialization
Following the discussion in Section 3.4.2, we exemplify our techniques with the cases
of Cartesian and Tensor product networks. For ease of exposition, we consider the
evaluation of f(t + kδt) and k = 2k1 + 2k2 + . . . + 2kj .
Recall that in Cartesian product, the heat field function is defined as f(t + kδt) =
e−kδt(αD+βI)ekδtαW0⊗ekδtαW1f(t). Clearly, the term e−kδt(αD+βI) is directly computable;
while the part ekδtαW0 ⊗ ekδtαW1 can be re-written as:












Instead of caching the entire matrix exponential in the heat diffusion equation,
we only cache the part {κ0(x)} and {κ1(x)} (x = 0, . . . , log2m − 1). First notice that
this scheme reduces the storage cost to O(n2 logm). Meanwhile, the computation
now consists of no more than (2 log2m + 2) (2 corresponds to the final matrix-vector
multiplication as indicated in Property 6) matrix multiplication, thus featuring com-
plexity of O(n2.376 logm) if the state-of-the-art matrix multiplication algorithms (e.g.,
Coppersmith-Winograd algorithm [31]) are applied, which improves significantly the
complexity of O(mn3) of using methods such as Padé approximant directly.
In the case of Tensor product, the same principle applies. It is noticed that the
major cost of computing f(t+kδt) is attributed to ekδtλiJ[j]1 for each Jordan block J [j]1 .
We may cache e2
xδtλiJ
[j]
1 ≜ π(i, j, x) (x = 0, . . . , log2m−1), and for k = 2k1+2k2+. . .+2kj ,
ekδtλiJ
[j]
1 can be efficiently evaluated using ∏ji=1 π(i, j, ki). The complexity analysis is
similar to the case of Cartesian product, which is omitted here.
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To achieve further space saving, instead of storing a set of entire matrices. We may
store a basis matrix M and the difference matrix M ′ ⊖M for rest M ′. Each matrix
M ′ can then be constructed based on the basis M and the difference M ′ ⊖M . This
scheme is especially effective when the difference between M and M ′ is in-significant,
which is indeed the case as shown in our experiments.
3.5 Application and Evaluation
Following we empirically evaluate the efficacy of µSI in two concrete applications,
namely, social tagging service and mobile phone call service, using real-life datasets
collected from these services. We start with introducing the datasets used in our
experiments.
3.5.1 Experimental Datasets
For the application of social tagging service, we used two datasets. The first dataset
is the social network corresponding to a set of IBM employees who participated in
the SmallBlue project [93]. The dataset comprises two snapshots of the network as
of January 2009 and July 2009, involving 41,702 and 43,041 individuals, respectively.
All links of the network are of uniform weight. The second dataset is an archive of
bookmarks tagged by the individuals appearing in the SmallBlue dataset, collected
by Dogear [39], a personal bookmark management application. The archive con-
tains 20,870 bookmark records, with respect to 7,819 urls. Since the urls are fully
anonymized, we solely use their associated tags define their semantic relationships
and to construct the url network. Let tag(r) denote the set of tags associated with
url r. Specifically, in our implementation, we define the weight wij of the link rirj
using their Jaccard similarity coefficient,
wij = wji =
∣tag(ri) ∩ tag(rj)∣∣tag(ri) ∪ tag(rj)∣
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Note that both social and object networks can be refined if extra information is
available, e.g., the link between urls can incorporate directionality information if
the reference relationship is known (e.g., one blog refers to another), while the link
between users can incorporate weight information if the strength of their social tie is
available [141].
For the application of mobile phone-call service, we use Reality Mining dataset [41]
in our experiments. It consists of the communication logs of 94 users over the period
from September 2004 to June 2005, with information including location logs (nearest
base stations), phone call logs, social relationships (friends or non-friends). We use
the cell transition information in location logs to infer the cell network (totally 3,138
cells), and use the friend and non-friend relationships to construct the social network.
In both networks, the links are of uniform weight. We extract the part of logs corre-
sponding to communications (voice, data, SMS) between the 94 users. The resulting
archive contains 3,984 communication records.
We implement our models in Matlab. All the experiments are conducted on a
workstation running Linux with 4G RAM and 2GHz Intel Core 2 Duo.
3.5.2 Case Study 1: Resource Recommendation in Social Tagging Service
Social tagging services (e.g., Del.icio.us8, CiteULike9, etc.) allow users to annotate
online resources (e.g., urls) with freely chosen keywords (tags), which provide mean-
ingful collaborative semantic data that could be exploited by recommender systems.
However, performing resource recommendation based on tagging data is a challenging
problem due to: First, it involves multi-type, complexly interrelated entities, namely,
users, tags and resources, the available tagging data in the form of user - tag - re-
source may only expose a fairly sparse set of views of the hidden semantic correlation




strong time sensitivity, e.g., most tags of a resource may be generated during a short
time period when the resource features an ongoing hot topic among users, while the
historical tagging records of a user may not reflect his/her current interest.
Existing solutions can be roughly categorized as two main classes. The first class
attempts to augment recommender systems by leveraging tagging data (e.g., [18, 35]).
They treat tags either as users or as items and then apply traditional item-based or
user-based collaborative filtering (CF) algorithms, in which the structural information
of tagging data is partially lost. The second class of solutions specifically exploit the
tagging information (e.g., [57, 112]). They typically assume bipartite graph structures
for the relationships between users and tags, and that between tags and resources,
and attempt to construct a low dimensional representation as an approximation to
this underlying semantic manifold. In both cases, the semantic-rich interconnections
between users (and that between resources) have not been fully exploited. Further,
these solutions are agnostic to the temporal sensitivity of users’ tagging behavior, and
rely on historical tagging records to infer users’ current interests.
With the help of the microscopic social influence model, we provide a dynamic,
social perspective of resource recommendation. We consider a tagging action as a
dynamic interaction between the social network and the resource network. We have
the following assumptions. First, the tagging behavior of a user regarding a resource
indicates his/her ongoing interest in the resource. Second, the influence of a tagging
action may spread over both social and resource networks: (i) socially close users tend
to share common interests, and thus one may follow his/her peers to tag the same
resource (which is frequently observed in social networking sites); (ii) meanwhile,
users tend to tag similar resources if they find the topic covered by these resources
interesting.
Based on these two observations, we propose a novel resource recommendation
approach for social tagging service. Intuitively, we use the social influence model to
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Figure 16: Spatial (in user and resource networks) and temporal locality of influence
of tagging actions.
capture the influence of specific tagging actions on inducing other tagging actions.
Leveraging this model, we may predict the tagging actions of potential interested
users before the actions actually occur, such that the resources can be recommended
to these users in advance of time.
Assumption Validation and Model Instantiation
We start with analyzing the dataset to validate the assumptions of our solution.
Specifically three important assumptions are made in our model: (i) the influence of
occurred interactions on triggering other interactions is local to both networks; (ii)
the influence may exhibit different patterns in the two networks (captured by the
concrete instantiation of production network and parameterization); and (iii) such
influence tends to decay over time.
We examine the entire history of interactions (tagging actions) that occurred dur-
ing the time period from April 20, 2008 to August 20, 2009. For each interaction (u, v)
(u in user space and v in resource space), we search for its closest neighboring inter-
action (u′, v′) in the history before (u, v) along the dimensions of user and resource,
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i.e., min(u′,v′) dist(u,u′) ∨ dist(v, v′), and measure this closest (hop) distance.
The upper plot of Figure 16 shows the distribution of such shortest distance in both
user and resource networks, where hop-0 refers to the node itself, and hop-∞ includes
all the cases of shortest distance above 4 hops. It is noticed that both distributions
demonstrate strong locality: typically a majority of closest neighbors belong to the
category of hop-0 or hop-1, and the distribution decays as hop increases. Further, the
distributions exhibit fairly different patterns in the two networks: the hop-0 category
dominates in the social network, while the hop-1 category accounts for the majority
in the resource space. This may be explained by that the influence in the resource
space is more “dynamic” than the user space, i.e., the tendency that a specific user
looks for resources with similar topics is stronger than that he/she is influenced by
the interests of other users. Leveraging this observation, in our implementation, we
adopt a Normal product network to model such type of influence, while assigning
the resource network with higher diffusion rate. In particular, we fix the diffusion
rate α = 0.1 and 10 for the user and resource networks, respectively. By default, the
time-tick is fixed as 108 ms.
One questions remains: what are the temporal characteristics of such closest neigh-
boring interactions? To answer this, we measure the temporal distance between the
interactions (u, v) and (u′, v′), and examine the distribution of the closest interac-
tions along the user and resource dimensions, with results shown in the lower plot
of Figure 16. It is clear that (i) both distributions match fairly well, indicating that
with high chance the closest neighboring interactions in the two networks are essen-
tially the same one, and (ii) both distributions decay quickly as the temporal distance
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Figure 17: Estimated heat intensity of observed interactions and inactive (back-
ground) interactions.
Predictive Power
This set of experiments evaluate the predictive power of our social influence model,
i.e., its ability of differentiating interactions highly likely to occur from the rest “back-
ground” interactions. We run the tracking process. Specifically at the t-th time-tick,
we update the estimation f(t) of the heat field based on the observed interactions at
t, based on which we predict f(t + 1) for the (t + 1)-th time-tick. We then compare
the estimated heat intensity of those interactions actually observed at (t+1) and the
rest inactive ones.
The results (mean and deviation) are shown in the upper plot of Figure 17 (in log-
arithmic scale10). It is observed that the two bands are clearly separable, indicating
the predictive power of our model: the heat of actually observed interactions is typi-
cally two orders of magnitude higher than that of background ones. It is also observed
that there exists certain “fluctuation” at the heat estimates (for both observed and
inactive interactions) for the time period (1.234 ∼ 1.239 × 1012 ms), as highlighted in
box. We then examine the overall growth of number of interaction, as shown in the
10In following, all the heat intensity measures are in logarithmic scale, unless otherwise noted.
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number of iterations (N)
Figure 18: Running time of Track operation with respect to varying network scale
and precision setting.
lower plot of Figure 17. It is seen that for the corresponding period, there exists a
burst of growth. We therefore conclude that (i) the absolute heat intensity measure
is sensitive to the occurrence rate of interactions, which tends to evolve over time,
yet (ii) the relative heat intensity (over the average level) may still serve as a good
indication of the occurrence likelihood of interactions.
Scalability
This set of experiments are designed to evaluate the operation efficiency of µSI, by
measuring the execution time of Track, the most fundamental operation of µSI, with
respect to varying network scale and precision requirement. More specifically, we
apply the KronFit tool in Stanford Network Analysis Platform11 (SNAP) to extract
the ”cores structures” of user and resource networks, and then apply the KronGen
tool in SNAP over such cores to generate networks of different scales; also we generate
different precision settings by varying the number of iterations required in computing
the discrete approximation of matrix exponential. We evaluate both baseline and
optimized versions of Track operation (details in Section 3.4), with results shown in
Figure 18. As predicted by the theoretical analysis, the optimized Track operation
achieves orders of magnitude of performance gain over the baseline implementation,
11http://snap.stanford.edu
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Figure 19: Relative frequency of observed interactions with respect to (relative) heat
itensity.
and can easily scale up to product network of scale 8.2×1011 or hundreds of iterations.
Prediction Accuracy versus Execution Efficiency
Following the estimation regarding the state of heat field, the next step is to accu-
rately predict the interactions that are highly likely to occur. The invocation model
bridges the gap between the two. The concrete form of the invocation model is
typically application-dependent; in this set of experiments, we consider one possible
construction for the application of resource recommendation.
At each time-tick t, we measure the estimated heat intensity for both observed
interactions and inactive ones. We plot the results in Figure 19. The left plot shows
the distribution of the heat intensity of both occurred and inactive interactions. Note
that the measures here have been normalized to the average heat intensity, i.e., the
average level as 0 (in logarithmic scale). One can notice the significant statistical
difference between observed and inactive interactions. For each specific heat level (in
logarithmic scale), we then measure the relative frequency of observed interactions
over the total number of interactions at that level. The right plot of Figure 19 shows
the result (in logarithmic scale). We use an exponential curve to fit the relative
frequency, which shows a tight match with the data. We can then use this fitted
model as our invocation model.
Next we evaluate the Predict operation of µSI. Given the current time t and
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Figure 20: Trade-off between prediction accuracy and execution time.
the elapsed time ∆t, to predict the heat field over all the (active or inactive) in-
teractions at (t + ∆t), the baseline approach is to faithfully simulate the estimat-
ing/sampling/updating procedure at each time-tick, which provides the best possible
estimation regarding the future state f(t +∆t), featuring linear complexity in terms
of ∆t. We propose a novel prediction model that trades the prediction accuracy
for the execution efficiency. We achieve this by focusing on interactions with higher
invocation likelihood (above a threshold h) while ignoring less likely ones.
This prediction accuracy-execution efficiency trade-off is illustrated in Figure 20.
Here the accuracy is measured by the cosine distance between the predicted heat
field vector f̂(t +∆t) and the tracked result f(t +∆t). We compare the prediction
accuracy and execution time for the baseline simulation approach and the lazy-probing
approach (with three different settings of threshold h). Clearly, under acceptable
accuracy loss (less than 0.1), the lazy-probing approach achieves considerable saving
on execution time, e.g., about 37% for h = e−5 and 57% for h = e0. However, as h
increases, the accuracy loss becomes significant, especially when ∆t is large, the error
is accumulated at each time-tick. It is thus important to properly tune h to achieve
the balance, e.g., h = e0 in the case here.
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3.5.3 Case Study 2: Paging Operation in Mobile Phone Call Service
For incoming mobile service requests (e.g., voice, SMS, data), efficiently locating
requested mobiles or devices is a critical operation for service providers. This is
typically done using a combination of location update (by the mobile) and paging
(by the network). The paging operation determines where (i.e., which cells) to search
for the mobile given its latest location update. Because paging consumes valuable
spectrum and signaling resources and the paging channel is a low bandwidth channel,
which can also easily become overwhelmed by denial of service attacks, it is considered
critical to decrease the utilization of this signaling channel (i.e., minimize the number
of cells to be probed).
Existing work on paging schemes has mostly relied on location management-based
approaches (e.g., [125, 147]), i.e., create mobility profiles for mobile users, and pre-
dict their current locations based on their latest updates and historical profile. In
this chapter, we take a different approach: instead of focusing on the mobility pat-
terns of requested mobiles (callee), we analyze the combined social and geographical
characteristics of both caller and callee. We then use such characteristics to design
smart paging schemes that minimize signaling traffics.
More specifically, we consider two networks: the social network formed by mobile
users, and the cell network formed by cellular base stations. A successfully connected
mobile phone call essentially comprises two interactions: caller - caller’s station and
callee - callee’s station. Clearly, understanding the characteristics of these two inter-
actions is the key for us to design effective paging schemes.
Characteristics and Feasibility
We start with examining the geographical characteristics of caller’ and callee’s base
stations. We differentiate the communications between friends and that between non-
friends. The distribution of calls with respect to the hop distance of base stations is
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Figure 21: Hop distance between caller’s and callee’s base stations (+∞ indicates no
connection).
illustrated in Figure 21. It is noted that both friend and non-friend contacts show
fairly similar patterns: the callers tend to contact the callees geographically close
to them (but not too close, e.g., within the same cell), while such likelihood decays
almost exponentially as hop distance grows. It seems a natural option to use this
geographical characteristics to design paging schemes, e.g., given a call request (caller
+ caller’s station + callee), first search base stations with shorter distance to caller’s
station.
To validate the feasibility of this scheme, and also contrast our solution against
traditional mobility profile-based approaches (e.g., [147]), we perform the following
experiments. Assume (i) the base station associated with callee as a random variable
X, (ii) the callee’s historical location logs as: received M calls with the corresponding
base stations as a vector L = (l1, l2, . . . , lM) (K distinct stations in total), each of
these K stations appears xi times in L, ∑Ki=1 xi = M . We consider the following
five measures: (1) entropy of X, entropy of X conditional on (2) previous N = 1
station, (3) previous N = 2 stations, (4) caller’s station, and (5) caller’s identify
(phone number) and base station. Taking (1) and (2) as an example, the entropy
of X is measured as H(X) = −∑Ki=1(xi/M) log(xi/M), while the conditional entropy
of X given previous station Y is defined as H(X,Y ) −H(X) where H(X,Y ) is the
entropy of the joint distribution of two consecutive stations in L. Here, scheme (1),
(2), and (3) have been used in the state-of-the-art paging schemes [147], while scheme
69





















caller’s station + number
N = 1 prev. station
N = 2 prev. station
caller’s station
Figure 22: CDF of entropy and conditional entropies of callee’s base stations.
(4) corresponds to the aforementioned caller’s station-based scheme. The CDFs of
these entropy and conditional entropy are plotted in Figure 22. It is observed: first,
the information of caller’s station alone may not be sufficient to determine callee’s
station, while caller’s station and caller’ and callee’ identities together may pinpoint
callee’s station with fairly high chance; second, this scheme may help improve the
traditional mobility profile-based solutions.
Success Rate and Paging Cost
Leveraging the observations in Figure 21 and 22, we construct a influence-based pag-
ing scheme. We first modify the cell network: for each station, add links to its hop-2
neighbors, and delete links to hop-1 neighbors (observation in Figure 21); we adopt
an instantiation of Tensor product of the cell and social networks. For the set of
candidate base stations (maybe returned by profile-based approaches), we sort them
according to their heat intensity, and probe the base stations according to this order.
Figure 23 shows the efficacy of this paging scheme. We construct five schemes, accord-
ing to the measures discussed in Figure 22. We measure them using two metrics, the
success rate of paging operation, which is defined as the probability that the callee’s
actual base station appears in the “first-search list” of paging scheme (or a broadcast
would be invoked), and the cost of paging, which is defined as the number of base
stations actually searched (the results are normalized to [0,1] where 1 indicates a
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Figure 23: Paging success rate and cost with respect to historical data size.
global broadcast). It is noticed that the influence-based scheme outperforms all the
rest in terms of both success rate and paging cost, particularly, when the learning
data is limited. This validates our theoretical analysis on its advantage of handling
data sparsity issues.
3.6 Other Related Work
Network dynamics has been a long-lasting topic for network science: existing work
mostly studied the dynamics inside a single, homogenous network, such as diffusion
and propagation [53], influence maximization [75], community formation [13], or net-
work evolution [107]. Recently, intensive research efforts have been directed to social
influence in online networks [9, 55, 141]. Using our microscopic model, these works
essentially focus on the interactions between one (implicit) object and multiple users.
More recently, a few works have started to account for the rich information con-
veyed by interactions between multiple objects and users, to detect communities [118],
to analyze the evolution of both object and social networks [151], and to model topic-
sensitve social influence [95, 120]. In all these cases, however, the relationships be-
tween users and objects are modeled as a heterogenous network wherein user-object
interactions are treated as static links. This formation, though amenable to graphi-
cal model-based learning, completely ignores the dynamic nature of interactions (i.e.,
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time-sensitivity), which we deem as one key element in understanding and modeling
microscopic social influence.
There are several other lines of work we build upon. In a set of recent works,
heat field model on a manifold has been applied for dimension reduction [16], classi-
fication [79], spam-resilient ranking [144], and viewpoint-based network analysis [10].
Meanwhile, product network, especially Kronecker product has been applied to model
graph generation [86] and dynamic tensor analysis [117]. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the present work is the first that considers the optimization of heat field model
in the context of product network.
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CHAPTER IV
XCOLOR: PRIVACY-AWARE DATA PUBLISHING
4.1 Introduction
Privacy preservation has become a paramount concern in numerous data dissemina-
tion applications that involve private personal information, e.g., medical data and
census data. Typically, such microdata is stored in a relational table T : each record
in T corresponds to an individual; the attributes of T are categorized as either sen-
sitive or non-sensitive. In the setting of central publication, a publisher intends to
release an anonymized version T ∗ of the microdata table T , such that no malicious
user, called an attacker, can infer the sensitive information regarding any individual
from T ∗, whereas the statistical utility of T is still preserved in T ∗.
Towards this end, a bulk of work has been done on anonymized data publica-
tion [15, 85, 92, 91, 98, 99, 104, 119, 139, 143, 142, 149]. One of the major aims is
to address association attack : the attacker possesses the exact non-sensitive (quasi-
identifier (QI)) values of the victim, and attempts to discover his/her sensitive (SA)
value from the published table T ∗. A popular methodology of thwarting such at-
tacks is generalization [119]: after partitioning the microdata table T into a set of
disjoint subsets of tuples, called QI-group, generalization transforms the QI-values in
each group to a uniform format such that all tuples belonging to the same group are
indistinguishable in terms of their QI-values.
Example 3. Consider publishing the medical data as shown in Table 5: age and
zip-code are QI-attributes, while syndrome is a composite SA-attribute, each compo-
nent indicating the severity of a patient’s suffering the corresponding symptom. The
generalization of the microdata produces two QI-groups, as indicated by the group
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Alice 1 [18, 30] [12k, 17k] 0.8 0.0 0.0 1
2 [18, 30] [12k, 17k] 0.6 0.4 0.4 1
3 [18, 30] [12k, 17k] 0.7 0.1 0.1 1
4 [18, 30] [12k, 17k] 1.0 0.2 0.2 1
5 [18, 30] [12k, 17k] 0.1 0.9 0.9 1
6 [32, 40] [22k, 30k] 0.2 0.5 0.2 2
7 [32, 40] [22k, 30k] 0.8 0.1 0.9 2
8 [32, 40] [22k, 30k] 0.4 0.3 0.5 2
9 [32, 40] [22k, 30k] 0.6 0.9 0.3 2
10 [32, 40] [22k, 30k] 1.0 0.7 0.7 2
identifiers (GID). An attacker who knows Alice’s QI-values can no longer uniquely
identify her SA-value: any tuple in the first group may belong to her; without further
information, the attacker can only conclude that Alice associates with each specific
syndrome value with identical probability 20%.
4.1.1 State of the Art
Essentially, the attack above is performed by leveraging the association between quasi-
identifier and sensitive attributes (QI-SA association) appearing in the published data.
Generalization weakens such association by reducing the representation granularity of
QI-values. The protection is sufficient if the weakened association is no longer infor-
mative enough for the attacker to infer individuals’ SA-values with high confidence.
To gauge the quality of protection, a plethora of generalization principles have been
proposed, which can be classified according to their targeted types of QI-SA associa-
tion, namely, exact and proximate association.
Exact QI-SA association refers to the links between specific QI-values and SA-
values in the published data. Exact association is particularly meaningful for pub-
lishing categorical sensitive data wherein different values tend to have no sense of
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proximity; it is desired to prevent the attacker from linking the victim to a specific SA-
value with high confidence. The principles in this category include k-anonymity [119],
l-diversity [98], and its variants [139, 143], all with the objective of avoiding uncover-
ing exact SA-values.
Proximate QI-SA association, meanwhile, refers to the links between specific QI-
values and a set of proximate SA-values. Clearly, this concept generalizes exact QI-
SA association in that it takes account of the semantic proximity among SA-values.
After studying the published data, even though with low certainty about the exact
value, the attacker might have learned with high confidence that the SA-value of the
victim belongs to a set of proximate values. A number of principles, including (k, e)-
anonymity [149], variance control [85], and (ǫ,m)-anonymity [91], have been proposed
to address such proximity breach under the model of one-dimensional numeric sensitive
data (different values are strictly ordered).
4.1.2 Motivation
While focusing on tackling proximity breach under specific data models, be it cat-
egorical or numeric sensitive data, existing research efforts, however, fail to address
the threat for a much richer set of models wherein the semantic proximity might
be defined by arbitrarily complex or customized functions. An example is given as
follows.
Example 4. Recall the running example of Table 5. Assume that the semantic distance
between two SA-values, represented as two vectors P = ⟨pi⟩ni=1 and Q = ⟨qi⟩ni=1, is
defined as ∆(P,Q) = mini ∣pi − qi∣. Measuring the pairwise distance of the syndrome
values appearing in the first QI-group, one can notice that the first four tuples form a
compact “neighborhood” structure, wherein the value of #3 is semantically proximate
to that of #1, #2, and #4, as shown in Figure 24.
















Figure 24: General proximity breach.
equal possibility; she can thus conclude that Alice associates with the neighborhood
structure with probability 80%. Moreover, she might choose the value of the center
node (#3) as an estimation, and arrives at a privacy intruding claim that “Alice’s
syndrome value is fairly close to (0.7,0.1,0.1)”.
Existing privacy principles and definitions, however, are incapable of capturing
this general form of proximity breach because of their assumptions regarding the
underlying data models. For example, in Table 5, the SA-values in each QI-group
are all distinct, thereby satisfying l-diversity [98] with the maximum possible l = 5;
meanwhile, these multi-dimensional values can not be strictly ordered, thus rendering
the techniques developed in [91] inapplicable.
Therefore, in this paper, we advocate studying proximity breach in a data-model-
neutral manner, which we refer to as general proximity breach, with the objective of
providing 1) a better understanding regarding proximity privacy and 2) anonymiza-
tion solutions of general applicability. We argue that the proximity breaches addressed
in the literatures, e.g., homogeneity breach [98], are essentially instantiations of this
concept. In this paper, we aim at developing effective countermeasures to tackle such
general breach.
It is worth contrasting our targeted setting with that of multiple sensitive at-
tributes. We focus our discussion on the case of a single sensitive attribute, which
might comprise multiple components (e.g., Table 5), but is associated with a unified
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distance metric; while in the setting of multiple sensitive attributes, each attribute
might be associated with a different distance metric, and possibly no single measure
exists to capture the overall proximity. Following existing practices such as [98], our
results can be readily extended to the case of multiple sensitive attributes.
4.1.3 Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first systematic study on prox-
imity privacy in a data-model-neutral manner, with findings of general applicability.
Concretely, we define QI-SA association under a highly abstract data model,
with the only assumption of a semantic distance metric over the domain of the
SA-attribute; then, we formalize general proximity breach in the framework of QI-
SA association, and address such breach with a unified privacy definition, (ǫ, δ)-
dissimilarity. It intuitively requires that in each QI-group, every SA-value should be
“dissimilar” to a sufficient number of others.
We provide sound theoretical proof that (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity, used in conjunction
with k-anonymity [119] (called (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity), offers effective protection against
association attack, in terms of both exact and proximate QI-SA association. We
further show that a number of existing privacy definitions are essentially instantiations
of this general principle under the data models that they are designed for.
We conduct an analytical study on the characteristics of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity, derive
criteria enabling to efficiently test its satisfiability for given microdata, and discuss
the optimal setting of the parameters ǫ, δ, and k to achieve the best quality of privacy
protection and utility preservation.
Most importantly, we propose a novel anonymization model, XColor, to fulfill
(ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity, with guarantees on both operation efficiency and utility preser-
vation, by extending the techniques of defect graph coloring. Extensive experiments
are conducted over real data to validate the practical performance of XColor.
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4.2 Formalization
In this section, we clarify the concept of general proximity breach, and prove the effec-
tiveness of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity in remedying such breaches. Furthermore, we discuss
the relevance of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity to existing privacy principles against proximity
breach.
4.2.1 Models and Assumptions
Let T denote a microdata table intended to be published, which consists of d quasi-
identifier (QI) attributes {Aqii }di=1 and a sensitive (SA) attribute As. Particularly, 1)
As can be of arbitrary data type, e.g., categorical, numeric, and customized defined
type; 2) a semantic distance metric ∆(⋅, ⋅) is defined over the domain of As, with
∆(x, y) denoting the distance between two SA-values x and y.
We begin with formalizing the concept of generalization:
Definition 16 (QI Group/Partition). The microdata table T is divided into m
disjoint subsets of tuples GT = {Gi}mi=1, which satisfy (i) ⋃mi=1Gi = T and (ii) Gi∩Gj =
∅ for i ≠ j. Each Gi is called a QI-group, and GT is referred to as a partition of T .
Definition 17 (Generalization). Given a partition GT = {Gi}mi=1, a generalization
of T is a table T ∗ that is obtained by transforming the QI-values in each group Gi
to a uniform format, i.e., all tuples in the same QI-group are indistinguishable with
respect to their QI-values.
For a numeric QI-attribute Aqi, the generalized value could be the minimum
bounding interval of all Aqi values in the group; while for a categorical attribute
Aqi, it could be the lowest common ancestor (LCA) of all Aqi values in the group on
the domain generalization taxonomy of Aqi.
Further, we introduce another fundamental concept underlying the attack model,
the neighborhood of a SA-value.
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Definition 18 (ǫ-Neighborhood). In a QI-group G with SA-values as a multi-set
SVG = {vi}ni=1, the ǫ-neighborhood of a value v ∈ SVG, ΦG(v, ǫ), is defined as the
subset of SVG with their distance to v within ǫ, formally
ΦG(v, ǫ) = {v′∣ v′ ∈ SVG and ∆(v, v′) ≤ ǫ}
Example 5. In the running example of Figure 24, given ǫ = 0.1, the ǫ-neighborhood
of v3 consists of {v1, v2, v3, v4}.
We proceed to presenting the attack model. The attacker attempts to exploit the
generalized table T ∗ to infer the SA-value o.As of a targeted individual o. We assume
that she possesses full identification information [99]:
Definition 19 (Background Knowledge). The attacker possesses the informa-
tion including (i) the exact QI-values of o, (ii) the QI-group G in T ∗ which o belongs
to, and (iii) the semantic distance metric ∆(⋅, ⋅) over As.
By assuming the background knowledge (ii), we are dealing with the worst-case
scenario that only one QI-group matches the QI-value of o in the generalized table
T ∗.
4.2.2 General Proximity Breach
After identifying the QI-group G containing o, the attacker proceeds to estimating
o.As following a probabilistic model:
Definition 20 (Attack Model). From the attacker’s perspective, every tuple in G
belongs to o with identical possibility; therefore, the probability that o.As belongs to
the ǫ-neighborhood of a SA-value v can be formulated as:
prob[o.As ∈ ΦG(v, ǫ)] = ∣ΦG(v, ǫ)∣/∣G∣ (3)
where ∣ΦG(v, ǫ)∣ denotes the cardinality of the neighborhood.
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It is clear now that exact QI-SA association is a special case of proximate QI-SA
association under the setting of ǫ = 0; for any v, prob[o.As = v] ≤ prob[o.As ∈ ΦG(v, ǫ)]
for any ǫ > 0.
Next, we formalize the concept of general proximity breach. Intuitively, if the ǫ-
neighborhood ΦG(v, ǫ) encompasses a considerable proportion of the SA-values in G,
the attacker can conclude that the victim o is associated with the SA-values appearing
in ΦG(v, ǫ) with high probability, though she may not be sure about the exact value.
Furthermore, by choosing v as the representative, she can arrive at fairly precise
estimation about o.As, if ǫ is sufficiently small.
To measure the severeness of the privacy threats, and particularly, to capture the
impact of proximate SA-values on enhancing the attacker’s estimation, we introduce
the metric of proximity risk.
Definition 21 (Proximity Risk). Given the neighborhood radius ǫ, the risk of
general proximity breach of a QI-group G, risk(G, ǫ), is formulated as:
risk(G, ǫ) = max
v∈SVG
∣ΦG(v, ǫ)∣ − 1∣G∣ − 1 (4)
Intuitively, risk(G, ǫ) measures the relative size of the largest ǫ-neighborhood in
G; by excluding v from the neighborhood, it highlights the effect of proximate SA-
values on improving the attacker’s belief: she priorly associates the victim with each
SA-value1 with identical probability 1/∣G∣.
We note that risk(G, ǫ) is a real number within the interval [0,1]. In particular,
G is free of proximity breach (risk(G, ǫ) = 0) if all the SA-values are dissimilar, and
reaches its maximum (risk(G, ǫ) = 1) if a SA-value v is proximate to all other SA-
values. Specially, we define that risk(G, ǫ) = 1 for the extreme case of ∣G∣ = 1.
Furthermore, we define the risk of general proximity breach, risk(GT , ǫ), for a
partition GT of the microdata table T , as the maximum risk of all the QI-groups in








To remedy general proximity breach, we propose a novel privacy definition, (ǫ, δ)-
dissimilarity.
Definition 22 ((ǫ, δ)-Dissimilarity). A partition GT satisfies (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity if
for each G ∈ GT , every SA-value v in G has less than (1 − δ) ⋅ (∣G∣ − 1) ǫ-neighbors.
Here the parameter ǫ specifies the threshold of semantic proximity; while the
parameter δ essentially controls the risk of potential proximity breach.
Next, we prove the effectiveness of this definition against association attack. Con-
cretely, we show that a partition GT is free of general proximity breach if and only if
it satisfies (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 8. Given the microdata table T and the neighborhood radius ǫ, for a par-
tition GT , risk(GT , ǫ) ≤ 1 − δ, if and only if GT satisfies (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity.
Theorem 8. (Necessity) If the partition GT violates (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity, i.e., ∃G ∈ GT ,
∃v ∈ SVG, ∣ΦG(v, ǫ)∣ − 1 > (1 − δ) ⋅ (∣G∣ − 1), then trivially, risk(GT , ǫ) ≥ (∣ΦG(v, ǫ)∣ −
1)/(∣G∣ − 1) > (1 − δ), which implies a proximity breach.
(Sufficiency) If GT contains a proximity breach with risk at least (1 − δ), then
there must exist certain G ∈ GT and certain v ∈ SVG which violates (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity.
Essentially, (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity counters general proximity breach via specifying
the maximum number of ǫ-neighbors that each SA-value can have, relative to the
QI-group size. It captures the impact of proximate SA-values on improving the ad-
versary’s estimation, who has a prior belief of 1/∣G∣ for each SA-value in G.
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Nevertheless, it is insensitive to the trivial case of small-sized QI-groups with
pair-wise dissimilar SA-values. In such scenarios, despite the weak proximate QI-SA
association, the small cardinality of G offers the attacker with a strong prior belief,
1/∣G∣, for each SA-value. To remedy this drawback, we introduce k-anonymity [119]
into our framework: by requiring every QI-group to contain at least k tuples, we
upper bound this prior belief with 1/k.
Thus, (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity, in conjunction with k-anonymity as auxiliary, can effec-
tively thwart association attack in terms of both exact and proximate QI-SA associ-
ation. We entitle this combination (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity.
4.2.4 Relevance to Principles in Literatures
It is worth emphasizing again that (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity makes no specific assumption
regarding the underlying data model; hence, it is effective to tackle proximity breach
under most existing models. In the following, we show that most generalization
principles in literatures are either in-adequate in preventing proximity breach, or
essentially the special instantiations of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity under the data models
which they are designed for.
Principles for categorical data
Motivated by the homogeneity breach wherein a majority of tuples in a QI-group share
an identical SA-value, l-diversity [98] and its variant (α,k)-anonymity [139] have been
proposed to ensure sufficient diversity of SA-values in every QI-group; essentially,
they are both special forms of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity for data models wherein different
SA-values have no sense of semantic proximity, e.g., categorical data.
Let us take (α,k)-anonymity as an example. It combines k-anonymity and l-
diversity, and demands that every QI-group must contain at least k tuples, and at
most α-percent of these tuples carry an identical SA-value. It is trivial to notice that
(α,k)-anonymity is equivalent to (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity under the setting of ǫ = 0 and
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1 − δ ≈ α.
Principles for numeric data
For data models wherein different SA-values can be strictly ordered, e.g., one-dimensional
numeric data, it qualifies as a several privacy violation if the attacker can identify the
victim individual’s SA-value within a short interval, even though not the exact value.
To address such privacy breach, a plethora of principles have been proposed for pub-
lishing numeric sensitive data, e.g., variance control [85] and (k, e)-anonymity [149].
Specifically, variance control specifies that in every QI-group, the variance of the SA-
values must be above certain threshold t; (k, e)-anonymity states that every QI-group
must have at least k different SA-values, and the difference between the maximum
and minimum ones must be at least e. Unfortunately, it is proved in [91] that none
of these principles provide sufficient protection against proximity breaches.
The principle most relevant to (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity is probably (ǫ,m)-anonymity [91];
it demands that in each QI-group G, for every SA-value x in G, at most 1/m of the
SA-values in G belong to the interval of [x − ǫ, x + ǫ]. Clearly, (ǫ,m)-anonymity is
an instantiation of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity for one-dimensional numeric data, with 1/m
≈ 1 − δ. Nevertheless, targeting a specific data model, the theoretical analysis and
generalization algorithms in [91] are inapplicable for addressing general proximity
breach. Moreover, since m is an integer, the users can only specify their privacy
requirements in a harmonic sequence manner, i.e., 12 ,
1
3 , . . ., instead of a “stepless”
continuous adjustment as supported by (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity.
4.3 Characterization
Next we present an analytical study on the characteristics of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity.
Specifically, we discuss the satisfiability of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity, and expose the implicit
trade-off in setting the parameters ǫ and δ.
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4.3.1 Satisfiability of (Epsilon, Delta)k- Dissimilarity
For the given microdata table T and privacy parameters (k, ǫ, δ), the first question
arises as “does there exist a partition GT for T that satisfies both k-anonymity and
(ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity?”, i.e., the satisfiability of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity with respect to T .
Unfortunately, in general, no efficient solution exists to answer this question unless P







Figure 25: Abstract graph and coloring.
Theorem 9. In general, for the given microdata table T and parameters (ǫ, δ, k),
deciding the satisfiability of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity for T is NP-hard.
Before presenting the proof, we first introduce two fundamental concepts, abstract
graph and proper coloring.
Definition 23 (Abstract Graph). For a microdata table T and a proximity thresh-
old ǫ, the abstract graph ΨǫT = (VǫT ,EǫT ) is defined as follows: VǫT denotes the set of
vertices, with each vertex corresponding to a SA-value in T ; EǫT represents the set
of edges over VǫT , and two vertices are adjacent if and only if their corresponding
SA-values are ǫ-neighbors.
Definition 24 (Proper Coloring). Given a graph Ψ = (V,E), a (proper) m-
coloring of Ψ is an assignment of no more than m colors to the vertices V, such that
no two adjacent vertices share the same color.
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Example 6. Figure 25 illustrates the abstract graph corresponding to the SA-values
appearing in the first QI-group of Table 5, under the setting of ǫ = 0.1. One possible
2-coloring scheme is to assign (#1, #2, #4) color 1 and (#3, #5) color 2.
Sketchily, our proof to Theorem 9 is constructed by mapping the satisfiability of
(ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity to a proper coloring of the abstract graph corresponding to T and
ǫ.
Theorem 9. It suffices to prove that the problem under a specific setting is NP-hard.
Let us consider a stringent version of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity with δ = 1; that is, all
SA-values in a same QI-group are required to be dissimilar.
For the given parameter ǫ and microdata T (of cardinality n), we construct an
abstract graph ΨǫT = (VǫT ,EǫT ). Without loss of generality, consider a partition GT of T
comprising m (m ≤ ⌊n/k⌋) QI-groups: GT = {Gi}mi=1. In ΨǫT , the vertices corresponding
to each Gi are assigned with one distinct color.
Clearly, under this setting, GT satisfies (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity, only if every two ad-
jacent vertices in ΨT (ǫ) have distinct colors, i.e., a proper m-coloring. Nevertheless,
it is known that determining for a general graph if a proper m-coloring exists is NP-
complete [49], which implies that deciding the satisfiability of (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity for
given T is NP-hard.
Therefore, instead of attempting to seek the exact answer to whether an (ǫ, δ)k-
dissimilarity-satisfying partition exists for given T , we are more interested in devel-
oping approximate solutions that can 1) provide explicit and intuitive guidance for
the setting of privacy parameters, and 2) efficiently find high-quality partitions of the
microdata.
4.3.2 Trade-off between Epsilon and Delta
In our framework, the privacy requirement is specified as a triple of parameters k, ǫ,
and δ, which however demonstrate implicit conflicts. In this section, we assume that
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k is fixed, and discuss the trade-off between ǫ and δ; in Section 4.5, we reveal the
quantitative relationship among ǫ, δ, and k.
Specifically, ǫ specifies the upper bound of semantic distance between two SA-
values to be considered as semantically proximate. Meanwhile, δ controls the alarm
threshold of proximity breach; a larger δ implies a lower tolerance of proximity-privacy
risk. Clearly, by increasing ǫ or δ, one can achieve better privacy protection against
association attack, though along different dimensions. An inherent trade-off, however,
exists between ǫ and δ. Here, we expose this trade-off in an informal manner, and
provide a quantitative modeling in Section 4.4.
Consider two extreme settings of ǫ. 1) ǫ = 0, which amounts to saying that all
distinct SA-values are considered dissimilar. By evenly distributing tuples sharing
an identical SA-value into different QI-groups, a majority of the SA-values in each
QI-group tend to be pairwise dissimilar; therefore, one expects to achieve high δ. 2)
ǫ = ∞, which means that all SA-values in the domain are considered similar. In this
case, no partition can achieve any δ < 1; that is, the risk of proximity-privacy breach
is always 1. Intuitively, as ǫ increases, the number of pairs of similar SA-values grows,
rendering it harder to achieve high dissimilarity (large δ in each QI-group), and vise
versa.
4.4 Theory
As discussed in Section 4.2, the key to anonymizing a microdata table T through
generalization is to determine a partition GT of T . It is however shown in Theorem 9
that deciding exactly if T is “anonymizable” for given parameters (k, ǫ, δ) is NP-hard.
In this section, we establish the theoretical foundation for an approximate solution
that allows intuitive and flexible tuning of the multiple privacy parameters, and finds
high-quality partitions with polynomial complexity.
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More concretely, we re-formulate the problem of finding an (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity-
satisfying partition in the framework of defect graph coloring; we map it to a novel
relaxed equitable coloring problem that embeds all the privacy parameters. We then
conduct an analytical study on the sufficient conditions (in terms of ǫ, δ, and k) for
the existence of a valid coloring. The constructive nature of the proofs naturally leads
to algorithms that are efficient in both theory and practice.
4.4.1 Problem Re-formulation
It is shown in Section 4.3 that given a microdata table2 T and a proximity threshold
ǫ, one can construct an abstract graph Ψǫ = (Vǫ,Eǫ). A partition G of T corresponds
to a m-coloring of Ψǫ (may not be proper), which partitions the vertices Vǫ into m
color classes, defined as below.
Definition 25 (Color Class). A m-coloring of a graph Ψ = (V,E) partitions
V into m disjoint subsets (color classes) {Vi}mi=1, each corresponding to one distinct
color.
Next, we intend to re-formulate the problem of finding a (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity-
satisfying partition G in the framework of graph coloring. Sufficiently and necessarily,
if a partition G = {G1}mi=1 of T satisfies (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity, then there must exist a
corresponding coloring of Ψǫ that satisfies the following conditions: 1) Ψǫ is colored
using m colors ({Vi}mi=1 represent the m color classes); 2) the size of every color class
is at least k, i.e., ∣Vi∣ ≥ k (1 ≤ i ≤ m); and 3) for any v ∈ Vi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), at most
(1 − δ) ⋅ (∣Vi∣ − 1) vertices in Vi are adjacent to v.
We note that the coloring problem above can be considered as a “relaxed” version
of the classic proper coloring (Definition 24), in the sense that it allows a constrained
2Without ambiguity, in the rest of the paper, we omit this referred microdata table in the
notations.
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number of monochromatic edges (called defects). It however deviates from the con-
ventional setting of defect coloring as studied in graph theory, e.g., [32], in the sense
that it imposes constraints on the size of every color class.
Therefore, in developing our solution, we target the following relaxed equitable
coloring problem.
Definition 26 (Relaxed Equitable (⌊n
k
⌋, δ)-Coloring). We define a relaxed
equitable (⌊n
k
⌋, δ)-coloring of a graph Ψǫ as the following conditions:
(i) Ψǫ is colored using m = ⌊n
k
⌋ colors, with the corresponding color classes denoted
by {Vi}mi=1;
(ii) the sizes of any two color classes differ by at most 1;
(iii) for any v ∈ Vi (1 ≤ i ≤m), at most ⌊(1−δ) ⋅(∣Vi∣−1)⌋ vertices in Vi are adjacent
to v.
Clearly, this coloring scheme incorporates both k-anonymity (condition (ii)) and
(ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity (condition (iii)). Note that for ease of presentation, here we limit
the size of every color class to be either k or k+1 (i.e., equitable coloring); our results
however can be readily extended to support different group sizes.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous study on such relaxed equitable
coloring problem; therefore, the solution presented here is interesting in its own right
from the perspective of graph theory.
4.4.2 Rationale
Following, we present the theoretical rationale of our equitable (⌊n
k
⌋, δ)-coloring scheme.
We begin with introducing the fundamental concepts. The complete list of notations
used in the presentation can be found in Table 6.
Among the properties of Ψǫ, we are particularly interested in its maximum degree,
which is formally defined as below.
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Table 6: List of symbols and notations.
notation definition
ǫ threshold of semantic proximity
δ threshold of breach
k parameter of k-anonymity
n cardinality of microdata table T
m number of color classes ⌊n/k⌋
t ⌊(1 − δ) ⋅ (k − 1)⌋
GǫT abstract graph for given ǫ and T
ΘǫT maximum degree of G
ǫ
T
g lower bound of the number of movable classes
Definition 27 (Maximum Degree). The maximum degree Θǫ of a graph Ψǫ is
defined as Θǫ = maxv∈VǫDΨǫ(v), where DΨǫ(v) denotes the degree of v in Ψǫ.
For the sake of clarity, we assume that n is divisible by k; thus, every color class
is of identical size k. We use m = n
k
to denote the number of color classes, and t
= ⌊(1 − δ) ⋅ (k − 1)⌋ to represent the maximum number of neighbors that a vertex is
allowed to have in its self-colored class.
Let DV (v) denote the number of neighbors of a vertex v in a color class V . Clearly,
if v has overlarge DV (v) in its self-colored class V , it violates (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity,
formally
Definition 28 (Violation/Movable Class). Given a color class V and a vertex
v, if v ∈ V and DV (v) ≥ (t + 1), v is called a violation; if v /∈ V and DV ′(v) ≤ t, V is
called a movable class for v, or v is movable to V .
We have the following lemma that establishes a lower bound on the number of
movable classes for any v.
Lemma 1. Given a graph Ψǫ = (Vǫ,Eǫ), and a m-coloring of Ψǫ, C = {Vi}mi=1, for any
v ∈ Vǫ, at least g =m − ⌊Θǫ/(t + 1)⌋ color classes V ∈ C satisfy DV (v) ≤ t.










Figure 26: Movable-classes and exchangeable classes.
Θǫ. According to the pigeon-hole principle, one can derive that at most ⌊Θǫ/(t + 1)⌋
classes contain more than t neighbors of v, from which follows this lemma.
Assume that an initial coloring C = {Vi}mi=1 violates (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity. The key
idea of transforming C to an (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity-satisfying coloring C′ = {V ′i }mi=1 is to
move every violation v ∈ V (V ∈ C) to a movable class V ′ with DV ′(v) ≤ t. In order
to satisfy the requirement that all color classes are of identical size, it is necessary
to move a vertex v′ ∈ V ′ back to V , i.e., v and v′ are exchanged. The movement
of adding v′ to V , however, could potentially create more violations in V , thereby
making this transformation process never converge.
To remedy this, we introduce the concept of global potential as an indication of the
convergence of this process. Specifically, the global potential of a coloring with respect
to a graph is defined as the total number of monochromatic edges. Informally, if every
move of the transformation makes the potential decrease, the process will converge
in polynomial time (the maximum possible potential of a coloring with respect to Ψǫ
is ∣Eǫ∣). Now, we proceed to formulating the impact of each move over the global
potential.
Definition 29 (Potential Change). The change in potential resulted from moving
a vertex v from color class V to V ′, Λ(V vÐ→ V ′), is calculated as Λ(V vÐ→ V ′) =
DV ′(v) −DV (v), i.e., the change in the number of monochromatic edges.
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We demand that the move of switching two vertices v ∈ V and v′ ∈ V ′ is allowed
only if the global potential is decreased, formally
Definition 30 (Exchangeable Class). A vertex v is exchangeable to a color class
V ′ (or V ′ is an exchangeable class for v) only if (i) v is movable to V ′, and (ii)
∃v′ ∈ V ′, Λ(V vÐ→ V ′) +Λ(V ′ ∪ {v} v′Ð→ V ∖ {v}) < 0.
This scenario is illustrated in Figure 26: among the family of movable classes
exists an exchangeable class V ′ that contains a vertex v′ such that switching v and
v′ results in the decrease of the global potential.
We are thus interested in investigating the existence of exchangeable class among
the family of movable classes for v. In the following lemma, we show that if the
maximum degree Θǫ is bounded by certain threshold, there must exist at least one
exchangeable class for v.
Lemma 2. If Θǫ ≤ m⋅(t+1)2 , for an arbitrary coloring C = {Vi}mi=1 and any v ∈ V with
DV (v) ≥ (t + 1), there exists at least one exchangeable class V ′ for v.
Lemma 2. Otherwise, assume that all the color classes of C are non-exchangeable for
v. Consider the family of movable classes for v. Without loss of generality, assume
that {Vi}gi=1 are movable for v. Applying the assumption of DV (v) ≥ (t + 1), we have
the following two facts:
1) ∑gi=1DVi(v) ≤ Θǫ − (m − g) ⋅ (t + 1), derived from Definition 28;
2) Λ(V vÐ→ Vi) ≤ DVi(v) − (t + 1) (1 ≤ i ≤ g), derived from Definition 29.
According to the assumption, none of the movable classes are exchangeable for v;
therefore, any vertex v′ ∈ Vi (1 ≤ i ≤ g) should satisfy the next condition:
Λ(Vi ∪ {v} v′Ð→ V ∖ {v}) ≥ −Λ(V vÐ→ Vi)
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We thus have the following inequality:
DV ∖{v}(v′) = Λ(Vi ∪ {v} v′Ð→ V ∖ {v}) +DVi∪{v}(v′)
≥ Λ(Vi ∪ {v} v′Ð→ V ∖ {v})
≥ −Λ(V vÐ→ Vi)
≥ (t + 1) −DVi(v)
Summing DV ∖{v}(v′) over all the vertices in the family of movable classes {Vi}gi=1 for









[(t + 1) −DVi(v)]
= g ⋅ k ⋅ (t + 1) − k g∑
i=1
DVi(v)
≥ g ⋅ k ⋅ (t + 1)
−k ⋅ [Θǫ − (m − g) ⋅ (t + 1)]
= m ⋅ k ⋅ (t + 1) − k ⋅Θǫ
≥ k ⋅Θǫ






ǫ, which is a contradiction to the maximality of Θǫ.
Based on Lemma 2, we are ready to introduce the following theorem, which can
be considered as a significant extension of the classic result of Lovász [96] along the
dimension of equitable coloring.
Theorem 10. For given m, a graph Ψ = (V,E) with maximum degree Θ can be
equitably colored using m colors, with each color class of degree at most (2Θ
m
− 1), in
time O(∣E ∣ ⋅ ∣V ∣).
Theorem 10. Start with an arbitrary initial coloring wherein all the color classes are




neighbors. As proved in Lemma 2, there must exist at least one vertex v′ in an
exchangeable class V ′ for v such that switching v and v′ decreases the potential of
the graph. We exchange the colors of v and v′, thereby decreasing the overall number
of monochromatic edges in the graph by at least 1. Repeat this process until all the
violations are removed. This takes at most ∣E ∣ steps, with the cost of each step at
most ∣V ∣, leading to the overall complexity of O(∣E ∣ ⋅ ∣V ∣).
4.5 XColor Algorithm
Theorem 10 paves the way for designing efficient solutions to fulfill (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity.
In this section, we bridge the gap between the theoretical methodology and the prac-
tical generalization algorithm.
Concretely, we aim at addressing three key challenges. 1) The setting of the
privacy parameters ǫ, δ, and k. As exposed in Section 4.3, their inherent conflicts
make it necessary to carefully balance these parameters in order to achieve the best
quality of privacy protection. 2) The utility of the anonymized data. So far we have
been solely focusing on providing adequate protection against proximity breach; while
in real applications, it is imperative to take account of the resulted data utility when
designing the anonymization algorithm. 3) The efficiency of the algorithm. Although
it is difficult to further improve the asymptotic complexity of the basic algorithm in
Theorem 10, one can construct a high-quality initial coloring that leads to significant
performance gains over unattended initial configurations.
Following, we first reveal how to set the privacy parameters to achieve the best
quality of protection, then show how to optimize the data utility along the process of
anonymization, and finally discuss how to speed up the anonymization process.
4.5.1 Setting of K, Epsilon, and Delta
Within our framework, the privacy requirement is specified as a triple of parameters
k, ǫ, and δ. Intuitively, k represents the lower bound of the QI-group size, thereby
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guaranteeing that an attacker is unable to associate a victim with a single SA-value
with high confidence; ǫ indicates the threshold of semantic proximity, and two SA-
values with distance below ǫ are considered as semantically similar; δ denotes the
alarm threshold of proximity breach, and any breach with risk above (1− δ) needs to
be eliminated.
Clearly, increasing k, ǫ, or δ all improves the quality of protection, but along dif-
ferent dimensions. The adjustment, however, is not arbitrary, as constrained by their
inherent trade-offs. Our framework provides an explicit and quantitative modeling of




⋅ [1 − (1 − 1
k
) ⋅ δ] (6)
At the first glance, it may seem that the parameter ǫ is not reflected in this
inequality. we note, however, that for given microdata T , there is a surjective mapping
from ǫ to the abstract graph Ψǫ; that is, ǫ uniquely determines the structure of Ψǫ.
In particular, the density of Ψǫ is directly correlated with ǫ; therefore, the maximum
degree Θǫ is a proper indicator of the underlying parameter ǫ: a larger ǫ implies a
denser Ψǫ and thus a higher maximum degree.
Different users tend to possess varying preferences for the importance of these
three parameters. Below, using the case of fixed ǫ as an example, we show how to
set δ and k to achieve the optimal protection. Note that stricter privacy protection
is obtained at the cost of reduced data utility. Here, we concentrate our discussion
on the maximum achievable protection, and temporarily ignore the utility issue.
For fixed ǫ (fixed Θǫ), one can increase both δ and k when Inequality 6 holds.
When it reaches the bottleneck, i.e., (1 − 1/k) ⋅ δ = (1 − 2Θǫ/n), depending on the
user’s preference, one can trade k (or δ) in order to increase δ (or k) further.
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4.5.2 Incorporation of Data Utility
A key consideration missing in the basic algorithm derived from Theorem 10 is the
utility of the resulted anonymized data. We intend to incorporate the optimization
of data utility in the anonymization process.
As discussed in Section 4.2, generalization transforms the QI-values in each QI-
group to a uniform format. Evidently, this operation is performed at the cost of
information loss; and the objective therefore is to minimize the global information
loss in the process of anonymization.
Various metrics (a detailed survey in [77]) have been proposed to measure the
information loss incurred by the generalization operation. Although our framework
makes no specific assumption regarding the metrics in use, in our experiments, we
employ the following model [91, 142, 143] to take the gauge of the information loss




where ∣Aqii ∣ represents the domain length of an QI-attribute Aqii , ∣G.Ai∣ represents the
length of the generalized QI-value of G, and d is the number of QI-attributes. Note
that since all the QI-groups are of identical size, we omit the factor of group size in
this model.
In our framework, we adopt a greedy strategy to minimize the global information
loss. Specifically, when exchanging a vertex v ∈ V with another one v′ ∈ V ′, the change
of information loss can be formulated as follows:
loss′(V v,v′←Ð→ V ′) = loss(V ∖ {v} ∪ {v′})
+loss(V ′ ∖ {v′} ∪ {v})
−loss(V ) − loss(V ′)
We seek the pair of vertices (̊v, v̊′) for exchange that lead to the maximum decrease
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in the overall information loss, formally
(̊v, v̊′) = argmin
v,v′
loss′(V v,v′←Ð→ V ′)
At the same time instance, however, a significant number of vertices might all
violate (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity, and each might correspond to a considerable number of
exchangeable vertices, resulting in the prohibitive complexity of finding the optimal
pair (̊v, v̊′). In our implementation, we make further approximation by dividing this
operation into two steps: in the first step, we find the vertex v̊ (in a class V ) whose
departure minimizes the information loss of V , formally
v̊ = argmin
v
loss(V ∖ {v}) − loss(V )
In the second step, we seek the vertex v̊′ (in a class V ′) whose exchange with v̊
minimizes the overall information loss of V and V ′, formally
v̊′ = argmin
v′
loss(V ∖ {̊v} ∪ {v′}) + loss(V ′ ∪ {̊v} ∖ {v′})
−loss(V ) − loss(V ′)
Assuming that at the time instance there are nv instances of v, each corresponding
to nv′ instances of v′, the approximation here reduces the complexity from O(nv ⋅nv′)
to O(nv + nv′).
4.5.3 Optimization of Initial Coloring
As proved in Theorem 10, for an arbitrary initial configuration, the basic algorithm
can converge to an equitable (m,δ)-coloring with time complexity of O(∣V ∣ ⋅ ∣E ∣),
where the term ∣E ∣ follows the upper bound of the number of monochromatic edges.
We deem it as the key of decreasing the computational complexity to minimize the
initial number of monochromatic edges. The following lemma provides the rationale
for our initial configuration construction procedure.
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Lemma 3. Assume that the probability that two vertices are adjacent is proportional
to the product of their degrees. The overall number of monochromatic edges is mini-
mized if all color classes have identical sum of degrees.
Lemma 3. Let {di}ni=1 denote the degrees of the vertices {vi}ni=1, correspondingly, and
edge(vi, vj) be the probability that two vertices vi and vj share an edge. According
to the assumption, we have edge(vi, vj) ∝ di ⋅ dj.
We intend to partition the vertices into m color classes of identical size k, Vc












Given the assumption that edge(vci , vcj) ∝ dci ⋅ dcj, one can derive that this problem























It is well known that under this setting the minimum is achieved when Xi = Xj
for every pair of i and j.
Unfortunately, reductible from the equal-subset-sum problem [138], constructing
an initial configuration with all the color classes of identical sum of degrees is NP-
hard.
Following, we present a heuristic solution to constructing the initial coloring, which
is empirically proved to lead to fairly small number of monochromatic edges. Algo-
rithm 5 outlines the Initialize procedure. It takes as input a graph Ψ (of cardinality
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Algorithm 5: Initialize (Ψ, k)
Input: graph Ψ = (V,E), k
Output: m color classes (m = ⌊n/k⌋, n = ∣V ∣)
sort {v∣v ∈ V} in descending order of degrees as v1, v2, . . . , vn (with degrees1
d1, d2, . . . , dn, respectively);
initialize m empty buckets {Vj}mj=1;2
for i from 1 to k ⋅m do3
j∗ ← argminj d(Vj) s.t. h(Vj) < k;4
add vi to Vj∗;5
// process the remaining vertices
for i from (k ⋅m + 1) to n do6
j∗ ← argminj d(Vj) s.t. h(Vj) < k + 1;7
add vi to Vj∗;8
return {Vj}mj=19
n) and a parameter k, and generates a coloring of Ψ with m color classes (m = ⌊n/k⌋).
For each class Vj, it keeps track of its sum of degrees d(Vj) and its height h(Vj) (the
number of vertices assigned to Vj). Initialize balances d(Vj) (1 ≤ j ≤m) in a greedy
manner: at each iteration, from the pool of unassigned vertices, it picks the one with
the maximum degree, and adds it to a non-full class with the minimum sum of degrees
(lines 3-5). After all the classes are filled with k vertices, it assigns remaining vertices
(if n is not divisible by k) to classes with the minimum sum of degrees (line 6-8).
4.5.4 A Complete Framework
Incorporating the suite of multi-folded optimizations into the basic algorithm de-
rived from Theorem 10, we are now ready to present the complete anonymization
framework, XColor, as sketched in Algorithm 6. Given the microdata table T and
the parameters ǫ, δ, and k, XColor produces an anonymized table T ∗ that satisfies
(ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity.
Specifically, for the given T and ǫ, XColor first constructs an abstract graph ΨǫT
(line 2), and invokes Initialize to obtain an initial coloring of ΨǫT (line 3). It then
identifies and eliminates all the violations of (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity (line 4-11): at each
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iteration, XColor switches a violation v̊ (in class V ) with an exchangeable vertex
v̊′ (in class V ′), meanwhile minimizing the information loss. Finally, the coloring is
mapped to a partition of the microdata table T (line 12); and by generalizing all the
corresponding QI-groups, an anonymized table T ∗ is obtained (line 13).
Algorithm 6: XColor (T,k, ǫ, δ)
Input: microdata table T , parameters k, ǫ, δ
Output: anonymized table T ∗
n = ∣T ∣, m = ⌊n/k⌋, t = ⌊(1 − δ) ⋅ (k − 1)⌋;1





// create an initial coloring
{Vi}
m




V = {v∣v ∈ Vi and DVi(v) ≥ t + 1 (1 ≤ i ≤m)};4
while V ≠ ∅ do5
find v̊ = minv∈V loss(V ∖ {v}) − loss(V );6
V ′ ← exchangeable vertices for v̊;7
find v̊′ = minv′∈V ′ loss(V ∖ {̊v} ∪ {v
′})8
+loss(V ′ ∪ {̊v} ∖ {v′})-loss(V )-loss(V ′);9
switch v̊ and v̊′;10
update V;11
// map to partition
map {Vi}
m
i=1 to a partition GT = {Gi}
m
i=1;12
generalize Gi (1 ≤ i ≤m) and return T
∗;13
4.6 Experiments
In this section, we perform an empirical evaluation to validate the analytical models
and the efficacy of the proposed countermeasure. The experiments comprise two
main parts: 1) we intend to study the impact of general proximity breach over the
anonymized data generated according to alternative privacy definitions; 2) we aim to
investigate the practical performance of the XColor method, in terms of proximity-
privacy protection, utility preservation and operation efficiency.
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4.6.1 Experimental Setting
Our experiments use a real dataset SAL (http://ipums.org), which has now become a
de facto benchmark for evaluating anonymized data publishing algorithms, e.g., [91,
143, 142]. The dataset contains 50k valid tuples, each corresponding to the personal
information of an American adult, collected from the US census. The attributes
used in the experiments, their domain lengths (the number of distinct values), and
the heights of their domain generalization taxonomies (for categorical attributes) are
listed in Table 7.
Table 7: Attributes of the SAL dataset.
attribute type d. length d. height
Age numeric 85 N/A
Sex categoric 2 2
Marital Status categoric 6 2
Race categoric 9 2
Education sensitive 17 N/A
Work Class sensitive 10 4
Income sensitive 50 N/A
We use the first four attributes as QI-attributes, and regard the last three as a
composite sensitive attribute. The semantic proximity between two sensitive values
is defined as their normalized Lp space distance (within the interval [0,1]); the weight
of each component in the attribute is set according to a health report [137] on the
influence of education, income, and occupation to cardiovascular disease.
All the algorithms are implemented in C++, and the experiments are conducted




In the first set of experiments, we intend to evaluate the impact of general proximity
breach over the “publishable” data generated according to alternative privacy defini-
tions. Specifically, we deploy an implementation of Mondrian [84], a state-of-the-art
anonymizaton algorithm, to generate l-diverse tables. To show that even strong l-
diversity does not guarantee sufficient protection against general proximity breach,
we fix the value of l to be 20, which implies that in every QI-group, no more than 5%
tuples can share identical sensitive values.
We then measure the risk of proximity breach (Definition 21) for the published
data by counting the number of QI-groups which violate (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity. Given a
generalized table, we define its vulnerability to association attack as the proportion
of QI-groups that contain proximity breach over the total number of QI-groups in
the table. Moreover, we measure the vulnerability under varying settings of semantic
proximity metric, i.e., L1- and L2-norm.






































Figure 27: Vulnerability of the published table (generated by Mondrian with l = 20)
to general proximity breach.
Figure 27 gives a contour view of the vulnerability (with respect to ǫ and δ) of the
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published table generated by Mondrian with l = 20. The left and right plots corre-
spond to L1- and L2-norm, respectively. It is clear that in both cases the vulnerability
increases significantly as ǫ or δ grows. For example, in the left plot (L1-norm), for any
ǫ ≥ 0.18 and δ ≥ 0.85, over half of the QI-groups are subjected to general proximity
breach. One can also notice the “mutual enforcement” of the two parameters ǫ and
δ with respect to the vulnerability: for a large ǫ (or δ), a trivial increase in δ (or ǫ)
leads to a considerable growth of the attack vulnerability.
Because of the similar characteristics of Lp-norms (p = 1,2 in the example above),
in the following, we primarily use L1-norm as the semantic proximity metric.
Data Quality
We measure the utility of the generalized data using the approach described in [91,
143, 142]. Consider the count queries of the form
select count (∗) from generalized-data
where A1 ∈ I1 and A2 ∈ I2 and . . . and Aq ∈ Iq
where A1, . . . ,Aq are q distinct random attributes, comprising qd QI-attributes and qs
SA-attributes (qd + qs = q), and each Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ q) is a randomly selected interval in
the domain of Ai. The length of the interval is controlled by a parameter s (0 ≤ s ≤ 1),
called the query selectivity. Specifically, the length ∣Ii∣ of Ii is given by ∣Ii∣ = ∣Ai∣ ⋅ s 1q ,
where ∣Ai∣ is the domain length of Ai. Clearly, a larger s implies a wider selection
interval. In our experiments, qs is fixed to 2, and qd is called the query dimensionality.
The quality of the resulted data is measured by the average relative error of
answering such count queries using the generalized table. Specifically, for each query,
we evaluate it over the generalized table using the approach described in [84], and
calculate the relative error as ∣gen − raw∣/raw, where gen and raw represent the
evaluation results over the generalized table and the microdata table, respectively.
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In each set of experiments, we fix three of the parameters, ǫ, δ, k, and s, and
evaluate the impact of the rest one over the quality of the generalized table. Each set
of experiments contain a workload of 1k queries. The default setting of the parameters
is: ǫ = 0.1, δ = 0.8, k = 10, and s = 0.1.







































Figure 28: Average relative error with respect to parameters ǫ and δ.
Figure 28 plots the data quality (measured by average relative error) with respect
to ǫ and δ. First notice that the data utility is a decreasing function of both ǫ and δ,
though demonstrating fairly different patterns. This is expected, since a larger ǫ or δ
indicates stricter privacy requirement, at the cost of reduced data utility. Meanwhile,
the sharp increase of the relative error for δ from 0.8 to 0.9 is contributed to the
fact that a majority of (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity violations fall in this interval; for the given
ǫ and initial configuration, the data utility is usually reversely correlated with the
number of operations needed to remedy these violations. Nevertheless, note that in
both cases, the relative error is always below 15%, even in the extreme case of query
dimensionality qd = 3.
In Figure 29, the influence of the parameter k over the data utility shows more
interesting patterns. The relative error decreases as k varies from 5 to 15, reaches
its minimum at k = 15, and then slightly grows afterwards. Here is an intuitive
explanation: for fixed ǫ and δ, we claim that smaller k usually results in a larger
number of (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity violations. To see this, consider the following simple
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Figure 29: Average relative error with respect to parameters k.
example, which can be readily generalized to support our claim:
Example 7. Assume a random initial partition, i.e., a tuple is assigned to every QI-
group with identical probability, a total number of 8 tuples, and δ = 1/2. Consider
a tuple x with two ǫ-neighbors x1 and x2 for given ǫ. If k = 4, x causes a violation
if x1 and x2 are assigned to the same QI-group as x, i.e., with probability (1/2)2 =
1/4; if k = 2, x results in a violation if either x1 or x2 is assigned to x’s group, thus
with a larger probability 1-(3/4)2 = 7/16.
As we have pointed out, the data utility is usually reversely correlated with the
number of operations needed to remedy the violations. This explains the high relative
error for a small k. Meanwhile, recall that the QI-attribute values in a QI-group is
generalized to their minimum bounding interval (for quantitative attribute) or their
lowest common ancestor on the hierarchy (for categorical attribute), a larger k implies
more significant distortions, which explains the high relative error for a large k.
Figure 30 shows the data utility as a function of the query selectivity s, which
varies from 0.05 to 0.25. It is noticed that the average workload error decreases as s
grows, which is consistent with the analysis in [84]: the generalized data enjoys higher
accuracy for queries with larger selection intervals. We note that even for s as low as
0.05, our approach guarantees high data utility, with the relative error below 5%.
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Figure 30: Average relative error with respect to parameter s.












































Figure 31: Average execution time with respect to ǫ, δ and the size of the dataset.
Execution Efficiency
Figure 31 and 32 plot the average execution time of our generalization algorithm with
respect to the dataset size which varies from 30k to 50k. Furthermore, in each set of
experiments, we fix two of the three parameters ǫ, δ, and k, and measure the impact
of the remaining one on the running time. By default, the parameter setting is: ǫ =
0.15, δ = 0.9, and k = 20.
One can notice that in all these plots, the average execution time grows approx-
imately linearly with respect to the dataset size, and all the experiments terminate
within minutes. As expected, the computation cost appears as an increasing function
of ǫ and δ. This is contributed to that for a given initial partition, a larger ǫ or δ
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Figure 32: Average execution time with respect to k and the size of the dataset.
results in a more significant number of (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity violations, and the compu-
tational cost is usually proportional to the number of operations needed to remedy
these breaches. It is also interesting to notice that in the rightmost plot, the cost
decreases as k grows, which empirically validates our analysis regarding the impact
of k over the number of (ǫ, δ)-dissimilarity violations.
4.7 Related Work
The problem of centralized publication has attracted intensive research recently. The
existing literatures can be classified mainly into two categories. The first one aims at
devising privacy definitions and principles, as the criteria to measure the quality of
the protection provided by an anonymization model. As mentioned in our discussion,
k-anonymity [119], l-diversity [98], and (α,k)-anonymity [139] target association at-
tack based on exact QI-SA association, while t-closeness [92], (k, e)-anonymity [149],
and (ǫ,m)-anonymity [91] take into consideration the attack leveraging proximate
association. For scenarios with different background knowledge assumptions, a col-
lection of principles have been proposed: δ-presence [104] assumes that the adversary
has no prior knowledge regarding the presence of individuals in the microdata; (c, k)-
safety [99] and privacy skyline [24] consider the case that the adversary possesses
external knowledge regarding the target individual, other individuals, or the family
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of individuals sharing a same SA-value; m-invariance [143] is designed for sequential
releases of microdata; while differential privacy [40] measures the quality of protection
from the perspective of the perturbation mechanism itself.
The second category of work explores the possibility of fulfilling the proposed
anonymization principles, meanwhile preserving the data utility to the maximum ex-
tent. In [2], Aggarwal showed that due to the curse of dimensionality, it is hard
to enforce even 2-anonymity for high-dimensional microdata. In [2, 84, 101], it was
proved that finding the optimal k-anonymization with minimum information loss is
NP-Hard for the suppression, multi-dimensional, and attribute models, respectively.
Despite these negative results, it was shown in [15, 83] that the optimal relation can
be found efficiently by systematically enumerating the possible generalizations, in
conjunction of effective pruning using heuristics. Efficient greedy-manner solutions
have also be considered [48, 84, 127]. Besides the heuristic methods above, a set of
approximation algorithms have been developed [15, 101, 109], which provide theo-
retical guarantees on the quality of the resulting data. Another direction of work
attempts to optimize the data utility, without compromising the hard privacy re-
quirement. Instead of anonymizing the whole microdata table, Kifer and Gehrke [77]
advocated anonymizing and publishing a set of marginals, to ameliorate the curse
of dimensionality. In [142, 149], it was proposed to publish the QI-attributes and
SA-attributes separately, so as to preserve the utility of the QI-values. LeFevre et
al. [85] differentiated the generalization level for different subsets of the microdata
according to their importance, and propose a workload-aware anonymization scheme.
Graph coloring has been a prominent topic in graph theory for a long history. An
(ordinary vertex) coloring is a partition of the vertices of a graph into independent
sets. It is known that determining if a general graph can be colored with less than
k colors (its chromatic number) is NP-Hard [49]. Many variants and generalizations
have been considered, particularly in relation to practical applications. Cowen et
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al. [32] considered a relaxation of coloring in which the color classes partition the
vertices into subgraphs of degree at most d, called (k, d)-coloring, following the classic
work of Lovász [96]. Erdös considered the problem of equitable coloring, imposing
the constraint that each color class should be of identical size, and made the famous
conjecture that the chromatic number of a graph with maximum degree Θ is at most
(Θ + 1), which was later proved. However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous
work exists on the problem of equitable coloring with defect.
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CHAPTER V
BUTTERFLY: PRIVACY-AWARE DATA MINING
5.1 Introduction
Privacy of personal information has been arising as a vital requirement in designing
and implementing data mining and management systems; individuals were usually
unwilling to provide their personal information if they knew that the privacy of their
data could be compromised. To this end, a plethora of work has been done on
preserving input privacy for static data [6, 119, 42, 25, 98], which assumes untrusted
data recipients and enforces privacy regulations by sanitizing the raw data before
sending it to the recipients. The mining process is then performed over the sanitized
data, and produce output (patterns or models) with accuracy comparable to, if not
identical to that constructed over the raw data. This scenario is illustrated as the first
four steps of the grand framework of privacy-preserving data mining in Figure 33.
Nevertheless, in a strict sense, privacy preservation not only requires to prevent
unauthorized access to raw data that leads to exposure of sensitive information, but
also includes eliminating unwanted disclosure of sensitive patterns through inference
attacks over mining output. By sensitive patterns, we refer to those properties pos-
sessed uniquely by a small number of individuals participating in the input data.
At the first glance, it may seem sufficient to sanitize input data in order to address
such threat; however, as will be revealed, even though the patterns (or models) are
built over the sanitized data, the published mining output could still be leveraged
to infer sensitive patterns. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that input-
privacy protection techniques are designed to make the constructed models close to,
if not identical to that built over the raw data, in order to guarantee the utility of
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the result. Such “no-outcome-change” property is considered as a key requirement of
privacy-preserving data mining [21]. Given that the significant statistical information
of the raw data is preserved, there exists the risk of disclosure of sensitive information.
Therefore, the preservation of input privacy may not necessarily lead to that of out-
put privacy, while it is necessary to introduce another unique layer of output-privacy
protection into the framework, as shown in Figure 33. A concrete example is given
as follows.
Example 8. Consider a nursing-care records database that collects the observed symp-
toms of the patients in a hospital. By mining such database, one can discover valu-
able information regarding syndromes characterizing particular diseases. However,
the released mining output can also be leveraged to uncover some combinations of
symptoms that are so special that only rare people match them (we will show how to
achieve this in the following sections), which qualifies as a severe threat to individuals’
privacy.
Assume that Alice knows that Bob has certain symptoms a, b but not c (c), and by
analyzing the mining output, she finds that only one person in the hospital matching
the specific combination of {a, b, c}, and only one having all {a, b, c, d}. She can safely
conclude that the victim is Bob, who also suffers symptom d. Further more, by
studying other medical databases, she may learn that the combination of {a, b, d} is
linked to a rare disease with fairly high chance.
The output-privacy issue is more complicated in stream mining, wherein the min-
ing output usually needs to be published in a continuous and in-time manner. Not
only a single-time release may contain privacy breaches, but also multiple releases
can potentially be exploited in combination, given the overlap of the corresponding
input data. Consider the sliding window model [12] as an example, arguably the most
popular stream processing model, where queries are not evaluated over the entire his-

















Figure 33: Grand framework of privacy-preserving data mining.
stream. The window may be defined over data items or timestamps, i.e., item-based
or time-based window, respectively. Besides the leakage in the output of a single
window (intra-window breach), the output of multiple overlapping windows can also
be combined to infer sensitive information (inter-window breach), even each window
itself contains no breach per se. Moreover, the characteristics of data streams typ-
ically evolve over time, which precludes the feasibility of global data analysis-based
techniques, due to the strict processing time and memory limitations. Hence, one
needs to consider addressing output-privacy vulnerabilities in stream mining systems
as a unique problem.
Surprisingly, in contrast of the wealth of work on protecting input privacy, out-
put privacy has received fairly limited attention so far in both stream data mining
and privacy-preserving data mining in general. This work, to our best knowledge,
represents the most systematic study to date of output-privacy vulnerabilities in the
context of data stream mining.
5.1.1 State of the Art
The first naturally arising question might be: is it sufficient to apply input-privacy
protection techniques to address output vulnerabilities? Unfortunately, most existing
techniques fail to satisfy the requirement of countering inference attacks over mining
output. They differ from one to another in terms of concrete mechanisms to provide
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attack-resilient protection while minimizing utility loss of mining output incurred
by sanitization; however, the adversarial attacks over input data (raw records) is
significantly different from that over mining output (patterns or models).
As a concrete case, in Example 8, one conceivable solution to controlling the in-
ference is to block or perturb those sensitive records, e.g., the one corresponding to
Bob, in the mining process; however, such record-level perturbation suffers from a
number of drawbacks. First, the utility of mining output is not guaranteed. Since
the perturbation directly affects the mining output, it is usually difficult to guarantee
both that the valuable knowledge (the intended result) is preserved and that the sen-
sitive patterns are disguised. Among these, one significant issue is the possible large
amount of false knowledge. For instance, in Example 8, if the dataset is prepared for
frequent pattern mining, blocking or perturbing sensitive records may make frequent
patterns become non-frequent, or vice versa; if the dataset is prepared for learning
classification tree, modifying sensitive records may result in significant deviation of
the cut points, crucial for decision making. Second, unlike the scenarios considered
in certain existing work, in real applications, the sensitive patterns may not be pre-
defined or directly observable; rather, sophisticated analysis over the entire dataset
is typically necessary to detect potential privacy leakage in the mining output. For
example, as we will show in Section 5.3, in the case of frequent pattern mining, the
number of potential breaches needed to be checked is exponential in terms of the num-
ber of items. The situation is even more complicated for the case of stream mining
wherein multiple windows can be exploited together for inference. Such complexity
imposes efficiency issues for record-level perturbation. Third, in a broad range of
computation-intensive applications, e.g., neural network-based models, the mining
output is typically not directly observable; thus the effect of applying record-level
perturbation cannot be evaluated without running the mining process. In all theses
cases, record-level perturbation is ineffective to protect sensitive patterns.
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Meanwhile, one might draw a comparison between our work and the disclosure
control techniques in statistical and census databases. Both concern about providing
statistical information without compromising sensitive information regarding individ-
uals; however, they also exhibit significant distinctions. First, the queries of statistical
databases typically involve only simple statistics, e.g., MIN, MAX, AVG, etc., while
the output (patterns or models) of data mining applications usually feature much
more complex structures, leading to more complicated requirements for output utility.
Second, compared with that in statistical databases, the output-privacy protection in
data mining faces much stricter constraints over processing time and space, which is
especially true for the case of stream mining.
5.1.2 Overview of Our Solution
A straightforward yet inefficient solution to preserving output privacy is to detect
and eliminate all potential breaches, i.e., the detecting-then-removing paradigm as
typically adopted by inference control in statistical databases. However, the detec-
tion of breaches usually requires computation-intensive analysis of the entire dataset,
which is negative in tone [27] for stream mining systems. Further, even at such high
cost, the concrete operations of removing the identified breaches, e.g., suppression and
addition [11], tend to result in considerable decrease in the utility of mining output.
Instead, we propose a novel proactive model to counter inference attacks over
output. Analogous to sanitizing raw data from leaking sensitive information, we
introduce the concept of “sanitized pattern”, arguing that by intelligently modifying
the “raw patterns” produced by mining process, one is able to significantly reduce the
threat of malicious inference, while maximally preserving the utility of raw patterns.
This scenario is shown as the last step in Figure 33.
In contrary to record-level perturbation, pattern-level perturbation demonstrates
advantages in both protecting sensitive patterns and preserving output utility. First,
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the utility of mining output is guaranteed, e.g., it is feasible to precisely control the
amount of false knowledge. For instance, in Example 8, all the valuable frequent
patterns regarding symptom-disease relationships can be preserved, while no false
frequent patterns are introduced. Also, as we will show in Section 5.5 and 5.6, in
the case of frequent pattern mining, not only the accuracy of each frequent item-
set can be controlled, but also their semantic relationships can be preserved to the
maximum extent, which is hard to achieve with record-level perturbation. Second,
it is possible to devise effective yet efficient pattern-level perturbation schemes that
can be performed either online or offline, without affecting the efficiency of (stream)
mining process. Finally, since the target of perturbation, the mining output, is di-
rectly observable to the perturbation process, it is possible to analytically gauge the
perturbation schemes.
Specifically, we present Butterfly∗, a light-weighted countermeasure against
malicious inference over mining output. It possesses a series of desirable features that
make it suitable for (stream) mining applications: 1) it needs no explicit detection
of (either intra-window or inter-window) privacy breaches; 2) it requires no reference
to previous output when publishing the current result; 3) it provides flexible control
over the balance of multiple utility metrics and privacy guarantee.
Following a two-phase paradigm, Butterfly∗ achieves attack-resilient protec-
tion and output-utility preservation simultaneously. In the first phase, it counters
malicious inference by amplifying the uncertainty of sensitive patterns, at the cost of
trivial accuracy loss of individual patterns. In the second phase, while guaranteeing
the required privacy, it maximally optimizes the output utility by taking account of
several model-specific semantic constraints.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: (i) we articulate the problem
and the importance of preserving output privacy in (stream) data mining; (ii) we
expose a general inferencing attack model that exploits the privacy breaches existing
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in current (stream) mining systems; (iii) we propose a two-phase framework that
effectively addresses attacks over mining output; (iv) we provide both theoretical
analysis and experimental evaluation to validate our approach in terms of privacy
guarantee, output utility, and execution efficiency.
5.1.3 Roadmap
We begin in Section 5.2 with introducing the preliminaries of frequent pattern mining
over data streams, exemplifying with which, we formalize the problem of addressing
output-privacy vulnerabilities in (stream) data mining. In Section 5.3, after introduc-
ing a set of basic inferencing techniques, we present two general attack models that
exploit intra-window and inter-window breaches in stream mining output, respec-
tively. Section 5.4 outlines the motivation and design objectives of Butterfly∗,
followed by Section 5.5 and 5.6 detailing the two phases of Butterfly∗ and dis-
cussing the implicit trade-offs among privacy guarantee and multiple utility metrics.
An empirical evaluation of the analytical models and the efficacy of Butterfly∗ is
presented in Section 5.7. Finally, section 5.8 surveys relevant literature.
5.2 Problem Formalization
To expose the output-privacy vulnerabilities in existing mining systems, we exemplify
with the case of frequent pattern mining over data streams. We first introduce the
preliminary concepts of frequent pattern mining and pattern categorization, and then
formalize the problem of protecting output privacy in such mining task.
5.2.1 Frequent Pattern Mining
Consider a finite set of items I = {i1, i2, . . . , iM}. An itemset I is a subset of I , i.e.,
I ⊆ I . A database D consists of a set of records, each corresponding to a non-empty
itemset. The support of an itemset I with respect to D, denoted by TD(I), is defined
as the number of records containing I as a subset in D. Frequent pattern mining
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aims at finding all itemsets with supports exceeding a predefined threshold C, called
minimum support.
A data stream S is modeled as a sequence of records, (r1, r2, . . . , rN), where N
is the current size of S , and grows as time goes by. The sliding window model is
introduced to deal with the potential of N going to infinity. Concretely, at each N ,
one considers only the window of most recent H records, (rN−H+1, . . . , rN), denoted
by S(N,H), where H is the window size. The problem is therefore to find all the
frequent itemsets in each window.
Example 9. Consider a data stream with current size N = 12, window size H =
8, as shown in Figure 34, where a ∼ d and r1 ∼ r12 represent the set of items
and records, respectively. Assuming minimum support C = 4, then within window
S(11,8), {c, bc, ac, abc} is a subset of frequent itemsets.
One can further generalize the concept of itemset by introducing the negation of
an item. Let i denote the negation of item i. A record is said to contain i if it does not
contain i. Following, we will use the term pattern to denote a set of items or negation
of items, e.g., abc. We use I to denote the negation of itmeset I, i.e., I = {i∣i ∈ I}.
Analogously, we say that a record r satisfies a pattern P if it contains all the
items and negation of items in P and the support of P with respect to database D is
defined as the number of records containing P in D.
Example 10. In Figure 34, r10 contains ab, but not ac. The pattern abc has support
2 with respect to S(12,8), because only records r8 and r11 match it.
5.2.2 Pattern Categorization
Loosely speaking, output privacy refers to the requirement that the output of mining
process does not disclose any sensitive information regarding individuals participating
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Figure 34: Data stream and sliding window model.
In the context of frequent pattern mining, such sensitive information can be in-
stantiated as patterns with extremely low supports, which correspond to properties
uniquely possessed by few records (individuals), as shown in Example 8. We capture
this intuition by introducing a threshold K (K ≪ C), called vulnerable support, and
consider patterns with (non-zero) supports below K as vulnerable patterns. We can
then establish the following classification system.
Definition 31. (Pattern Categorization) Given a database D, let P be the set
of patterns appearing in D, then all P ∈ P can be classified into three disjoint classes,
for the given threshold K and C.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Frequent Pattern ∶ Pf = {P ∣TD(P ) ≥ C}
Hard Vulnerable Pattern ∶ Phv = {P ∣0 < TD (P ) ≤K}
Soft Vulnerable Pattern ∶ Psv = {P ∣K < TD (P ) < C}
Intuitively, frequent pattern (Pf ) is the set of patterns with supports above min-
imum support; they expose the significant statistics of the underlying data, and are
often the candidate in the mining process. Actually the frequent itemsets found by
frequent pattern mining are a subset of Pf . Hard vulnerable pattern (Phv) is the set of
patterns with supports below vulnerable support; they represent the properties pos-
sessed by only few individuals, so it is unacceptable that they are disclosed or inferred
from the mining output. Finally, soft vulnerable pattern (Psv) neither demonstrates
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the statistical significance, nor violates the privacy of individual records; such pat-
terns are not contained in the mining output, but it is usually tolerable that they are
learned from the output.
Example 11. As shown in Figure 34, given K = 1 and C = 4, ac and bc are both Pf ,
and abc is Phv with respect to S(12,8), while bcd is Psv since its support lies between
K and C.
5.2.3 Problem Definition
We are now ready to formalize the problem of preserving output privacy in the con-
text of frequent pattern mining over streams: For each sliding window S(N,H),
output-privacy preservation prevents the disclosure or inference of any hard vulnera-
ble patterns with respect to S(N,H) from the mining output.
It may seem at the first glance that no breach exists at all in frequent pattern
mining, if it only outputs frequent itemsets (recall C ≫ K); however, as shown in
the next example (with detailed discussion in Section 5.3), from the released frequent
patterns and their associated supports, the adversary may still be able to infer certain
hard vulnerable patterns.
Example 12. Recall Example 11. Given the supports of {c, ac, bc, abc}, based on the
inclusion-exclusion principle [106], T (abc) = T (c)−T (ac)−T (bc)+T (abc), one is able
to infer the support of abc, which is Phv in S(12,8).
5.3 Attack over Mining Output
In this section, we reveal the privacy breaches existing in current (stream) mining
systems, and present a general attack model that exploits these breaches.
5.3.1 Attack Model
For simplicity of presentation, we will use the following notations: given two itemsets
I and J , I ⊕J denotes their union, I ⊙J their intersection, J ⊖ I the set difference of
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Table 8: Symbols and notations.
notation description
S(N,H) stream window of (rN−H+1 ∼ rN)
TD(X) support of X in database D
K vulnerable support
C minimum support
X JI set of itemsets {X ∣I ⊆X ⊆ J}
Wp previous window
Wc current window
∆+X number of inserted records containing X
∆−X number of deleted records containing X
J and I, and ∣I ∣ the size of I. The notations used in the rest of the paper are listed
in Table 8.
As a special case of multi-attribute aggregation, computing the support of I (I ⊆ J)
can be considered as generalization of J over all the attributes of J ⊖I; therefore, one
can apply the standard tool of multi-attribute aggregation, a lattice structure, based
on which we construct the attack model.
Lattice Structure
Consider two itemsets I, J that satisfy I ⊂ J . All the itemsets X JI = {X ∣I ⊆ X ⊆ J}
form a lattice structure: each node corresponds to an itemset X, and each edge
represents the generalization relationship between two nodes Xs and Xt such that
Xs ⊂ Xt and ∣Xt ⊖Xs∣ = 1. Namely, Xs is the generalization of Xt over the item
Xt ⊖Xs.
Example 13. A lattice structure is shown in Figure 35, where I = c, J = abc, and
J ⊖ I = ab.
For simplicity, in what follows, we use X JI to represent both the set of itemsets and
their corresponding lattice structure. Next, we introduce the basis of our inferencing
model, namely, deriving pattern support and estimating itemset support. These two
techniques have been introduced in [11] and [23], respectively, with usage or purpose
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different from ours. In [11], deriving pattern support is considered as the sole attack
model to uncover sensitive patterns; in [23], estimating itemset support is used to
mine non-derivable patterns, and thus saving the storage of patterns. The novelty of
our work, however, lies in constructing a general inferencing model that exploits the
privacy breaches existing in single or multiple releases of mining output, with these
two primitives as building blocks.
Deriving Pattern Support
Consider two itemsets I ⊂ J , if the supports of all the lattice nodes of X JI are accessi-
ble, one is able to derive the support of pattern P , P = I ⊕ (J ⊖ I), according to the
inclusion-exclusion principle [106]:
T (I ⊕ (J ⊖ I)) = ∑
I⊆X⊆J
(−1)∣X⊖I ∣T (X)
Example 14. Recall the example illustrated in Figure 35. Given the supports of
the lattice nodes of X abcc in S(12,8), the support of pattern P = abc is derived as:
TS(12,8)(abc) = TS(12,8)(c) - TS(12,8)(ac) - TS(12,8)(bc) + TS(12,8)(abc) = 1.
Essentially, the adversary can use this technique to infer vulnerable patterns with
respect to one specific window from the mining output.
Estimating Itemset Support
For the support of any itemset is non-negative, according to the inclusion-exclusion
principle, if the supports of the itemsets {X ∣I ⊆ X ⊂ J} are available, one is able to
bound the support of J as follows:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
T (J) ≤ ∑I⊆X⊂J(−1)∣J⊖X ∣+1T (X) ∣J ⊖ I ∣ is odd
T (J) ≥ ∑I⊆X⊂J(−1)∣J⊖X ∣+1T (X) ∣J ⊖ I ∣ is even
Example 15. Given the supports of c, ac, and bc in S(12,8), one is able to establish
the lower and upper bounds of TS(12,8)(abc) as: ≤ TS(12,8)(ac) = 5, ≤ TS(12,8)(bc) = 5,
≥ TS(12,8)(ac) + TS(12,8)(bc) − TS(12,8)(c) = 2.
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Figure 35: Privacy breaches in stream mining output.
When the bounds are tight, i.e., the lower bound meets the upper bound, one can
exactly determine the actual support. In our context, the adversary can leverage this
technique to uncover the information regarding certain unpublished itemsets.
5.3.2 Intra-Window Inference
In stream mining systems without output-privacy protection, the released frequent
itemsets over one specific window may contain intra-window breaches, which can be
exploited via the technique of deriving or estimating pattern support.
Example 16. As shown in Example 14, abc is Phv with respect to S(12,8) if K = 1;
however, one can easily derive its support if the supports of c, ac, bc, abc are known.
Formally, if J is a frequent itemset, then according to the Apriori rule [5], all
X ⊆ J must be frequent, which are supposed to be reported with their supports.
Therefore, the information is complete to compute the support of P = I ⊕ (J ⊖ I)
for all I ⊂ J . This also implies that the number of breaches needed to be checked is
potentially exponential in terms of the number of items.
Even if the support of J is unavailable, i.e, the lattice of X JI is incomplete to infer
P = I ⊕ (J ⊖ I), one can first apply the technique of estimating itemset support to
complete certain missing “mosaics”, then derive the supports of vulnerable patterns.
Possibly the itemsets under estimation themselves may be vulnerable. Following, we




The intra-window inference attack is only a part of the story. In stream mining,
privacy breaches may also exist in the output of overlapping windows. Intuitively,
the output of a previous window can be leveraged to infer the vulnerable patterns
within the current window, and vice versa, even though no vulnerable patterns can
be inferred from the output of each window per se.
Example 17. Consider two windows Wp = S(11,8) and Wc = S(12,8) as shown in
Figure 34, with frequent itemsets summarized in Figure 35. Assume C = 4 and K =
1. In window Wp, no Phv exists; while in Wc, abc is unaccessible (shown as dashed
box). From the available information of Wc, the best guess about abc is [2,5], as
discussed in Example 15. Clearly, this bound is not tight enough to infer that abc is
Phv. Both windows are thus immune to intra-window inference.
However, if one is able to derive that the support of abc decreases by 1 between
Wp and Wc, then based on the information released in Wp, which is TWp(abc) = 4,
the exact value of abc in Wc can be inferred, and abc is uncovered.
The main idea of inter-window inference is to exactly estimate the transition of the
supports of certain itemsets between the previous and current windows. We below
discuss how to achieve accurate estimation of such transition over two consecutive
windows.
Without loss of generality, consider two overlapping windows Wp = S(N − L,H)
and Wc = S(N,H) (L < H), i.e., Wc is lagging Wp by L records (in the example
above, N = 12, H = 8 and L = 1). Assume that the adversary attempts to derive
the support of pattern P = I⊕(J ⊖ I) in Wc. Let Xp and Xc be the subsets of X JI that
are released or estimated from the output of Wp and Wc, respectively. We assume
that Xp ⊕Xc = X JI (X
J
I ⊖ Xc = Xp ⊖ Xc), i.e., the missing part in Xc can be obtained
in Xp. In Figure 35, Xp = {c, ac, bc, abc}, while Xc = {c, ac, bc}.
For itemset X, let ∆+X and ∆
−
X be the number of records containing X in the
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windows S(N,L) and S(N − H,L), respectively. Thus, the support change of X
over Wp and Wc can be modeled as inserting ∆+X records and deleting ∆
−
X ones, i.e.,
TWc(X) = TWp(X) + ∆+X - ∆−X .
Example 18. Recall our running example, with N = 12, H = 8, and L = 1. S(N,L)
corresponds to record r11 while S(N −H,L) refers to record r4. Clearly, r4 contains
ac, while r11 does not; therefore, TS(12,8)(ac) =TS(11,8)(ac) + ∆+ac - ∆−ac = 5.
The adversary is interested in estimating TWc(X∗) for X∗ ∈ Xp ⊖Xc. The bound
(min, max) of TWc(X∗) can be obtained by solving the following integer programming
problem:
max(min) TWp(X∗) +∆+X∗ −∆−X∗
satisfying the constraints:
R1 ∶ 0 ≤ ∆+X ,∆−X ≤ L
R2 ∶∆+X −∆−X = TWc(X) − TWp(X) X ∈ Xp ⊙Xc
R3 ∶∆+X(∆−X) ≤∑I⊆Y ⊂X(−1)∣X⊖Y ∣+1∆+Y (∆−Y ) ∣X ⊖ I ∣ is odd
R4 ∶∆+X(∆−X) ≥∑I⊆Y ⊂X(−1)∣X⊖Y ∣+1∆+Y (∆−Y ) ∣X ⊖ I ∣ is even
Here, R1 stems from that Wp differs from Wc by L records. When transiting from
Wp to Wc, the records containing X that are deleted or added cannot exceed L. R2
amounts to saying that the support change (∆+X −∆−X) for those itemsets X ∈ Xc⊙Xp
is known. R3 and R4 are the application of estimating itemset support for itemsets in
windows S(N,L) and S(N −H,L).
Sketchily, the inference process runs as follows: starting from the change of X ∈
Xp ⊙ Xc (R2), by using rules R1, R3, and R4, one attempts to estimate ∆+X(∆−X) for
X ∈ Xp⊖Xc. It is noted that when the interval L between Wp and Wc is small enough,
the estimation can be fairly tight.
Example 19. Consider our running example, L = 1, and Xp ⊙ Xc = {c, ac, bc}. One
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can first observe the following facts based on R1 and R2:
∆+ac −∆−ac = −1,0 ≤∆+ac,∆−ac ≤ 1 ⇒ ∆+ac = 0,∆−ac = 1
∆+bc −∆−bc = −1,0 ≤ ∆+bc,∆−bc ≤ 1 ⇒ ∆+bc = 0,∆−bc = 1
Take ac as an instance. Its change over Wp and Wc is ∆+ac - ∆
−
ac = −1, and both
∆+ac and ∆
−
ac are bounded by 0 and 1; therefore, the only possibility is that ∆
+
ac = 0
and ∆−ac = 1. Further, by applying R3 and R4, one has the following facts:
∆+abc ≤ ∆
+
ac = 0 ⇒ ∆+abc = 0
∆−abc ≥ ∆
−
ac +∆−bc −∆−c = 1 ⇒ ∆−abc = 1
Take abc as an instance. Following the inclusion-exclusion principle, one knows
that ∆+abc should be no greater than ∆
+
ac = 0; hence, ∆
+
abc = 0. Meanwhile, ∆
−
abc has
tight upper and lower bounds as 1. The estimation of abc over Wc is thus given by
TWc(abc) = TWp(abc) + ∆+abc - ∆−abc = 3, and the Phv abc is uncovered.
The computation overhead of inter-window inference is dominated by the cost of
solving the constrained integer optimization problems. The available fast off-the-shelf
tools make such attack feasible even with moderate computation power.
5.4 Overview of Butterfly∗
Motivated by the inferencing attack model above, we outline Butterfly∗, our solu-
tion to protecting output privacy for (stream) mining applications.
5.4.1 Design Objective
Alternative to the reactive, detecting-then-removing scheme, we intend to use a proac-
tive approach to tackle both intra-window and inter-window inference in a uniform
manner. Our approach is motivated by two key observations. First, in certain mining
applications, the utility of mining output is measured by metrics other than the exact
supports of individual itemsets, e.g., the semantic relationship of their supports (e.g.,
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the order or ratio of supports). It is thus acceptable to trade the accuracy of indi-
vidual itemsets for boosting the output-privacy guarantee, provided that the desired
output utility is maintained. Second, both intra-window and inter-window inferenc-
ing attacks are based on the inclusion-exclusion principle, which involves multiple
frequent itemsets. Trivial randomness injected into each frequent itemset can accu-
mulate into considerable uncertainty in inferred patterns. The more complicated the
inference (i.e., harder to be detected), the more considerable such uncertainty.
We therefore propose Butterfly∗, a light-weighted output-privacy preservation
scheme based on pattern perturbation. By sacrificing trivial accuracy of individual
frequent itemsets, it significantly amplifies the uncertainty of vulnerable patterns, and
thus blocking both intra-window and inter-window inference.
5.4.2 Mining Output Perturbation
Data perturbation refers to the process of modifying confidential data while preserv-
ing its utility for intended applications [1]. This is arguably the most important
technique used to date for protecting original input data. In our scheme, we employ
perturbation to inject uncertainty into mining output. The perturbation over output
pattern significantly differs from that over input data. In input perturbation, the
data utility is defined by the overall statistical characteristics of the dataset. The
distorted data is fed as input into the following mining process. Typically no utility
constraints are attached to individual data values. While in output perturbation, the
perturbed results are directly presented to end-users, and the data utility is defined
over each individual value.
There are typically two types of utility constraints for the perturbed results. First,
each reported value should have enough accuracy, i.e., the perturbed value should not
deviate wildly from the actual value. Second, the semantic relationships among the
results should be preserved to the maximum extent. There exist non-trivial trade-offs
125
among these utility metrics. To our best knowledge, this work is the first to consider
such multiple trade-offs in mining output perturbation.
Concretely, we consider two perturbation techniques, with their roots at statistics
literature [27, 1]. Value distortion perturbs the support by adding a random value
drawn from certain probabilistic distribution. Value bucketization partitions the range
of support into a set of disjoint, mutually exclusive intervals; instead of reporting the
exact support, it returns the interval which the support belongs to.
Both techniques can be applied to output perturbation. However, value bucketi-
zation leads to fairly poor utility compared with value distortion, since all supports
within an interval are modified to the same value, and any semantic constraints,
e.g., order or ratio, can hardly be enforced in this model. We thus focus on value
distortion in the following discussion. Moreover, in order to guarantee the accuracy
of individual frequent itemsets, we are more interested in probabilistic distributions
with bounded intervals. We thus exemplify with discrete uniform distributions over
integers, although our discussion is applicable for other distributions.
5.4.3 Operation of Butterfly∗
On releasing the mining output of a stream window, we perturb the support of each
frequent itemset X, T (X)1 by adding a random variable rX drawn from a discrete
uniform distribution over the integers within an interval [lX , uX]. The sanitized
support T ′(X) = T (X) + rX is hence a random variable, which can be specified by
its bias β(X) and variance σ2(X). Intuitively, the bias indicates the difference of the
expected value E[T ′(X)] and actual value T (X), while the variance represents the
average deviation of T ′(X) from E[T ′(X)]. Note that compared with T (X), rX is
non-significant, i.e., ∣rX ∣≪ T (X).
While this operation is simple, the setting of β(X) and σ2(X) is non-trivial, in
1In what follows, without ambiguity, we omit the referred database D in the notations.
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order to achieve sufficient privacy protection and utility guarantee simultaneously,
which is the focus of our following discussion. Specifically, we will address the trade-
off between privacy guarantee and output utility in Section 5.5, and the trade-offs
among multiple utility metrics in Section 5.6.
5.5 Basic Butterfly∗
We start with defining the metrics to quantitatively measure the precision of individ-
ual frequent itemsets, and the privacy protection for vulnerable patterns.
5.5.1 Precision Measure
The precision loss of a frequent itemset X incurred by perturbation can be measured
by the mean square error (mse) of the perturbed support T ′(X):
mse(X) = E[(T ′(X) − T (X))2] = σ2(X) + β2(X)
Intuitively, mse(X) measures the average deviation of perturbed support T ′(X)
with respect to actual value T (X). A smaller mse implies higher accuracy of the
output. Also, it is conceivable that the precision loss should take account of the
actual support. The same mse may indicate sufficient accuracy for an itmeset with
large support, but may render the output of little value for another itemset with lower
support. Therefore, we have the following precision metric:
Definition 32. (Precision Degradation) For each frequent itemset X, its pre-
cision degradation, denoted by pred(X), is defined as the relative mean squared error
of T ′(X):
pred(X) = E[(T ′(X) − T (X))2]




Distorting the original supports of frequent itemsets is only a part of the story, it is
necessary to ensure that the distortion cannot be filtered out. Hence, one needs to
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consider the adversary’s power in estimating the real supports of vulnerable patterns
through the protection.
Without loss of generality, assume that the adversary desires to estimate the sup-
port of pattern P of the form I ⊕(J ⊖ I), and has full access to the sanitized support
T ′(X) of allX ∈ X JI . Let T ′′(P ) represent the adversary’s estimation regarding T (P ).
The privacy protection should be measured by the error of T ′′(P ). Following let us
discuss such estimation from the adversary’s perspective. Along the discussion, we
will show how various prior knowledge possessed by the adversary may impact the
estimation.
Recall that T (p) is estimated following the inclusion-exclusion principle: T (p) =
∑X∈XJ
I
(−1)∣X⊖I ∣T (X). From the adversary’s view, each support T (X)(X ∈ X JI ) is now
a random variable; therefore T (P ) is also a random variable. Thus, the estimation
accuracy of T ′′(P ) with respect to T (P ) (by the adversary) can be measured by the
mean square error, defined as mse(P ) = E[(T (P )−T ′′(P ))2]. We consider the worst
case (the best case for the adversary) wherein mse(P ) is minimized, and define the
privacy guarantee based on this lower bound. Intuitively, larger minmse(P ) indicates
more significant estimation error by the adversary, i.e., better privacy protection. Also
it is noted that the privacy guarantee should account for actual support T (P ): if T (P )
is close to zero, trivial variance makes it hard for the adversary to infer if pattern
P exists. Such “zero-indistinguishability” decreases as T (P ) grows. Therefore, we
introduce the following privacy metric for vulnerable pattern P .
Definition 33. (Privacy Guarantee) For each vulnerable pattern P , its privacy
guarantee, denoted by prig(P ), is defined as its minimum relative estimation error
(by the adversary):
prig(P ) = minmse(P )
T 2(P )
In the following, we show how various assumptions regarding the adversary’s prior
knowledge impact this privacy guarantee. We start the analysis by considering each
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itemset independently, then take account of the interrelations among them.
Prior Knowledge 11. The adversary may have full knowledge regarding the applied
perturbation, including its distribution and parameters.
In our case, the parameter of rX specifies the interval [lX , rX] from which the
random variable rX is drawn; therefore, from the adversary’s view, of each X ∈ X JI , its
actual support T (X) = T ′(X)−rX , is a random variable following a discrete uniform
distribution over interval [l′X , u′X], where l′X = T ′(X)−uX , u′X = T ′(X)− lX and has
expectation T ′(X) − (lX + uX)/2 and variance σ2(X). Recalling that ∣rX ∣ ≪ T (X),
this is a bounded distribution over positive integers. Given the expectation of each
T (X), we have the following theorem that gives the lower bound of mse(P ).
Theorem 12. Given the distribution f(x) of a random variable x, the mean square
error of an estimator e of x, mse(e) = ∫ ∞−∞(x − e)2f(x)dx reaches its minimum value
V ar[x], when e = E[x].
(Theorem 12). We have the following derivation:
mse(x) = ∫ ∞
−∞
(x − e)2f(x)dx
= E[x2] + e2 − 2e ⋅E[x]
= (e −E[x])2 + V ar[x]
Hence, mse(e) is minimized when e = E[x].
Therefore, mse(P ) is minimized when T ′′(P ) = E[T (P )], which is the best guess
that the adversary can achieve (note that the optimality is defined in terms of average
estimation error, not the semantics, e.g., E[T (P )] is possibly negative). In this case,
the lowest estimation error is reached as V ar[T (P )].
In the case that each itemset is considered independently, the fact that T (p) is a
linear combination of all involved T (X) implies that V ar[T (p)] can be approximated




Prior Knowledge 13. The supports of different frequent itemsets are interrelated
by a set of inequalities, derived from the inclusion-exclusion principle.
Here, we take into consideration the dependency among the involved itemsets. As
we have shown, each itemset X is associated with an interval [l′X , u′X] containing its
possible support. Given such itemset-interval pairs, the adversary may attempt to
apply these inequalities to tighten the intervals, and thus obtaining better estimation
regarding the support. Concretely, this idea can be formalized in the entailment
problem [22]:
Definition 34 (Entailment). A set of itemset-interval pairs C entail a constraint
T (X) ∈ [lX , uX], denoted by C ⊧ T (X) ∈ [lX , uX] if every database D that satisfies C,
also satisfies T (X) ∈ [lX , uX]. The entailment is tight if for every smaller interval
[l′X , u′X] ⊂ [lX , uX], C /⊧ T (X) ∈ [l′X , u′X], i.e., [lX , uX] is the best interval that can be
derived for T (X) based on C.
Clearly, the goal of the adversary is to identify the tight entailment for each T (X)
based on the rest; however, we have the following complexity result.
Theorem 14. Deciding whether T (X) ∈ [lX , uX] is entailed by a set of itemset-
interval pairs C is DP-Complete.
(Theorem 14-sketch). Deciding whether C ⊧ T (X) ∈ [lX , uX] is equivalent to the
entailment problem in the context of probabilistic logic programming with conditional
constraints [97], which is proved to be DP-Complete.
This theorem indicates that it is hard to leverage the dependency among the
involved itemsets to improve the estimation regarding each individual itemset; there-
fore, we can approximately consider the supports of frequent itemsets as independent
varaibles in measuring the adversary’s power. The privacy guarantee prig(P ) can




Prior Knowledge 15. The adversary may have access to other forms of prior knowl-
edge, e.g., published statistics of the dataset, samples of a similar dataset, or supports
of the top-k frequent itemsets, etc.
All these forms of prior knowledge can be captured by the notion of knowledge
point : a knowledge point is a specific frequent itemset X, for which the adversary has
estimation error less than σ2(X). Note that following Theorem 14, the introduction
of knowledge points in general does not influence the estimation of other itemsets.
Our definition of privacy guarantee can readily incorporate this notion. Concretely,
let KJI denote the set of knowledge points in the set of X
J
I , and κ
2(X) be the average
estimation error of T (X) for X ∈ KJI . We therefore have the refined definition of
privacy guarantee.
prig(P ) = ∑X∈KJI κ2(X) +∑X∈XJI ∖KJI σ2(X)
T 2(P )
Another well-known uncertainty metric is entropy. Both variance and entropy are
important and independent measures of privacy protection. However, as pointed out
in [61], variance is more appropriate in measuring individual-centric privacy wherein
the adversary is interested in determining the precise value of a random variable. We
therefore argue that variance is more suitable for our purpose, since we are aiming at
protecting the exact supports of vulnerable patterns.
Prior Knowledge 16. The sanitized supports of the same frequent itemsets may be
published in consecutive stream windows.
Since our protection is based on independent random perturbation, if the same
support is repeatedly perturbed and published in multiple windows, the adversary
can potentially improve the estimation by averaging the observed output (the law
of large numbers). To block this type of attack, once the perturbed support of a
frequent itemset is released, we keep publishing this sanitized value if the actual
support remains unchanged in consecutive windows.
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Discussion
In summary, the effectiveness of Butterfly∗ is evaluated in terms of its resilience
against both intra-window and inter-window inference over stream mining output.
We note three key implications.
First, the uncertainty of involved frequent itemsets is accumulated in the inferred
vulnerable patterns. Moreover, more complicated inferencing attacks (i.e., harder to
be detected) face higher uncertainty.
Second, the actual supports of vulnerable patterns are typically small (only a
unique or less than K records match vulnerable patterns), and thus adding trivial
uncertainty can make it hard to tell the existence of such patterns in the dataset.
Third, inter-window inference follows a two-stage strategy, i.e., first deducing the
transition between contingent windows, then inferring the vulnerable patterns. The
uncertainty associated with both stages provides even stronger protection.
5.5.3 Trade-off between Precision and Privacy
In our Butterfly∗ framework, the trade-off between privacy protection and output
utility can be flexibly adjusted by the setting of variance and bias for each frequent
itemset. Specifically, variance controls the overall balance between privacy and util-
ity, while bias gives a finer control over the balance between precision and other
utility metrics, as we will show later. Here, we focus on the setting of variance. Intu-
itively, smaller variance leads to higher output precision, however also decreases the
uncertainty of inferred vulnerable patterns, thus lower privacy guarantee.
To ease the discussion, we assume that all the frequent itemsets are associated
with the same variance σ2 and bias β. In Section 5.6 when semantic constraints are
taken into account, we will lift this simplification, and consider more sophisticated
settings.
Let C denote the minimum support for frequent itemsets. From the definition of
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precision metrics, it can be derived that for each frequent itemset X, its precision
degradation pred(X) ≤ (σ2 + β2)/C2, because T (X) ≥ C. Let P1(C) = (σ2 + β2)/C2,
i.e., the upper bound of precision loss for frequent itemsets. Meanwhile, for a vul-
nerable pattern P = I(J ∖ I), it can be proved that its privacy guarantee prig(P ) ≥
(∑X∈XJ
I
σ2)/K2 ≥ (2σ2)/K2, because T (P ) ≤ K and the inference involves at least
two frequent itemsets. Let P2(C,K) = (2σ2)/K2, i.e., the lower bound of privacy
guarantee for inferred vulnerable patterns.
P1 and P2 provide convenient representation to control the trade-off. Specifi-
cally, setting an upper bound ǫ over P1 guarantees sufficient accuracy of the reported
frequent itemsets; while setting a lower bound δ over P2 provides enough privacy
protection for the vulnerable patterns. One can thus specify the precision-privacy
requirement as a pair of parameters (ǫ, δ), where ǫ, δ > 0. That is, the setting of β
and σ should satisfy P1(C) ≤ ǫ and P2(C,K) ≥ δ, as
σ2 + β2 ≤ ǫC2 (7)
σ2 ≥ δK2/2 (8)
To make both inequalities hold, it should be satisfied that ǫ/δ ≥ K2/(2C2). The
term ǫ/δ is called the precision-privacy ratio (PPR). When precision is a major con-
cern, one can set PPR as its minimum value K2/(2C2) for given K and C, resulting
in the minimum accuracy loss for given privacy requirement. The minimum PPR
also implies that β = 0 and the two parameters ǫ and δ are coupled. We refer to the
perturbation scheme with the minimum PPR as the basic Butterfly∗.
5.6 Optimized Butterfly∗
The basic Butterfly∗ scheme attempts to minimize the accuracy loss of individual
frequent itemsets, without taking account of their semantic relationships. Although
easy to implement and resilient against attacks, this simple scheme may easily violate
these semantic constraints directly related to the specific applications of the mining
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output, and thus decreasing the overall utility of the results. In this section, we
refine this basic scheme by taking semantic constraints into our map, and develop
constraint-aware Butterfly∗ schemes. For given precision and privacy requirement,
the optimized scheme preserves the utility-relevant semantics to the maximum extent.
In this work, we specifically consider two types of constraints, absolute ranking
and relative frequency. By absolute ranking, we refer to the order of frequent itemsets
according to their supports. In certain applications, users pay special attention to
the ranking of patterns, rather than their actual supports, e.g., querying the top-ten
most popular purchase patterns. By relative frequency, we refer to the pair-wise ratio
of the supports of frequent itemsets. In certain applications, users care more about
the ratio of two frequent patterns, instead of their absolute supports, e.g., computing
the confidence of association rules.
To facilitate the presentation, we first introduce the concept of frequency equivalent
class (FEC).
Definition 35. (Frequent Equivalent Class). A frequent equivalent class
(FEC) is a set of frequent itemsets that feature equivalent support. Two itemsets
I, J belong to the same FEC if and only if T (I) = T (J). The support of a FEC fec,
T (fec), is defined as the support of any of its member.
A set of frequent itemsets can be partitioned into a set of disjoint FECs, according
to their supports. Also note that a set of FECs are a strictly ordered sequence: we
define two FECs feci and fecj as feci < fecj if T (feci) < T (fecj). Following we
assume that the given set of FECs FEC are sorted according to their supports, i.e.,
T (feci) < T (fecj) for i < j.
Example 20. In our running example as shown in Fig. 35, given C = 4, there are
three FECs, {cd}, {ac, bc}, {c}, with support 4, 5, and 8, respectively.
Apparently, to comply with the constraints of absolute ranking or relative fre-
quency, the equivalence of itemsets in a FEC should be preserved to the maximum
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extent in the perturbed output. Thus, in our constraint-aware schemes, the pertur-
bation is performed at the level of FECs, instead of specific itemsets.
We argue that this change does not affect the privacy guarantee as advertised,
provided the fact that the inference of a vulnerable pattern involves at least two
frequent itemsets with different supports, i.e., at least two FECs. Otherwise assuming
that the involved frequent itemsets belong to the same FEC, the inferred vulnerable
pattern would have support zero, which is a contradiction. Therefore, as long as
each FEC is associated with uncertainty satisfying Eq.(8), the privacy preservation
is guaranteed to be above the advertised threshold.
5.6.1 Order Preservation
When the order of itemset support is an important concern, the perturbation of differ-
ent FECs cannot be uniform, since that would easily invert the order of two itemsets,
especially when their supports are close. Instead, we need to maximally separate
the perturbed supports of different FECs, under the given constraints of Eq.(7) and
Eq.(8). To capture this intuition, we first introduce the concept of uncertainty region
of FEC.
Definition 36. (Uncertainty Region) The uncertainty region of FEC fec is the
set of possible values of its perturbed support: {x∣Pr(T ′(fec) = x) > 0}.
For instance, when adding to FEC fec a random variable drawn from a discrete
uniform distribution over interval [a, b], the uncertainty region is all the integers
within interval [a+T (fec), b+T (fec)]. To preserve the order of FECs with overlap-
ping uncertainty regions, we maximally reduce their intersection, by adjusting their
bias setting.
Example 21. As shown in Fig. 36, three FECs have intersected uncertainty regions,
and their initial biases are all zero. After adjusting the biases properly, they share no
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overlapping uncertainty region; thus, the order of their supports is preserved in the
perturbed output.
Note that the order is not guaranteed to be preserved if certain FECs still have
overlapping regions after adjustment, due to the constraints of given precision and
privacy parameters (ǫ, δ). We intend to achieve the maximum preservation under the
given requirement.
Minimizing Overlapping Uncertainty Region
Below we formalize the problem of order preservation. Without loss of generality,
consider two FECs feci, fecj with T (feci) < T (fecj). To simplify the notation, we
use the following short version: let ti = T (feci), tj = T (fecj), t′i and t′j be their
perturbed supports, and βi and βj the bias setting, respectively.
The order of feci and fecj can be possibly inverted if their uncertainty regions
intersect; that is, Pr[t′i ≥ t′j] > 0. We attempt to minimize this inversion probability
Pr[t′i ≥ t′j] by adjusting βi and βj . This adjustment is not arbitrary, constrained by
the precision and privacy requirement. We thus introduce the concept of maximum
adjustable bias :
Definition 37. (Maximum Adjustable Bias) For each FEC fec, its bias is al-
lowed to be adjusted within the range of [−βmax(fec), βmax(fec)], βmax(fec) is called
the maximum adjustable bias. For given ǫ and δ, it is defined as
βmax(fec) = ⌊√ǫT 2(fec) − δK2/2⌋
derived from Eq.(7) and Eq.(8).
Wrapping up the discussion above, the problem of preserving absolute ranking can
be formalized as: given a set of FECs {fec1, . . . , fecn}, find the optimal bias setting
for each FEC fec within its maximum adjustable bias [−βmax(fec), βmax(fec)] to











Figure 36: Adjusting bias to minimize overlapping uncertainty regions.
Exemplifying with discrete uniform distribution, we now show how to compute
Pr[t′i ≥ t′j]. Consider a discrete uniform distribution over interval [a, b], with α
= b − a as the interval length. The variance of this distribution is given by σ2 =
[(α + 1)2 − 1]/12. According to Eq.(8), we have α = ⌈√1 + 6δK2⌉ − 1. Let dij be the
distance of their estimators ei = ti + βi and ej = tj + βj2, i.e., dij = ej − ei.
The intersection of uncertainty regions of feci and fecj is a piece-wise function,
with four possible types of relationships: 1) ei < ej, feci and fecj do not overlap; 2)
ei ≤ ej , feci and fecj intersect; 3) ei > ej , feci and fecj intersect; 4) ei > ej , feci
and fecj do not overlap. Correspondingly, the inversion probability Pr[t′i ≥ t′j] is
computed as follows:
Pr[t′i ≥ t′j] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 dij ≥ α + 1
(α+1−dij)
2
2(α+1)2 0 < dij < α + 1
1 − (α+1+dij)22(α+1)2 −α − 1 < dij ≤ 0
1 dij ≤ −α − 1
Following we use Cij (or Cji) to denote Pr[t′i ≥ t′j], the cost function of the pair
of feci and fecj. The formulation of Cij can be considerably simplified based on
the next key observation: for any pair of feci and fecj with i < j, the solution of
the optimization problem contains no configuration of dij < 0, as proved in the next
2Following we will use the setting of bias and estimator exchangeably.
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lemma.
Lemma 4. In the optimization solution of min ∑i<j Cij, any pair of FECs feci and
fecj with i < j must have ei ≤ ej, i.e., dij ≥ 0.
(Lemma 4). Assume that the estimators {e1, . . . , en} corresponding to the optimal
setting, and there exists a pair of FECs, feci and fecj with i < j and ei > ej. By






j) be their new setting, and e
′
i = ej ,
and e′j = ei, the overall cost is reduced, because ∑k≠i,j Cki + Ckj remains the same,
and Cij is reduced, which is contradictory to the optimality assumption.
We need to prove that the new setting is feasible, that is ∣β′i ∣ ≤ βmax(feci) and
∣β′j ∣ ≤ βmax(fecj). Here, we prove the feasibility of β′i, and a similar proof applies to
β′j . First, according to the assumption, we know that
ej = tj + βj < ti + βi = ei and ti < tj
therefore, we have the next fact
β′i = βj + tj − ti < βi ≤ βmax(feci)
We now just need to prove that β′i ≥ −βmax(feci), equivalent to βj+tj−ti ≥ −βmax(feci),
which is satisfied if
tj − ti ≥ βmax(fecj) − βmax(feci)
By substituting the maximum adjustable bias with its definition, and considering the
fact ǫ ≤ 1, this inequality can be derived.
Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the case dij ≥ 0 for every pair of feci and
fecj when computing Pr[t′i ≥ t′j]. The optimization problem is thus simplified as:
∑i<j(α + 1 − dij)2.
One flaw of the discussion so far is that we treat all FECs uniformly without
considering their characteristics, i.e., the number of frequent itemsets within each
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FEC. The inversion of FECs containing more frequent itemsets is more serious than
that of FECs with less members. Quantitatively, let si be the number of frequent
itemsets in FEC feci, the inversion of two FECs feci and fecj means the order of
(si + sj) itemsets are disturbed.
Therefore, our aim now is to solve the weighted optimization problem:
min ∑
i<j
(si + sj)(α + 1 − dij)2
s.t. dij =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
α + 1 ej − ei ≥ α + 1
ej − ei ej − ei < α + 1
∀i < j, ei ≤ ej
∀i, ei ∈ Z+, ∣ei − ti∣ ≤ βmax(feci)
This is a quadratic integer programming (QIP) problem, with piece-wise cost
function. In general, QIP is NP-Hard, even without integer constraints [124]. This
problem can be solved by first applying quadratic optimization techniques, such like
simulated annealing, and then using random rounding techniques to impose the inte-
ger constraints. However, we are more interested in online algorithms that can flexibly
trade between efficiency and accuracy. Following we present one such solution based
on dynamic programming.
A Near Optimal Solution
By relaxing the constraint that ∀i < j, ei ≤ ej to ei < ej, we obtain the following key
properties: (i) the estimators of all the FECs are in strict ascending order, i.e., ∀i < j,
ei < ej ; (ii) the uncertainty regions of all the FECs have the same length α. Each
FEC can thus intersect with at most α of its previous ones. These properties lead to
an optimal substructure, crucial for our solution.
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Lemma 5. Given that the biases of the last α FECs {fecn−α+1 ∶ fecn}3 are fixed
as {βn−α+1 ∶ βn}, and {β1 ∶ βn−α} are optimal w.r.t. {fec1 ∶ fecn}, then for given
{βn−α ∶ βn−1}, {β1 ∶ βn−α−1} must be optimal w.r.t. {fec1 ∶ fecn−1}.
(Lemma 5). Suppose that there exists a better setting {β′1 ∶ β′n−α−1} leading to lower
cost w.r.t. {fec1 ∶ fecn−1}. Since fecn does not intersect with any of {fec1 ∶ fecn−α−1},
the setting of {β′1 ∶ β′n−α−1, βn−α ∶ βn} leads to lower cost w.r.t. {fec1 ∶ fecn}, contra-
dictory to our optimality assumption.
Based on this optimal substructure, we propose a dynamic programming solution,
which adds FECs sequentially according to their order. Let Cn−1(βn−α ∶ βn−1) rep-
resent the minimum cost that can be achieved by adjusting FECs {fec1 ∶ fecn−α−1}
with the setting of the last α FECs fixed as {βn−α ∶ βn}. When adding fecn, the
minimum cost Cn(βn−α+1 ∶ βn) is computed using the rule:
Cn(βn−α+1 ∶ βn) =min
βn−α
Cn−1(βn−α ∶ βn−1) + n−1∑
i=n−α
(si + sn)(α + 1 − din)2
The optimal setting is the one with the minimum cost among all the combinations of
{βn−α+1 ∶ βn}.
Now, let us analyze the complexity of this scheme. Let β∗max denote the upper
bound of maximum adjustable biases of all FECs: β∗max = maxi βmax(feci). For
each fec, its bias can be chosen from at most (2β∗max + 1) integers. Computing
Cn(βn−α+1 ∶ βn) for each combination of {βn−α+1 ∶ βn} from Cn−1(βn−α ∶ βn−1) takes at
most (2β∗max +1) steps, and the number of combinations is at most (2β∗max +1)α. The
time complexity of this scheme is thus bounded by (2β∗max+1)α+1n, i.e., O(n) where n
is the total number of FECs. Meanwhile, the space complexity is also bounded by the
number of cost function values needed to be recorded for each FEC, i.e., (2β∗max+1)α.
In addition, at each step, we need to keep track of the bias setting for the added
FECs so far for each combination, thus (2β∗max + 1)α(n − α) in total.
3In the following we use {xi ∶ xj} as a short version of {xi, xi+1, . . . , xj}.
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In practice, the complexity is typically much lower than this bound, given that
(i) under the constraint ∀i < j, ei < ej, a number of combinations are invalid, and (ii)
β∗max is an over-estimation of the average maximum adjustable bias.
It is noted that as α or β∗max grows, the complexity increases sharply, even though
it is linear in terms of the total number of FECs. In view of this, we develop an
approximate scheme that allows trading between efficiency and accuracy. The basic
idea is that on adding each FEC, we only consider its intersection with its previous γ
FECs, instead of α ones (γ < α). This approximation is tight when the distribution of
FECs is not extremely dense, which is usually the case, as verified by our experiments.
Formally,
Cn(βn−γ+1 ∶ βn) =min
βn−γ
Cn−1(βn−γ ∶ βn−1) + n−1∑
i=n−γ
(si + sn)(α + 1 − din)2
Now the complexity is bounded by (2β∗max+1)γ+1n. By properly adjusting γ, one can
control the balance between accuracy and efficiency.
The complete algorithm is sketched in Algorithm 7: one first initializes the cost
function for the first γ FECs; then by running the dynamic programming procedure,
one computes the cost function for each newly added FEC. The optimal configuration
is the one with the global minimum value Cn(βn−γ+1 ∶ βn).
5.6.2 Ratio Preservation
In certain applications, the relative frequency of the supports of two frequent item-
sets carries important semantics, e.g., the confidence of association rules. However,
the random perturbation may easily render the ratio of the perturbed supports con-
siderably deviate from the original value. Again, we achieve the maximum ratio
preservation by intelligently adjust the bias setting of FECs. First, we formalize the
problem of ratio preservation.
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Algorithm 7: Order-preserving bias setting
Input: {ti, βmax(feci)} for each feci ∈ FEC, α, γ.
Output: βi for each feci ∈ FEC.
begin1
/*initialization*/;2
for β1 = −βmax(fec1) ∶ βmax(fec1) do3
C1(β1) = 0;4
for i = 2 ∶ γ do5
for βi = −βmax(feci) ∶ βmax(feci) do6
/*ei < ej*/;7
if βi + ti > βi−1 + ti−1 then8
Ci(β1 ∶ βi) = Ci−1(β1 ∶ βi−1) + ∑i−1j=1(sj + si)(α + 1 − dji)2;9
/* dynamic programming */;10
for i = γ + 1 ∶ n do11
for βi = −βmax(feci) ∶ βmax(feci) do12
if βi + ti > βi−1 + ti−1 then13
Ci(βi−γ+1 ∶ βi) = minβi−γ Ci−1(βi−γ ∶ βi−1) +14 ∑i−1j=i−γ(sj + si)(α + 1 − dji)2;
/*find the optimal setting*/;15
find the minimum Cn(βn−γ+1 ∶ βn);16
backtrack and output βi for each feci ∈ FEC;17
end18
Maximizing (k, 1/k) Probability of Ratio
Consider two FECs feci and fecj with ti < tj. To preserve the ratio of feci and
fecj, one is interested in making the ratio of perturbed supports t′i/t′j appear in the
proximate area of original value ti/tj with high probability, e.g., interval [k titj , 1k titj ],
where k ∈ (0,1) indicates the tightness of this interval. We therefore introduce the
concept of (k,1/k) probability.
Definition 38. ((k,1/k) Probability) The (k,1/k) probability of the ratio of two
random variables t′i and t
′
j, Pr(k,1/k) [ t′it′
j
] is defined as
Pr(k,1/k) [ t′i
t′j











This (k,1/k) probability quantitatively describes the proximate region of original
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ratio ti/tj. A higher probability that t′i/t′j appears in this region indicates better







s.t ∀i, ei ∈ Z+, ∣ei − ti∣ ≤ βmax(feci)
It is not hard to see that in the case of discrete uniform distribution, the (k,1/k)
probability of the ratio of two random variables is a non-linear piece-wise function,
i.e., a non-linear integer optimization problem. In general, non-linear optimization
problem is NP-Hard, even without integer constraints. Instead of applying off-the-
shelf non-linear optimization tools, we are more interested in efficient heuristics that
can find near-optimal configurations with linear complexity in terms of the number
of FECs. Following, we present one such scheme that performs well in practice.
A Near Optimal Solution
We construct our bias setting scheme based on Markov’s inequality. To maximize the
























































The maximization of the (k,1/k) probability of t′i/t′j is therefore simplified as the





























, E [ t′i
t′
j
], is computed as
E [ t′i
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α + 1(Hej+α2 −Hej−α2 )




α + 1 ln
ej +α/2
ej −α/2 = eiα + 1 ln(1 + αej − α/2) (10)
This form is still not convenient for computation. We are therefore looking for
a tight approximation for the logarithm part of the expression. It is known that
∀x, y ∈ R+, (1 + x/y)y+x/2 is a tight upper bound for ex. We have the following
approximation by applying this bound: 1 + α/(ej − α/2) = e αej−α/2+α/2 = e αej .
Applying this approximation to computing E [ t′i
t′
j






















Assuming that ei is fixed, by differentiating Eq.(11) w.r.t. ej, and setting the deriva-
tive as 0, we get the solution of ej as ej/ei = tj/ti, i.e., βj/βi = tj/ti.
Following this solution is our bottom-up bias setting scheme: for each FEC feci,
its bias βi should be set in proportion to its support ti. Note that the larger (ti + βi)
compared with α, the more accurate the applied approximation; hence, βi should be
set as its maximum possible value.
Algorithm 8 sketches the bias setting scheme: one first sets the bias of the min-
imum FEC fec1 as its maximum βmax(fec1), and for each remaining FEC feci, its
bias βi is set in proportion to ti/ti−1. In this scheme, for any pair of feci and fecj ,
their biases satisfy βi/βj = ti/tj . Further, we have the following lemma to prove the
feasibility of this scheme. By feasibility, we mean that for each FEC feci, βi falls
within the allowed interval [−βmax(feci), βmax(feci)].
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Algorithm 8: Ratio-preserving bias setting
Input: {ti} for each feci ∈ FEC, ǫ, δ, K.
Output: βi for each feci ∈ FEC.
begin1
/* setting of the minimum FEC */;2
set β1 = ⌊√ǫt21 − δK2/2⌋;3
/* bottom-up setting */;4
for i = 2 ∶ n do5
set βi = ⌊βi−1 titi−1 ⌋;6
end7
Lemma 6. For two FECs feci and fecj with ti < tj, if the setting of βi is feasible for
feci, then the setting βj = βi
tj
ti
is feasible for fecj.
(Lemma 6). Given that 0 < βi ≤ βmax(feci), then according to the definition of max-








ǫt2i − δK22 ⌋tjti
= ⌊






ǫt2j − δK22 ⌋ = βmax(fecj)
Thus if β1 is feasible for fec1, βi is feasible for any feci with i > 1, since ti > t1.
5.6.3 A Hybrid Scheme
While order-preserving and ratio-preserving bias settings achieve the maximum utility
at their ends, in certain applications wherein both semantic relationships are impor-
tant, it is desired to balance the two quality metrics in order to achieve the overall
optimal quality.
We thus develop a hybrid bias setting scheme that takes advantage of the two
schemes, and allows to flexibly adjust the trade-off between the two factors. Specif-
ically, for each FEC fec, let βop(fec) and βrp(fec) denote its bias setting obtained
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by the order-preserving and frequency-preserving schemes, respectively. We have the
following setting based on a linear combination:
∀fec ∈ FEC β(fec) = λβop(fec) + (1 − λ)βrp(fec)
The parameter λ is a real number within the interval of [0,1], which controls the
trade-off between the two quality metrics. Intuitively, a larger λ tends to indicate
more importance over order information, but less over ratio information, and vise
versa. Particularly, the order-preserving and ratio-preserving schemes are the special
cases when λ = 1 and 0, respectively.
5.7 Experimental Analysis
In this section, we investigate the efficacy of the proposed Butterfly∗ approaches.
Specifically, the experiments are designed to measure the following three properties:
1) privacy guarantee: the effectiveness against both intra-window and inter-window
inference; 2) result utility: the degradation of the output accuracy, the order and ratio
preservation, and the trade-off among these utility metrics; 3) execution efficiency:
the time taken to perform our approaches. We start with describing the datasets and
the setup of the experiments.
5.7.1 Experimental Setting
We tested our solutions over both synthetic and real datasets. The synthetic dataset
T20I4D50K is obtained by using the data generator as described in [5], which mimics
transactions from retail stores. The real datasets used include: 1) BMS-WebView-
1, which contains a few months of clickstream data from an e-commerce web site;
2) BMS-POS, which contains several years of point-of-sale from a large number of
electronic retailers; 3) Mushroom in UCI KDD archive4, which is used widely in
4http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/
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machine learning research. All these datasets have been used in frequent pattern
mining over streams [26].
We built our Butterfly∗ prototype on top of Moment [26], a streaming fre-
quent pattern mining framework, which finds closed frequent itemsets over a sliding
window model. By default, the minimum support C and vulnerable support K are
set as 25 and 5, respectively, and the window size is set as 2K. Note that the set-
ting here is designed to test the effectiveness of our approaches with high ratio of
vulnerable/minimum threshold (K/C). All the experiments were performed over a
workstation with Intel Xeon 3.20GHz and 4GB main memory, running Red Hat Linux
9.0 operating system. The algorithm is implemented in C++ and compiled using g++
3.4.
5.7.2 Experimental Results
To provide an in-depth understanding of our output-privacy protection schemes, we
evaluated four different versions of Butterfly∗: the basic version, the optimized
version with λ = 0, 0.4, and 1, respectively, over both synthetic and real datasets.
Note that λ = 0 corresponds to the ratio-preserving scheme, while λ = 1 corresponds
to the order-preserving one.
Privacy and Precision
To evaluate the effectiveness of Butterfly∗ in terms of output-privacy protection,
we need to find all potential privacy breaches in the mining output. This is done
by running an analysis program over the results returned by the mining algorithm,
and finding all possible vulnerable patterns that can be inferred through either intra-
window or inter-window inference.
Concretely, given a stream window, let Phv denote all the hard vulnerable patterns
that are inferable from the mining output. After the perturbation, we evaluate the
relative deviation of the inferred value and the estimator for each pattern P ∈ Phv for
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100 continuous windows. we use the following average privacy (avg prig) metric to
measure the effectiveness of privacy preservation:
avg prig = ∑
P ∈Phv
(T ′(P ) −E[T ′(P )])2
T 2(P )∣Phv∣
The decrease of output precision is measured by the average precision degradation
(avg pred) of all frequent itemsets I :
avg pred =∑
I∈I
(T ′(I) − T (I))2
T 2(I)∣I∣
In this set of experiments, we fix the precision-privacy ratio as ǫ/δ = 0.04, and
measure avg prig and avg pred for different settings of ǫ (δ).
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Figure 37: Average privacy guarantee (avg prig) and precision degradation
(avg pred).
Specifically, the four plots in the top tier of Figure 37 show that as the value
of δ increases, all four versions of Butterfly∗ provide similar amount of average
privacy protection for all the datasets, far above the minimum privacy guarantee
δ. The four plots in the lower tier show that as σ increases from 0 to 0.04, the
output precision decreases; however, all four versions of Butterfly∗ have average
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precision degradation below the system-supplied maximum threshold ǫ. Also note
that among all the schemes, basic Butterfly∗ achieves the minimum precision loss,
for given privacy requirement. This can be explained by the fact that the basic scheme
considers no semantic relationships, and sets all the biases as zero, while optimized
Butterfly∗ trades precision for other utility-related metrics. Although the basic
scheme maximally preserves the precision, it may not be optimal in the sense of other
utility metrics, as shown next.
Order and Ratio
For given privacy and precision requirement (ǫ, δ), we measure the effectiveness of
Butterfly∗ in preserving order and ratio of frequent itemsets.
The quality of order preservation is evaluated by the proportion of order-preserved
pairs over all possible pairs, referred to as the rate of order preserved pairs (ropp):
ropp =
∑I,J∈I and T (I)≤T (J) 1T ′(I)≤T ′(J)
C2
∣I ∣
where 1x is the indicator function, returning 1 if condition x holds, and 0 otherwise.
Analogously, the quality of ratio preservation is evaluated by the fraction of the
number of (k,1/k) probability-preserved pairs over the number of possible pairs, re-
ferred to as the rate of ratio preserved pairs (rrpp) (k is set 0.95 in all the experiments):
rrpp =











In this set of experiments, we vary the precision-privacy ratio ǫ/δ for fixed δ =
0.4, and measure the ropp and rrpp for four versions of Butterfly∗ (the parameter
γ = 2 in all the experiments), as shown in Figure 38.
As predicted by our theoretical analysis, the order-preserving (λ = 1) and ratio-
preserving (λ = 0) bias settings are fairly effective, both outperform all other schemes
at their ends. The ropp and rrpp increase as the ratio of ǫ/δ grows, due to the fact
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Figure 38: Average order preservation (avg ropp) and ratio preservation (avg rrpp).
that larger ǫ/δ offers more adjustable bias therefore leading to better quality of order
or ratio preservation.
It is also noticed that order-preserving scheme has the worst performance in terms
of avg rrpp, even worse than the basic approach. This is explained by that in order to
distinguish overlapping FECs, the order-preserving scheme may significantly distort
the ratio of pairs of FECs. In all these cases, the hybrid scheme λ = 0.4 achieves the
second best in terms of avg rrpp and avg ropp, and an overall best quality when order
and ratio information is equally important.
Tuning of Parameters γ and λ
Next we give a detailed discussion on the setting of the parameters γ and λ.
Specifically, γ controls the depth of dynamic programming in the order-preserving
bias setting. Intuitively, a larger γ leads to better quality of order preservation, but
also higher time and space complexity. We desire to characterize the gain of the
quality of order preservation with respect to γ, and find the setting that balances the
150
quality and efficiency.



























Figure 39: Average rate of order-preserved pairs with respect to setting of γ.
For all four datasets, we measure the ropp with respect to the setting of γ, with
result shown in Figure 39. It is noted that the quality of order preservation increases
sharply at certain points γ = 2 or 3, and the trend becomes much flatter after that.
This is explained by that in most real datasets, the distribution of FECs is not
extremely dense; under proper setting of (ǫ, δ), a FEC can intersect with only 2 or 3
neighboring FECs on average. Therefore, the setting of small γ is usually sufficient
for most datasets.









































Figure 40: Trade-off between order preservation and ratio preservation.
The setting of λ balances the quality of order and ratio preservation. For each
dataset, we evaluate ropp and rrpp with different settings of λ (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and
1) and precision-privacy ratio ǫ/δ (0.3, 0.6 and 0.9), as shown in Figure 40.
These plots give good estimation of the gain of order preservation, for given cost
of ratio preservation that one is willing to sacrifice. A larger ǫ/δ gives more room for
this adjustment. In most cases, the setting of λ = 0.4 offers a good balance between
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the two metrics. The trade-off plots could be made more accurate by choosing more
settings of λ and ǫ/δ to explore more points in the space.
Execution Efficiency
In the last set of experiments, we measure the computation overhead of Butterfly∗
over the original mining algorithm for different settings of minimum support C. We
divide the execution time into two parts contributed by the mining algorithm (mining
algorithm) and Butterfly∗ algorithm (butterfly), respectively. Note that we do
not distinguish basic and optimized Butterfly∗, since basic Butterfly∗ involves
simple perturbation operations, with unnoticeable cost. The window size is set 5K
for all four datasets.
The result plotted in Figure 41 shows clearly that the overhead of Butterfly∗
is much less significant than the mining algorithm; therefore, it can be readily imple-
mented atop existing stream mining algorithms. Further, while the current versions
of Butterfly∗ are window-based, it is expected that an incremental version of
Butterfly∗ can achieve even lower overhead.















































Figure 41: Overhead of Butterfly∗ algorithms in stream mining systems.
It is noted that in most cases, the running time of both mining algorithm and
Butterfly∗ algorithm grows significantly as C decreases; however, the growth of the
overhead of Butterfly∗ is much less evident compared with the mining algorithm
itself. This is expected since as the minimum support decreases, the number of
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frequent itemsets increases super-linearly, but the number of FECs has much lower
growth rate, which is the most influential factor for the performance of Butterfly∗.
5.8 Related Work
5.8.1 Disclosure Control in Statistical Database
The most straightforward solution to preserving output privacy is to detect and elim-
inate all potential privacy breaches, i.e., the detecting-then-removing strategy, which
stemmed from the inference control in statistical and census databases from 1970’s.
Motivated by the need of publishing census data, the statistics literature focuses
mainly on identifying and protecting the privacy of sensitive data entries in contin-
gency tables, or tables of counts corresponding to cross-classification of the microdata.
Extensive research has been done in statistical databases to provide statistical
information without compromising sensitive information regarding individuals [27,
113, 1]. The techniques, according to their application scenarios, can be broadly
classified as query restriction and data perturbation. The query restriction family
includes controlling the size of query results [46], restricting the overlap between
successive queries [38], suppressing the cells of small size [33], and auditing queries
to check privacy compromises [27]; the data perturbation family includes sampling
microdata [37], swapping data entries between different cells [34], and adding noises to
the microdata [121] or the query results [37]. Data perturbation by adding statistical
noise is an important method of enhancing privacy. The idea is to perturb the true
value by a small amount ǫ where ǫ is a random variable with mean = 0 and a small
variance = σ2. While we adopt the method of perturbation from statistical literature,
one of our key technical contributions is the generalization of the basic scheme by
adjusting the mean to accommodate various semantic constraints in the applications
of mining output.
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5.8.2 Input Privacy Preservation
Intensive research efforts have been directed to addressing the input-privacy issues.
The work of [6, 3] paved the way for the rapidly expanding field of privacy-preserving
data mining; they established the main theme of privacy-preserving data mining so
as to provide sufficient privacy guarantee while minimizing the information loss in the
mining output. Under this framework, a variety of techniques have been developed.
The work of [6, 3, 42, 25] applied data perturbation, specifically random noise
addition, to association rule mining, with the objective of maintaining sufficiently
accurate estimation of frequent patterns while preventing disclosure of specific trans-
actions (records). In the context of data dissemination and publication, group-based
anonymization approaches have been considered. The existing work can be roughly
classified as two categories: the first one aims at devising anonymization models
and principles, as the criteria to measure the quality of privacy protection, e.g., k-
anonymity [119], l-diversity [98], (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity [132], etc.; the second category
of work explores the possibility of fulfilling the proposed anonymization principles,
meanwhile preserving the data utility to the maximum extent, e.g., [84, 109]. Crypto-
graphic tools have also been used to construct privacy-preserving data mining proto-
cols, e.g., secure multi-party computation [94, 123]. Nevertheless, all these techniques
focus on protecting input privacy for static datasets, Quite recently, the work [90]
addresses the problem of preserving input privacy for streaming data, by online anal-
ysis of correlation structure of multivariate streams. The work [21] distinguishes the
scenario of data custodian, where the data collector is entrusted, and proposes a per-
turbation scheme that guarantees no change in the mining output. In [73, 65], it is
shown that a hacker can potentially employ spectral analysis to separate the random
noise from the real values for multi-attribute data.
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5.8.3 Output Privacy Preservation
Compared with the wealth of techniques developed for preserving input privacy, the
attention given to protecting mining output is fairly limited. The existing liter-
ature can be broadly classified as two categories. The first category attempts to
propose general frameworks for detecting potential privacy breaches. For example,
the work [71] proposes an empirical testing scheme for evaluating if the constructed
classifier violates the privacy constraint. The second category focuses on proposing
algorithms to address the detected breaches for specific mining tasks. For instance, it
is shown in [11] that the association rules can be exploited to infer information about
individual transactions; while the work [126] proposes a scheme to block the infer-




XSTAR: PRIVACY-AWARE LOCATION DATA
MANAGEMENT
6.1 Introduction
With ubiquitous wireless connectivity and continued advance in mobile positioning
technologies (e.g., cellular phones, GPS-like devices), recent years have witnessed the
explosive growth of location-based services (LBS). Examples include location-based
store finders (“Where is the nearest gas station to my current location?”), traffic con-
dition tracking (“What is the traffic condition on Highway 85 North?”), and spatial
alarms (“Remind me to drop off a letter when I am near a post office.”). The mobile
users obtain such services by issuing queries together with their location informa-
tion to the LBS service providers. Nevertheless, while offering great convenience and
business opportunities, LBS also opens the door for misuse of mobile users’ private
location information [136, 72]. For example, the collected location information can
be exploited to spam users with unwanted advertisements, execute physical stalk-
ing [47, 122], or perform inference about personal medical records by knowing user’s
frequent visits to specific clinics.
A plethora of work has been done on the anonymization of location information
of mobile users [14, 17, 44, 56, 51, 50, 70, 69, 102]. While most existing solutions
target spatial-temporal obfuscation techniques under the random waypoint mobility
model [20, 66], where mobile users can move in arbitrary directions at random speed,
they fail to address the vulnerabilities of mobile users traveling over roads, where
both the user mobility and the location-based service processing are constrained by
the underlying road networks.
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More specifically, the protection enough under the random waypoint model may be
insufficient under the network-constrained mobility model. For example, the spatial
cloaking techniques protect users’ privacy by blurring their exact location information
with cloaked spatial areas, and measure the amount of protection as the area size.
Such measurement however, is inapplicable under the road network model, since a
large area may contain a single road segment, which enables the adversary to track
down the mobile user fairly easily. Furthermore, the condition of the road networks,
e.g., the network topology, has considerable impact on the query processing and
communication efficiency, which should be a critical concern for developing location
privacy solutions. For instance, the complexity of computing the network distance of
two objects, a most fundamental operation in location-based query processing, varies
significantly with the underlying network structures.
In this work, we present a general framework for location privacy protection under
the network-constrained mobility model. Compared with prior work, our framework
highlights three distinct features.
First, we argue that the protection for mobile users’ privacy should be provided
along two orthogonal dimensions: 1) location anonymity, which advocates that it
should be difficult to identify a specific user among a set of users, the anonymous set,
based on their location information; and 2) location diversity, which promotes that it
should be hard to link a specific user with a specific location (such as a road segment)
with high certainty. Furthermore, such privacy requirements should be customizable
and supported on a per query basis. In this following, we refer to the process of
achieving location-anonymity and location-diversity as location anonymization.
Second, we regard the attack resilience of the performed anonymization and the
cost of processing queries with anonymous location information (including both com-
putation and communication costs) as two critical measures for designing location
privacy solutions. We propose corresponding analytical models to quantitatively
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evaluate the efficacy of location anonymization models. In particular, we reveal the
inherent tradeoff between these two metrics through a formal study of two basic
anonymization models.
Third and most importantly, we present XStar, a novel star graph based location
anonymization model, to achieve the optimal tradeoff between high query processing
efficiency and strong inference attack resilience. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first model that takes account of both measures. In implementing XStar, we
further introduce a suite of novel optimizations to enhance its performance. Exten-
sive experimental evaluation is carried out to validate the analytical models and the
efficacy of XStar.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we intro-
duce fundamental concepts and models, and discuss the design objectives of location
privacy solutions; Section 6.3 describes in detail the design of XStar, a novel star
graph based anonymization model; The theoretical analysis of XStar in terms of
query processing cost and inference attack resilience are presented in Section 6.4
and Section 6.5, respectively; Section 6.6 addresses detailed issues of implementing
XStar and proposes multi-folded optimization strategies; The proposed solution is
empirically evaluated in Section 6.7; Section 6.8 surveys relevant literatures.
6.2 Overview
In this section, we intend to give an overview of the design of XStar. We start with
introducing the concept of road network aware location privacy, and then present our
model of anonymous query processing; through an analysis of two extreme anonymiza-
tion models in terms of attack resilience and query processing cost, we highlight our
design objectives of location privacy solutions; finally, we outline the design of the
XStar location anonymization model.
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6.2.1 Road Network Model
In this chapter, we model a road network as an un-directed graph G = (VG,EG), with
the node set VG and the edge set EG representing road junctions and direct road links,
respectively. An example of the road network model is shown in Figure 42. We use
dG(n) to denote the degree of a node n with respect to the graph G. Specifically, n
is called an intersection node if dG(n) ≥ 3, an intermediate node if dG(n) = 2, and an



























Figure 42: A road network model.
To model the restriction of users’ mobility by the underlying road network, we
introduce the concept of segment : a segment s is a sequence of edges (n0n1, n1n2, . . .,
nL−1nL)1 where {ni}Li=0 are all distinct, and the degrees of the nodes satisfy dG(ni) ≥ 3
for i = 0 or L, and dG(ni) = 2 otherwise, i.e., n0 and nL are intersection or end nodes,
all others are intermediate nodes.
Note that each edge is either a segment itself, or belongs to a unique segment, i.e.,
a road network can be uniquely partitioned into a set of segments. Hence, we assume
the following scenario: every mobile user registered with LBS is moving along certain
road segment, and sends her location-based query together with the information of
her current position to the LBS provider, which then executes the query based on the
provided location information.
1Without ambiguity, below we use the sequence of nodes n0 . . . nL to denote the segment (n0n1,
n1n2, . . ., nL−1nL).
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6.2.2 Location Privacy Model
We consider two types of privacy concerns arising in LBS under the road network
mobility model, namely location anonymity and location diversity. The first require-
ment ensures the indistinguishability of a specific mobile user among a set of users
(anonymous set), and is usually captured by the location k-anonymity model [56, 50].
Definition 39 (Location k-anonymity). The published location of a user is said to
be k-anonymous, if there at at least (k−1) other active users with the same published
location.
However, ensuring location k-anonymity alone (the goal of most prior work [14,
56, 51, 102]) does not provide sufficient protection when the underlying road network
is taken into consideration. For example, in Figure 42, assume that users u1 and u2
publish their k-anonymous location as A1 and A2, respectively. Given that A1 and
A2 are of same size and contain same number of active users, u1 and u2 are considered
to enjoy equivalent amount of privacy protection, under the criterion of location k-
anonymity. However, it is much easier for the adversary to track down u1 than u2,
since u1 is associated with a single road segment n5n6, while u2 is possibly associated
with three. Intuitively, from the view of the adversary, the difficulty of tracking a user
is in proportion to the number of segments that she is possibly associated with. This
motivates us to introduce location diversity [98] as the second dimension of privacy
measurement.
Definition 40 (Segment l-diversity). The published location of a user is said to be
l-diverse, if it satisfies location k-anonymity, and contains at least l different road
segments.
In this framework, every mobile user u specifies customized privacy requirements
as (δuk, δul ) in terms of k-anonymity and l-diversity on a per query level. Besides, to
guarantee the quality of received services, e.g., response time, each user u may also
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specify customized QoS requirements as maximum spatial tolerance σus and temporal
tolerance σut : the spatial tolerance bounds the expansion of the anonymized location,
while the temporal tolerance specifies the tolerable delay due to the anonymization
operation (if a request could not be honored within σut , it is typically discarded).
To fulfill such requirements, we introduce the operation of location anonymization:
Definition 41 (Location Anonymization). Let q denote a location-based query issued
by a mobile user u. Location anonymization transforms the exact location information
associated with q to some approximate version that satisfies both privacy and QoS
requirements as specified by u.
With road networks as the background context, we assume that the anonymization
operation is performed on the basis of road segments, and an anonymous location is











Figure 43: Overall architecture of XStar.
Furthermore, in this work, we assume a trusted, third party location anonymiza-
tion engine that acts as a middle layer between mobile users and the LBS provider,
and performs location anonymization. Specifically, it is responsible for (1) receiving
the query and the exact position information from the mobile user; (2) anonymizing
the location information according to the user’s privacy requirements, and relaying
it to the LBS provider; (3) generating the exact query result from the candidate
answer returned by the service provider by properly filtering false positive informa-
tion, and (4) delivering the exact answer to the client. Figure 43 sketches the overall
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architecture of this framework.
6.2.3 Anonymous Query Processing Model
Now we consider the processing of queries with anonymous location information (a set
of segments). Without loss of generality, we concentrate our discussion on k nearest
neighbors (k-NN) style queries, in which the user requests for the k objects of interest
with the minimum distance to her current position, called the query focal point. The
distance between two points on the road network is defined as the length of their
shortest path.
Intensive research has been directed to the query processing for road network
databases recently [28, 63, 78, 103, 108]. While the proposed approaches differ in as-
sumptions and techniques, we abstract two fundamental operations underlying these
approaches to build our model, which is therefore generally applicable for most state-
of-the-art frameworks: 1) segment-based operation, which takes the query q and a
segment s as input, and returns the set of objects on s that satisfy the query con-
dition, denoted by O(q, s); 2) node-based operation, which takes q and a node n
as input, and returns the set of objects in the vicinity of n that satisfy the query
condition, denoted by O(q, n).
We base our basic query processing model on the following theorem (the proof is
omitted due to the space constraint).
Theorem 17. For a k-NN query q with query point p on a segment s, with ns0 and
ns1 as the two ends of s, the query result R(q, p) satisfies the following condition:
R(q, p) ⊆ O(q, s) ∪O(q, ns0) ∪O(q, ns1)
This theorem amounts to saying that the result of q must be included in the
union of the following two sets of objects: (1) the objects of interest on s, and (2)
the k nearest objects of interest to the two nodes ns0 and n
s
1. An example is given in
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Figure 42. The user u issues a k-NN query q with k = 3 while moving on the segment
n5n6. It is clear that the exact answer R(q, p) = {o5, o6, o7} appears in the union of
O(q, n5n6) = {o5, o6}, O(q, n5) = {o1, o6, o7} and O(q, n6) = {o5, o3, o4}.
Hence, given a location-based query q with its query point on a segment s, the
processing of q comprises one segment-based operation with respect to s, and two
node-based operations with respect to ns0 and n
s
1. We now extend this model to
the case of anonymous queries involving multiple segments. We first introduce the
concept of boundary nodes.
Definition 42 (Boundary Node). Given a set of segments S in the road network G,
the set of boundary nodes of S, denoted by BVS, is defined as:
BVS = {n∣n ∈ VS,dG(n) > dS(n)}
That is BVS are those nodes in S that are connected to the rest of the network.
For instance, for the set of segments S = {n2n1n4, n2n6, n2n3n8} in Figure 42, its
boundary node set is given as BVS = {n4, n6, n8}.
For a query q with associated anonymous location as a set of segments S, the
evaluation of q consists of two parts: (1) the objects of interest on the segments of
S, i.e., ∪s∈SO(q, s); and (2) the results as q issued on the boundary nodes of S, i.e.,
∪n∈BVSO(q, n). Formally,
R(q, S) ⊆ (∪s∈SO(q, s)) ∪ (∪n∈BVSO(q, n))
6.2.4 Two Motivating Schemes
The focus of this work is to develop robust and scalable location anonymization
model. While multiple models are available to perform location anonymization to
meet users’ privacy requirements, we are interested in the optimal one that leads to
(1) low query processing cost and (2) high attack resilience. Below we present two
motivating models, based on random sampling and network expansion, respectively,
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Figure 44: Two näıve location anonymization models.
Random Sampling




), and maximum spatial
tolerance σus , at each iteration, this scheme samples one segment at random from the
spatial region as defined by σus and adds it to u’s anonymous location. The process
continues until both requirements (δuk, δ
u
l ) are satisfied. As an example, consider a
user u in Figure 44(a) with (δuk, δ
u
l ) = (5,5). With the Random Sampling scheme,
four segments are randomly selected (containing four active users {ui}4i=1), in addition
to the original one that q is associated with, as represented by bold lines.
Network Expansion
At the other extreme of the spectrum, one can perturb u’s location based on the
network expansion scheme [108]: starting from the original segment which u is on,
following Dijkstra’s algorithm, one incrementally adds in neighboring segments, or-
dered by their network distances (mid points) to u’s position. The process halts when
u’s privacy requirements are met. For example, as shown in Figure 44(b). the four
segments with the minimum network distance to u’s position are added incrementally
to form u’s anonymous location.
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Discussion
It is observed that under the same requirements (δk, δl, σs), the Random Sampling
scheme results in a set of segments evenly distributed over the spatial region as defined
by σs, which is essentially equivalent to issuing a set of queries at different locations,
thus leading to high query processing cost. However, the strength of this scheme lies
in its high resilience against inference attacks since the set of segments are selected
at random.
In contrast, the Network Expansion scheme results in a set of segments lying
in a tightly compact structure. As will be theoretically proved in Section 6.4, such
structure leads to the minimal query processing cost (the number of boundary nodes
grows sub-linearly with the number of segments), which is further reduced by the fact
that the expanded network is a partial result in the query processing [108]. However,
the Network Expansion scheme suffers low attack resilience as the expansion
process follows a best-first search strategy which can be potentially exploited by the
adversary to perform a reverse-engineering attack.
6.2.5 XSTAR: A Star Graph Based Approach
Motivated by the strengths and weaknesses of the two schemes above, we develop
XStar, a star-graph based location anonymization model, aiming at achieving an
optimal balance between low query processing cost and high attack resilience. Specif-
ically, XStar achieves this balance in two main phases: first, it groups neighboring
queries into basic structures, called cloaking star . The goal of this phase is to carefully
choose the set of stars that minimize the computation and communication costs; then
it adjusts the cloaking stars resulted from the previous step, and merges neighboring
stars into super-star structures if necessary, to fulfill the privacy requirement of each
individual user.
Intuitively, in XStar, the low query processing cost (see Section 6.4) is guaranteed
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by two main factors: (1) the cost-aware cloaking-star selection scheme, and (2) the
compact structure of the anonymous location as resulted from the basic star-graph
structure and the operation of merging neighboring stars. Meanwhile, the high attack
resilience (see Section 6.5) is contributed by two factors: (1) employing the cloaking
star as the basic unit of location anonymization, and (2) injecting randomness into
the cloaking-star merging operation.
Furthermore, in implementing XStar (see Section 6.6), we propose a suite of
multi-folded optimizations to improve its efficiency, and introduce sharing processing
of multiple queries for the service provider, which leads to considerable performance
enhancement.
6.3 Anatomy
The location anonymization operation of XStar is composed of two main phases,
cloaking-star construction and super-star construction. Concretely, in the first phase,
a set of neighboring queries are grouped into a cloaking-star structure resulted from
a cost-aware selection procedure; in the second phase, the privacy requirements of
individual users are imposed by merging a set of neighboring stars into a super-
star structure. The details of the two phases are presented in Section 6.3.1 and
Section 6.3.2, respectively.
6.3.1 Cloaking-Star Construction
We first introduce the concept of cloaking star , which serves as the fundamental
structure for location anonymization in XStar.
Definition 43 (Cloaking Star). For an intersection node n in the road network G,
the cloaking star φn is the subgraph of G consisting of n and all the segments adjacent
on n.

































Figure 45: Illustration of XStar model.
φn. For example, in the left plot of Figure 45, the star φn5 comprises the node n5 and
the segments {n5n4, n5n6, n5n10}.
The star structure possesses several desirable properties for our purpose: (i) it
preserves the locality of neighboring segments, therefore employing it as the unit of
anonymization is expected to lead to a compact structure of the anonymous location;
(ii) it is amenable to indexing, since only the node identifier is needed to represent
a star without information loss, hence using it to represent the anonymous location
can reduce the communication cost, and ease the implementation.
Given a road network G = (VG,EG), one can construct a corresponding star net-
work Gφ = (VGφ ,EGφ), where each node of Gφ represents a star in G, and two nodes
of Gφ are adjacent if their corresponding stars in G share a segment. The right plot
of Figure 45 shows the star network corresponding to the left road network. Note
that in Gφ, all the edges are of unit length. We define the distance between two stars
φi and φj in a road network G as their network distance in Gφ, called hop, denoted
by hG(φi, φj). For example, in Figure 45, hG(φn6 , φn10) = 2, as their shortest path in
Gφ is composed of φn6 , φn5 and φn10 .
A segment is marked as active if it is associated with at least one active query.
To make our scheme resilient against the inference attacks (see Section 6.5), and
amenable to the sharing processing of multiple queries (see Section 6.6), all the queries
on the same segment share the same anonymous location.
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If a star φ is chosen as the anonymous location for the queries on certain active
segment s, it is said that φ is “selected”, and s is “assigned” to φ, denoted by s← φ.
Consider a segment s with two ends as ns0 and n
s
1. If both dG(nss) ≥ 3 and dG(nst) ≥ 3
hold, then s is associated with two stars φnss and φnst , e.g., φn5 and φn6 for n5n6 in




. In a sequel, over the whole network, one need to choose a set of stars Φ to
cover all the active segments.
To achieve low query processing cost, it is desired to incorporate the cost model
into this selection phase. Formally, let Cost(φ) be the cost of executing a typical
query with the anonymous location as φ (as will be discussed in Section 6.4), AS
denote the set of current active segments in the road network G, and Φ be the set of




s.t. ∀s ∈ AS,∃φ ∈ Φ, s ← φ
This cost-aware segment-to-star assignment scheme aims at finding a set of stars
Φ that cover all the active segments, with the lowest overall cost. Note that this
modeling ignores the numbers of queries on active segments for simplicity. However,
as indicated in the empirical evaluation, it has captured the essential elements of
the overall cost of query processing at the server, especially after introducing the
machinery of sharing processing of multiple queries (see Section 6.6).
Nevertheless, no efficient solution to this optimization problem exists, unless P =
NP, as shown in the next theorem (the proof is referred to our technical report).
Theorem 18. Reductible from the weighted vertex cover problem, this cloaking star
selection problem is NP-Hard.
Consequently, instead of attempting to find a global optimal solution, we propose
an efficient randomized algorithm that can find high-quality approximate solution,
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and is robust against inference attacks. The procedure of inserting a new arrival
query q associated with segment s (InsertQuery) is sketched in the following four cases:




are already selected, yet s is not covered, one assigns s to one of the two stars with
probability in reverse proportion to their corresponding costs; (3) if only one star
φnss or φnst has been selected, s is assigned to that star; (4) if neither φnss nor φnst is
selected, one assigns s to the one of them with probability reversely proportional to
the corresponding cost.
Function InsertRequest(a new request q)
// insertion of a new request
// Iφ:active star index
s ← the segment containing q;1
case s is already assigned to φnst (or φnss)2
return φnst (or φnss);3
case {φnss, φnst} ∩ Iφ = {φnss, φnst}4





) or φnst o.w.;5
case {φnss, φnst} ∩ Iφ = φnss (or φnst )6
assign s to φnss (or φnst );7
case {φnss, φnst} ∩ Iφ = ∅8
// neither star is selected yet
if dG(nss) = 1 or dG(nst) = 1 then9
// only one end corresponds to a star
add φnst (or φnss) to Iφ;10
assign s to φnst (or φnss);11
else12
// both ends are intersection nodes





) or φnst o.w.;13
add φnss (or φnst ) to Iφ;14
return φnst (or φnss);15











guarantees that the quality of the star set Φ selected by our randomized algorithm
does not deviate far from the optimal one, as shown in the lemma below (the proof
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is referred to our technical report):
Lemma 7. Let Costopt be the cost achieved by the optimal star set. The randomized
star-selection algorithm achieves the cost Costrnd satisfying E [Costrnd] ≤ 2 ⋅Costopt.
It is also important to note that the quality of the selected stars does not de-
grade with continuous insertion/deletion of queries, given the fact that it makes no
assumption about the order of the arrival of the queries, which is a desirable feature
in supporting real-time road network based LBS.
6.3.2 Super-Star Construction
In the previous phase, a set of stars are selected to cover active segments, with the
criteria of processing cost measure. In this phase, we fulfill the privacy requirements
of mobile users. Concretely, this objective is achieved by merging a set of nearby
stars to form a “super-star” structure, which then serves as the anonymous location
for the queries inside.
Definition 44 (Super Star). A set of stars {φi}∣ψ∣i=1 are said to form a super-star ψ if
the subgraph consisting of {φi}∣ψ∣i=1 is connected, where ∣ψ∣ denotes the number of stars
in ψ (the cardinality of ψ).
As an example, in Figure 45, the user u1 is assigned to the star φn5, while u2
and u3 assigned to φn10. However, the numbers of segments and active users in φn5
or φn10 alone do not satisfy users’ privacy requirement (δul , δuk ) as (5,3), (5,2) and
(4,3), respectively. By merging φn5 and φn10, one obtains a superstar ψ that meets
the requirements of all users involved.
The privacy profile of each user u considered in XStar is a tuple (δuk, δul ), which
specifies the k-anonymity and l-diversity, respectively. Besides, to guarantee the
service quality, e.g., to limit the query result size, each user u is also encouraged
to specify the spatial and temporal tolerance (σus , σut ), which indicate the bound on
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the magnitude of the anonymous location, and the tolerable time delay due to the
anonymization operation, respectively. Specifically, given a super-star ψ, σus is defined
in terms of the hop count between the star covering u and the furthest star in ψ, and
while a query can not be honored within σut , it is typically discarded.
Now we describe how to construct the super-star that satisfies the privacy pro-
files of all users involved in it. The procedure of merging stars to form super-stars
(MergeStar) is sketched as follows: starting from an initial star φ, one applies a bottom-
up aggregation, incrementally adding in neighboring stars until the privacy require-
ments of all users inside the super-star are satisfied, or the spatial tolerance of certain
user is reached. Concretely, one first checks if the star φ already satisfies the privacy
requirement of users in it; if not, one iteratively adds in neighboring active stars if
possible. At each iteration, one first identifies all the neighboring stars whose merg-
ing with current superstar ψ do not violate the spatial tolerance of any user inside; if
such star exists, one randomly picks one to merge with ψ to form a new super-star.
This expansion process repeats until meeting the privacy requirements of all the users
inside ψ, or reports failure (all the involved queries will be pushed back to the stack
waiting for anonymization triggered by new arrival queries).
6.4 Model of Processing Cost
The cost of processing a location-based query consists of both the query execution
cost at the LBS provider, and the communication cost of transferring the query results
back to the mobile clients on the move. In this section, we establish an analytical
model to compare the three alternative location anonymization models considered in
this chapter from the perspective of query processing cost.
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6.4.1 Measurement of Cost
Query Execution Cost
We use Cs and Cn to denote the computational cost (in terms of both CPU and IO)
of a segment-based operation and a node-based one, respectively. Note that both Cs
and Cn may vary from segment to segment and from node to node, depending on
the condition of the road network (e.g., the density of objects), the predicate of each
query (e.g., the parameter k of a k-NN query) and the system implementation (e.g.,
the performance of the look-up table). In the XStar prototype system, we set Cs
and Cn statically for a typical setting. One direction of our ongoing research is to
develop finer granularity and dynamic cost model.
Hence, for a typical query with a set of segments S as its anonymous location, the
execution cost, Costexec(S), can be approximately estimated as follows: Costexec(S)
= Cn ⋅ ∣BVS ∣ + Cs ⋅ ∣S∣, where ∣ ⋅ ∣ denotes the cardinality of the set.
Communication Cost
Now we analyze the additional communication cost incurred due to the location
anonymization operation. We measure the communication cost in terms of the length
of the sent and received messages. Recall the XStar framework in Section 6.2, for
given privacy requirement, i.e., stable number of segments in the anonymous location,
the cost of sending/receiving the candidate answer becomes the dominating communi-
cation cost between the location anonymization engine and the LBS provider. Given
a k-NN query q and a set of segments S as the anonymous location, ∣R(q, S)∣ can be
estimated as: ∣R(q, S)∣ ≈ k ⋅ ∣BVS ∣ + ∑s∈S ∣O(q, s)∣, where the first component corre-
sponds to the result size of issuing a k-NN query over each boundary node of S, and
the second represents all the objects on the segments of S.
Let ρo denote the average number of objects on a segment, and Co be the cost
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of sending/receiving an object o. The communication cost for an anonymous k-
NN query, with S as the anonymous location, is estimated as: Costcomm(S) = Co ⋅
[k ⋅ ∣BVS ∣ + ρo ⋅ ∣S∣].
6.4.2 Cost Analysis of Anonymization Models
Now we analyze the impact of the thee location anonymization models over the query
processing overhead. For ease of exposition, we consider a uniform grid as the un-
derlying road network, and assume that all the static objects of interest and active
mobile users are distributed over the network with average density of ρo and ρu per
segment. Consider a typical query q with (δk, δl) specified as k-anonymity, l-diversity,
respectively. Thus its anonymous location comprises a set of segments S, with ∣S∣ =
max(δk/ρu, δl). It is noticed that for fixed ∣S∣, the size of the bound node set ∣BVS ∣
becomes the dominating factor in the two cost models above. Thus in the following,
we focus on analyzing ∣BVS ∣ for each scheme.
Random Sampling
With the assumptions above, the Random Sampling scheme results in a set of
segments S with a boundary node set of size 2 ⋅ ∣S∣ in the worst case, where no two
selected segments are adjacent. Clearly, both the query execution and the communi-
cation costs grow linearly with the number of segments ∣S∣.
Network Expansion
In contrast, the Network Expansion scheme results in a set of segments S with
∣BVS ∣ = √∣S∣ + 2 in the worst case. Given the fact that the cost of node-based
operation usually dominates the computation, i.e., Cn ≫ Cs, here the execution cost
grows sub-linearly, square-root-wise, more precisely, with the cardinality of S.
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XStar
We have shown in Section 6.3.1 that the cost-aware star selection scheme guarantees
the low overall cost of the set of cloaking stars. Here we concentrate our analysis on
the second phase of XStar, super-star construction.
To be attack resilient, the MergeStar operation picks neighboring active stars at
random, without considering any cost metrics. However the resulted anonymous lo-
cation, usually exhibits fairly desirable properties in terms of query processing costs
for two reasons: (1) the star structure preserves the locality of neighboring segments,
i.e., in a star, the number of boundary nodes is no more than that of the segments
involved; (2) the star selected at each iteration must satisfy the user-specified maxi-
mum spatial tolerance requirement, therefore leading to a highly compact super-star
structure.
It can be proved that the XStar scheme produces a super-star ψ (with segments
as ∣S∣) with ∣BVS ∣ no more than (2∣S∣ + 4)/3, i.e., approximately one third of that
under the Random Sampling model. Also note that this worst case occurs only at
the extreme case where the stars forming ψ lay in a chain structure, with probability
lower than (1/4)∣S∣/3. In real applications, as verified by our experiments, XStar
usually leads to anonymous location with quality comparable to that achieved by the
Network Expansion model.
6.5 Model of Inference Attack
The obfuscation of the original location information is only a part of the story, one
needs to consider the resilience of the anonymization against the adversary’s attack:
based on her prior knowledge or understanding regarding the working anonymization
model, the adversary attempts to reveal users’ original location through the blurred
information. For the ease of presentation, in the following discussion, we assume a
homogeneous road network, e.g., a grid.
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Given the anonymous location as a set of segments S, the ideal protection is
achieved if each segment is indistinguishable to the adversary, i.e., from her perspec-
tive, the mobile user is associated with each segment in S with equal probability
1/∣S∣. However, with effective attacks, the adversary can identify that the association
between u and a specific segment s ∈ S has much higher probability than 1/∣S∣, thus
revealing u’s private location with high confidence. We capture such vulnerability
using the notion of Linkability :
Definition 45 (Linkability). For a user u with original location as segment s∗ and
anonymous location as a set of segments S. The linkability Link[u ← s∗∣S,Kad] is
defined as the probability that an adversary can infer that u is associated with s∗
based on S and her background knowledge Kad.
In particular, the background knowledge Kad considered in this work includes (1)
the location anonymization model, (2) the underlying road network structure, and
(3) the estimation of query processing cost for every cloaking star (for XStar only).
Following, we present a general Replay Attack model, which serves to measure attack
resilience of the three location anonymization model.
6.5.1 Replay Attack
In a replay attack, for each segment s ∈ S, by re-running the anonymization algorithm
with s assumed to be the original location, the adversary estimates the likelihood of
s to generates the anonymous location S, Like[S∣u ← s,Kad]. Under this model, the
linkability is calculated as:
Link[u ← s∗∣S,Kad] = Like[S∣u← s∗,Kad]∑s∈S Like[S∣u← s,Kad]
Specifically, we assume that the adversary has full knowledge regarding the loca-
tion anonymization algorithm, A(⋅), which takes a segment s as input, and generates
a set of segments as the anonymous location for s. Therefore, she is able to replay the
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anonymization process: for each s ∈ S, (1) run A(s), and generate a set of segments
S′, with ∣S′∣ = ∣S∣; (2) compute the likelihood Like[S, ∣u ← s,Kad] = ∣S′ ∩ S∣/∣S∣; (3)
pick the segment s+ that leads to the largest likelihood value as the original location,
s+ = argmaxs Like[S∣u← s,Kad].
6.5.2 Analysis of Attack Resilience
In this section, we evaluate the attack resilience of the three anonymization models
with respect to the replay attack.
Random Sampling
In this scheme, the extra (∣S∣−1) segments are selected at random. Therefore following
the replay attack model, the adversary will find that each segment s ∈ S can generate
S with identical probability, i.e., maxs Link[u ← s∣S,Kad] = 1/∣S∣, which implies the
possible strongest protection.
Network Expansion
In this scheme, the (∣S∣ − 1) extra segments are expanded from the original one s∗,
based on their network distance to s∗. Under the replay attack model, the adversary
runs the network expansion algorithm for each s ∈ S. Clearly, s∗ will generate S′ =
S, i.e., the highest likelihood, while other segments tend to result in likelihood no
larger than s∗, therefore highlighting s∗ as the expansion source. This is empirically
verified in our experiments.
XStar
Recall that given the original segment s∗, the first phase of XStar generates a star
φ covering s∗, and the second phase expands from φ and produces a super-star ψ.
Assume that φ consists of the segments {si}ni=1, with the corresponding neighboring
stars as {φi}ni=1. According to the design principle of our star selection scheme, the
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likelihood that u is associated with si, given φ as u’s anonymous location, Like[φ, ∣u←
si,Kad], can be calculated as:
Like[φ∣u← si,Kad] = Cost(φi)
Cost(φ) + Cost(φi) .
Furthermore, the posterior probability Prob[u← si∣φ,Kad] is given by:
Prob[u← si∣φ,Kad] = Like[φ∣u← si,Kad]∑nj=1 Like[φ∣u← sj,Kad]
It is observed that the adversary can identify the association between u and a specific
segment si with high probability only if the cost of φi and other stars are extremely
biased, i.e., Cost(φi)≫ Cost(φj) for all j ≠ i, which however is unusual in real scenarios.
Now consider the second phase, provided the facts that (1) ψ is generated by
randomly expanding from some initial star, and (2) all the stars in ψ contain active
users, and each can initiate and lead to the construction of ψ. Without further
knowledge, from the perspective of the adversary, u is associated with each star
with identical probability. Formally, assume that ψ consists of the stars {φi}mi=1.
The probability that the adversary can infer that u belongs to φi given ψ follows:
Prob[ψ∣u← φi,Kad] = 1/m.
Combining the results above, we can now estimate the linkability under the XStar
model: Link[u ← s∗∣ψ,Kad] = ∑φ∈ψ Prob[u ← s∗∣φ,Kad] ⋅ Prob[u ← φ∣ψ,Kad], where
Prob[u← s∗∣φ,Kad] = 0 if s∗ /∈ φ.
The above analysis is empirically verified in Section 6.7. It is also shown that in
real scenarios, the XStar model provides almost the same amount of resilience as
the Random Sampling model against the replay attack.
6.6 Implementation
In this section, we deal with the issues in implementing XStar in the location
anonymization engine (LAE), and propose multiple optimizations to improve its per-
formance, bringing in considerable enhancement over the basic version.
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6.6.1 Location Anonymization Engine
Algorithm 10: Location Anonymization Engine
// Qq:arrival-query queue, Hq:expiration heap
// Iφ:active-star index, Qφ:ready-star queue
while true do1
Qφ ← ∅;2
// purge of expired requests
while true do3
q ← top entry of H ;4
if q not expired then break;5
φ ← DeleteQuery(q);6
// φ still active
if φ ∈ Iφ then add φ to Qφ;7
// insertion of new requests
if Qq ≠ ∅ then8
q ← first entry of Qq;9
φ← InsertQuery(q);10
add φ to Qφ;11
// location anonymization
while Qφ ≠ ∅ do12
φ← first entry of Qφ;13
MergeStar(φ);14
Algorithm 10 sketches the main procedure of the engine, where the InsertQuery,
DeleteQuery and MergeStar compose a complete framework of location anonymization.
At each iteration, it first purges all expired requests, and pushes the affected active
stars to the ready-star queue Qφ to be processed (line 3-7); it then pops up one new
request q from the query queue Qq, and pushes the selected star φ to Qφ (line 8-11);
finally, it attempts to perform anonymization for each star in Qφ (line 12-14).
6.6.2 Optimizations
Though simple to implement, the basic version of LAE introduced above suffers sev-
eral drawbacks: (1) each request deletion operation results in a trial of anonymizing
the affected star, without checking the success condition; (2) it attempts to anonymize
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the affected star immediately after a new query is inserted. It is expected that a sig-
nificant number of attempts would fail due to insufficient numbers of active users and
segments to satisfy users’ privacy requirement; (3) for each request, the anonymization
process starts from the scratch in a bottom-up manner, thus incurring the scalability
problem.
In this section, we present multi-folded optimizations to improve the success rate
and the scalability of the location anonymization engine. Corresponding to the draw-
backs above, we propose three optimization policies as below.
Lazy Update for Deletion
We devise this policy based on the following observation: for a star φ that is not
anonymized successfully in the previous iteration, if no updates happen to other stars,
then φ can possibly be anonymized only if updates occur to its profile parameters
(δφd , δφk , σφs ), which are defined as the maximum k-anonymity, maximum l-diversity,
and minimum spatial tolerance values associated with the queries in φ, respectively.
Therefore, we introduce the policy of lazy update for the deletion operation: for a
query being deleted, one attempts to anonymize the affected star φ only if its profile
(δφd , δφk , σφs ) is updated.
Batch Insertion of Queries
To improve the success rate of the anonymization operation, at each iteration, one
can insert a batch of new queries, i.e., waiting for a period of time, before beginning
the anonymization process. Concretely, a parameter Tw is specified as the waiting
time before performing the anonymization, and it can be adjusted to trade the average
processing burden over the anonymization engine for the success rate of the operation.
Also, Tw should be set according to users’ maximum tolerable service delay. The
optimal setting of Tw is empirically discussed in Section 6.7.
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Early Failure Detection
The star-merging operation is costly in the sense that it may fail due to no enough
segments or active users appearing in the neighborhood of the initial star φ. Thus
it is desirable to maintain such statistical information, and stop the merging process
early if detecting no enough number of active users or segments available.
Specifically, for each intersection node n, we maintain the number of active users
Numu(n,R) and segments Nums(n,R) in the sub-network of radius R hops to n. The
statistical information for multiple R’s {Ri}hi=0 (with R0 corresponding to the star
centering n) can be maintained in order to achieve more effective detection, though
at higher maintenance cost.
The cached information can be used in two ways: (1) on anonymizing an initial star
φ, with center node n, and profile (δφl , δφk , σφs ), check if ∃i ∈ [0, h] such that (i) Ri ≥ σφs ,
and (ii) Numu(n,Ri) < δφk or Nums(n,Li) < δφl . If such i exists, then the merging
process stops as failure. (2) On adding a new star φ′ centering n′ to the current super-
star ψ, check if ∃i ∈ [0, h], such that (i) Ri ≥ σφ′s , and (ii) Numu(n′,Ri) <max{δφ′k , δψk }
or Nums(n′,Ri) < max{δφ′l , δψl }. If such i exists, then one can safely exclude φ′ from
the candidate list for expansion.
6.6.3 Multiple Queries Sharing
From the perspective of the query processing at the server, XStar enjoys two major
advantages over conventional methods: (1) independence of the underlying imple-
mentation of the processing techniques. XStar can be optimized for specific imple-
mentation, as introduced in Section 6.4, by configuring the cost function according
to the adopted models, e.g., solution indexing [78], network expansion [108], etc. (2)
capability of sharing processing of multiple requests. It considers the possibility of
sharing processing in the location anonymizing operation, by grouping queries with
nearby locations together and perturbing their location as an entirety.
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Concretely, given a set of k-NN style queries {qi}ti=1 sharing the same anonymous
location ψ, having corresponding k’s as {ki}ti=1 and ki ≤ kj for i < j, one can first
evaluate qt and retrieve the top ki objects of O(qt, n) as O(qi, n) for each n ∈ BVψ
and i ∈ [1, t − 1]. This principle developed for k-NN queries can easily be extended
to other types of requests, e.g., range queries, which is omitted here due to the space
limit.
6.7 Evaluation
In this section, we perform an empirical analysis of the location anonymization mod-
els proposed in the chapter. The experiments are designed to compare these models
based on the following three metrics: 1) attack resilience. The performed protec-
tion should be robust against malicious inference attack, i.e., hard for the adversary
to penetrate the protection to identify users’ exact position with high certainty; 2)
cost awareness. The privacy protection mechanism should not incur excessive system
burden for either the service provider or the mobile clients, in terms of query process-
ing and communication cost; 3) operation efficiency. The anonymization operation
should be computationally efficient and scalable, and a location anonymization en-
gine equipped with modest computational resources should be able to handle a large
number of mobile users on continuous move, and support real time query processing.
6.7.1 Experimental Setting
All our experiments are performed over real road maps from areas of the United
States: the first road map corresponds to the highways in the entire State of Califor-
nia [89], which contains 21,048 nodes and 21,693 edges; moreover, it is associated with
a real dataset of 104,771 points of interest (POIs), as categorized into 62 classes, e.g.,
church, hospital, airport, etc., which we used as queried objects in our simulation; the
second road map corresponds to the roads in the City of Oldenburg, which contains
6,105 nodes and 7,035 edges. Choosing these road maps, we intend to evaluate the
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performance of location anonymization models for road networks at varying scales.
On these maps we simulated different traffic conditions using the Network-based
Generator of Moving Objects by T. Brinkhoff 2, a state-of-the-art traffic simulator.
We assign a same number (10,000) of moving objects to each map. Since the two
maps are of significantly different scales, we intend to simulate high user density (rush
hour) and low user density (non-rush hour) conditions, respectively. In each simu-
lation, we defined two classes of moving objects, with speeds corresponding to slow
(e.g., trucks) and fast (e.g., passenger cars) vehicles, respectively. With a randomly
assigned probability, each vehicle generates a set of k-NN (or none) queries during
the simulation, with the parameters specified as follows: 1) the requested number
of nearest points of interest as k; 2) the category of the points of interest as c, e.g.,
church, hospital, etc.; 3) privacy requirements as k-anonymity (δk) and l-diversity (δl);
and 4) service quality requirements as the spatial (σs) and temporal tolerance (σt).
The values of each query are drawn independently following certain distributions,
with parameters listed in Table 9. After issuing a query, the vehicle waits for some
normally distributed inter-wait time γ, waiting for the request to be either answered
or dropped, before issuing another service request.
Table 9: Default parameter setting for query generation. Note: all the parameters
except c follow normal distributions; c follows a uniform distribution over the interval
[0, 62]; the values of σt and γ are in the unit of second.
parameters k c δk δl σs σt γ
mean 5 N/A 5 5 4 10 20
deviation 1 N/A 1.5 1.5 1 2 2
For the location anonymization engine, we implemented four different methods:
Random Sampling (R), Network Expansion (E), basic XStar (X), and opti-
mized XStar (OX). For the privacy-aware query processing server, two versions are
developed, one with the machinery of multiple queries sharing processing (MQS), and
2http://www.fh-oow.de/institute/iapg/personen/brinkhoff
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the other without MQS. Most of the algorithms are implemented in Java. The exper-
iments are performed on a Linux box running 1.5Ghz CPU with 512 MB memory.
6.7.2 Experimental Results
Cost Awareness
Now, we proceed to evaluating the impact of the location anonymization operation
over the service performance, i.e., the query execution cost and the communication
cost, under varying setting of traffic condition, privacy (δk, δl) and service quality
requirements (k, σs). Specifically, in terms of the query execution cost, we measure
the average execution time of processing a query at the server side; while in terms of
the communication cost, we measure the average number of objects returned in the
candidate result for each query. Specifically, we used the road map of California and
its associated dataset of points of interest in query processing.
We measured the query processing cost corresponding to the three anonymization
models (R, E and X represent the Random Sampling, Network Expansion and
XStar methods, respectively) in the case without Multiple Query Sharing Processing
(MQS), and the XStar method with MQS policy (XMQS), as the mean values of the
parameters k, δl, δk and σs change within the intervals of [2, 10], [3, 15], [3, 15] and
[1, 5], respectively. In each set of experiments, we fix three parameters and vary the
last one. Figure 46 plots the average execution time of processing each anonymous
query by the server, while Figure 47 row plots the average size of the candidate result
returned by the server.
With respect to anonymous query execution time, it is observed that the R-scheme
incurs the highest system overhead at the server among the three schemes and the
X-scheme outperforms both R and E in most cases, which validates our theoretical
analysis regarding its superiority in terms of query execution cost. Note that although
working ideally in the homogeneous grid world (Section 6.4), the E-scheme ignores
the heterogeneity of real road maps when selecting extra segments, leading to its
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Figure 46: Average execution time per query with respect to varying settings of
parameters δk, δl, σs, and k.
unsatisfying performance in real applications. Also notice that the MQS policy further
improves query processing efficiency, and the improvement tends to become significant
as the parameters δl, δk, k or σs increase. This can be explained by the facts that
1) stronger privacy requirement leads to larger number of queries to be anonymized
in batches, therefore more queries can be processed in group; 2) a larger k results
in higher execution cost for each individual query, but also lends more considerable
savings for grouped queries; 3) a large spatial tolerance σs boosts the chance for a
query to be successfully anonymized (to satisfy δk and δl) by allowing more queries
to be grouped together.
Moreover, by examining the impacts of these four parameters over the query ex-
ecution cost, one can notice that the parameters δk and δl have stronger influence
than σs and k for all the anonymization models; this is contributed by the fact that
stricter privacy requirements result in anonymous location of much coarser granu-
larity (larger area), with its impact over the query execution easily exceeding that
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exerted by the requested number of POIs or spatial tolerance. Meanwhile, it is also
interesting to note that the performance of the X-scheme is fairly insensitive to the
parameter setting: in all four cases, its increase is the least significant among all the
anonymization models under consideration.

































































































Figure 47: Average size of candidate result per query with respect to varying settings
of parameters δk, δl, σs, and k.
With respect to communication cost, as expected, the R-scheme generates signif-
icantly larger size of candidate result than the other schemes (note that the multiple
queries sharing processing does not affect the average size of candidate result; there-
fore, X and XMQS have the same size). Meanwhile, the X-scheme outperforms the
other two for the cases of varying δk and δl, though the lead is not considerable as
that in query execution time, especially for small δk and δl; in the cases of varying σs
and k, it is interesting to observe that here both R and E schemes perform slightly
better than the X-scheme for small σs and k. All these phenomenon is explained by
the following facts: both R and E perform segment-based perturbation, which stop
just after obtaining sufficient number of segments; meanwhile, X performs star-based
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perturbation, and the generated anonymous location may include slightly more than
enough number of segments (or nodes). This difference exhibits significantly when
these parameters are small; however, as the privacy or service quality requirements
grow, the inherent superiority of star-based perturbation dominates the performance.
Attack Resilience
In the first set of experiments, we take a close examination of the resilience of the
anonymous locations generated by location anonymization models against malicious
inference attacks. Specifically, we consider the replay attack as described in Sec-
tion 6.5: given a set of segments S as the user u’s anonymous location, the adversary
attempts to estimate for each segment s ∈ S its probability to be associated with
u. We measure the strength of the privacy protection using the information entropy
of the distribution of such probabilistic estimations: a larger entropy value indicates
higher uncertainty for the adversary, i.e., better protection. We used both the Cali-
fornia and Oldenburg road networks, aiming at capturing the influence of factors such
as area scale, user density, etc.
The first set of results is illustrated in Figure 48, where we measured the in-
formation entropy of anonymous locations, with respect to varying δl and σs, two
parameters relevant to the spatial expansion of anonymous locations. The left two
plots correspond to the road network of Oldenburg, and the right two that of Cal-
ifornia. First notice that all the protection strengths of all the models increase as
segment-diversity (δl) or spatial tolerance (σs) grows; intuitively, an anonymous loca-
tion containing more segments tends to provide better protection. Also, as expected,
under the replay attacks, the protection provided by the E-scheme is easy to pene-
trate, while the R-scheme demonstrates the best protection strength in most cases.
The performance of the X-scheme is fairly stable, and its difference with the R-scheme
tends to decrease as the number of segments increases. For the case of Oldenburg
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Figure 48: Average information entropy of anonymous locations generated by location
anonymization models with respect to δl and σs, for maps of Oldenburg and California.
Note: the entropy is in unit of ban (Hart).
road network (the leftmost plot), the entropy corresponding to the X-scheme is even
higher than that provided by the R-scheme under varying setting of δl. This can be
explained by that for a road network with sufficient user density, and for given privacy
and service quality requirements, the anonymous location generated by a star-based
perturbation scheme tends to feature higher segment-diversity than that produced
by segment-based perturbation schemes, yet without compromising query processing
efficiency (as shown above).
Also, note that the attack resilience discussed here focuses on the case of one-
shot query. We anticipate that by combining the anonymous location information
of multiple continuous queries of mobile users, the adversary can potentially infer




The last set of experiments are designed to evaluate the operation efficiency of var-
ious location anonymization models. In particular, we are interested in two critical
measurements: the success rate of the location anonymization operation and the
average execution time of anonymization for each query. We incorporate the two
measurements into a single metric, successful throughput (SF):
SF = query arrival rate × anonymization success rate
That is, for given number of LBS requests, a higher successful throughput indicates
better performance of the location anonymization engine.
In our experiments, specifically, in addition to the R, E, X anonymization schemes
discussed so far, we implemented an optimized version of X-scheme, X∗ which in-
corporates the optimizations introduced in Section 6.6. We measured the successful
throughput of these four location anonymization models as the functions of the pa-
rameters δk, δl, σs, and σt (the parameter k is not relevant to query anonymization).






















































Figure 49: Successful throughput with respect to δl and δk.
The result is illustrated in Figure 49 and 50. Figure 49 shows the influence of
the privacy parameters δk and δl over the SF of anonymization. Overall, it is noted
that the performance of all four schemes tend to decrease as the privacy requirement
becomes stronger. It is expected because 1) larger δl and δk are harder to satisfy, lead-
ing to higher rate of failure, and 2) moreover, even a successful attempt takes longer
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execution time. The successful throughput of the X (and X∗) is significantly higher
than that of R and E, and the gap tends to grow as the privacy requirements become
stricter. For example, even the basic X-scheme maintains throughput at about 56
for δk = 15. This can be attributed to the strategy of star-based perturbation: com-
pared with segment-based perturbation, which involves costly distance computation
for node (or segment) pairs, the randomized star selection and merging operations
are much less costly. It is also noted that the setting of δk has less impact than δl
over SF. However, keep in mind that the Oldenburg road network features high user
density; therefore, δk is easier to satisfy than δl.

















































Figure 50: Successful throughput with respect to σs and σt.
Figure 50 demonstrates how the setting of spatial and temporal setting affect
anonymization SF. Clearly, the SF of all anonymization models exhibit increasing
trends as the spatial tolerances grows. This is expected, since larger tolerance in-
creases the chance for a query to be successfully anonymized. Meanwhile, interest-
ingly, the SFs of all the models stay fairly stable as the temporal tolerance changes.
This may be explained as follows: longer lives of queries increase their chance to be
successfully anonymized, i.e., a higher success rate of anonymization, but also in-
creases computational overhead for the anonymization engine, i.e., a large stack of
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Figure 51: Fractions of improvement contributed by the multiple optimization strate-
gies.
It is also interesting to analyze the contributions by the optimization strategies
to the SF of X∗-scheme. The space limitation preclude the possibility of detailed
analysis. Here, we take two snapshots of the fractions of improvement contributed
by each strategy for δk = 3 and 15, respectively. For brevity, we use the following
short notations: Lazy Update for Deletion (LU), Batch Insertion of Queries (BI), and
Early Detection of Failure (ED). Figure 51 shows the result, from which we can obtain
the following observations. (1) The contribution from LU generally decreases as δl
grows. This is explained by that as the success rate of anonymization decreases,
more queries tend to be deleted, resulting in frequent changes to the privacy profiles
of the corresponding stars; therefore, LU takes less effect in preventing false update.
(2) The portion of (BI) stays stable as the parameters change. This is because that
the insertion of more queries necessarily increases the average number of queries per
star, thus improving the success rate of anonymization operation. (3) The fraction
contributed by ED tends to increase with δl grows. This is due to that stronger privacy
requirement brings higher failure probability for an anonymization operation, and FD
can effectively counter its impact over the performance, by avoiding unnecessary
attempts.
6.8 Related Work
Location privacy research is gaining increasing interests from both mobile networking
community [17, 54, 44, 70, 69] and data management community [14, 56, 50, 51,
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102]. The former has been focused on anonymous routing [54, 80], MIXes in mobile
communication systems [44], source location privacy [70, 69] and Mix Zones [17, 44],
Most existing solutions assume random waypoint mobility model [66] and utilize
location hiding techniques to disable adversaries to associate location-based service
requests (be it routing or query) with a particular mobile client.
Alternatively, location privacy research in data management community has been
focused on extending data perturbation techniques developed for data privacy pro-
tection such as k-anonymity to address location privacy concerns, with examples
including spatial cloaking [14, 56, 50, 51, 102], false dummies [76], and landmark
objects [60]. Arguably, the most popular machinery of location privacy protection
to date has been the spatial-temporal cloaking techniques, where the exact position
of a mobile user is transformed to a spatial cloaking region. The transformation
criterion has been solely based on location k-anonymity, and measures the amount
of privacy protection in terms of the area size of the anonymous location. Unfortu-
nately, as we have pointed out, most of the spatial cloaking algorithms tend to fail
under the network-constrained mobility model, because the size of the cloaking area
is no longer an effective and valid measure of the protection quality. The work [81]
considers privacy-aware query processing for spatial networks; however, the adopted
privacy protection model is still limited to spatial area cloaking.
Processing spatial queries over road network has been an emerging research topic
recently [28, 62, 63, 78, 103, 108]. Two commonly used search paradigms have been
proposed for k-NN style queries, namely incremental network expansion [108], and
solution indexing [78]. The former gradually expands the search from the query point
through the edges and reports the accessed objects during the expansion, while the
latter precomputes and stores the solutions to the queries. Another line of research
has been directed to continuous nearest neighbor (CNN) recently [63, 103], which




This thesis centers around designing, building, analyzing and measuring massive
data analytical systems wherein data come from multiple autonomous, yet correlated
sources. Examples include network monitoring systems, mobile computing infrastruc-
tures and social networking platforms. Such systems hold the promise of supporting
critical decision making by fusing information from different sources and providing
consistent, multi-scale views of underlying phenomena. Today this promise remains
largely unfulfilled, because building and operating large-scale multi-source analytical
systems still face a multitude of challenges, from both system and data perspectives.
We focus on addressing the data-centric challenges facing system designers and
operators, in particular including (i) data correlation: data may only consist of local,
correlated observations of the global phenomena; and (ii) data privacy: data may
be contributed by sources (e.g., individuals) that impose strict privacy requirements
regarding their sensitive information. Although existing studies have explored to cer-
tain extent along each dimension separately, understanding the global phenomena
as a function of a set of correlated observations in a privacy-preserving manner is a
scope way beyond existing investigation. We propose Network-Aware Analysis and
Privacy-Aware Analysis, two general design paradigms that seek to unleash the po-
tential of multi-source analysis by making analytical systems more capable of weaving
correlated observations into globally consistent pictures, and more privacy-preserving
with respect to sensitive information,
Next we conclude this thesis and point to a set of future research directions.
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7.1 Discussion
We begin with concluding our contributions in each concrete case study and discussing
the limitations of our work.
7.1.1 Network-Aware Correlation Reasoning
Our work advances the state-of-the-art in network operational data analysis by pre-
senting Meta, a general framework of learning, indexing and identifying topological
and temporal correlation existing in network-event data, based on a novel class of
network signatures. We present efficient learning algorithms to extract such signa-
tures from noisy historical event data. With the help of novel indexing structures, we
show how to perform efficient, online signature matching against high-volume event
streams. While focusing on topological-temporal patterns only is unlikely to capture
the myriad semantic structures existing in network-event data, we show that it is a
powerful primitive to support a range of applications. Our experiments of deploying
Meta with a large-scale testbed NMS to perform fault diagnosis show that Meta
is able to perform scalable, yet robust correlation analysis. Our work also opens up
several directions for further research: (i) incorporation of domain knowledge in train-
ing fault signatures; (ii) exploration of alternative models of temporal evolution, e.g.,
hidden Markov chains, frequent item-sets; (iii) search for data structures that can be
incrementally adapted as network evolves; and (iv) incorporation of a richer set of
topological relationships derived from multi-layer networks, e.g., mining information
diffusion or providing risk-aware access-control in socio-information networks.
7.1.2 Network-Aware Causality Tracking
Our work advances the state-of-the-art in modeling the influence between the actions
of individuals with social ties. We present a novel heat field over product network
model (HFPN) that explicitly accounts for the action-sensitivity, time-sensitivity and
user-sensitivity of such influence. We show that a broad range of applications, such
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as resource recommendation and mobile phone call services, can be benefited by this
model in terms of accuracy and freshness of customer action prediction. While our
framework is rich and flexible, several key challenges need to be addressed before
it can be readily adopted. (i) Measures of social influence. To meet our ambitious
objective of informative action prediction, it may require to assign influence strength
over social ties. Various measures can be used to derive influence strength; it is
however challenging to quantify such measures and to identify the optimal one. (ii)
Network evolution. While our model captures dynamic aspects including the shift
of communities’ and individuals’ interests, as well as the dynamic nature of social
influence, it assumes relatively static interconnections between users and objects.
How to extend it to support social or object networks in rapid evolution? (iii) Multi-
type objects. In this work we considered the interactions between users and one type of
objects. What happens when different types of objects are present? How to transfer
the knowledge for the interactions with one type of objects to another? Our work
might be part of a temporary solution until more comprehensive models are available,
and it might inform the design of these models.
7.1.3 Privacy-Aware Data Dissemination
We represent a systematical study on the problem of protecting general proximity
privacy, with findings of broad applicability. Our contributions are multi-fold: we
highlight and formalize proximity breach in a data-model-neutral manner; we pro-
pose a unified privacy definition, (ǫ, δ)k-dissimilarity, with theoretically guaranteed
protection against association attack in terms of both exact and proximate QI-SA as-
sociation; we derive the criteria that enable to efficiently check the satisfiability of the
principle for given microdata; we develop a novel anonymization model, XColor, to
fulfill this principle, which offer flexible control over multiple privacy requirements.
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Our work also opens several directions for future research. First, we define prox-
imity breach as a set of SA-values proximate to a common one in a QI group (star
structure). As other topological structures are taken into consideration, e.g., clique,
chain and cycle, how to measure and remedy the possible privacy breach is an im-
portant problem. Second, in developing our solution, we only allow the vertices to
be exchanged between two color classes. While allowing vertices to be transferred in
a cycle, e.g., moving vertex v1 from class V1 to V2, v2 from V2 to V3, and v3 from V3
to V1, the solution is still valid, and we envision a better bound than that provided
in this work. Third, in our generalization framework, we apply a suite of heuristics
to optimize the statistical utility of the resulted data (a best-effort strategy). It is
worth investigating how to incorporate utility as a first-class citizen in designing the
anonymization solution.
7.1.4 Privacy-Aware Data Mining
We highlight the importance of imposing privacy protection over (stream) mining
output, a problem complimentary to conventional input privacy protection. We artic-
ulate a general framework of sanitizing sensitive patterns (models) to achieve output-
privacy protection. We present the inferencing and disclosure scenarios wherein the
adversary performs attacks over the mining output. Motivated by the basis of the
attack model, we propose a lighted-weighted countermeasure, Butterfly∗. It coun-
ters the malicious inference by amplifying the uncertainty of vulnerable patterns, at
the cost of trivial decrease of output accuracy; meanwhile, for given privacy and ac-
curacy requirement, it maximally preserves the utility-relevant semantics in mining
output, and thus achieving the optimal balance between privacy guarantee and out-
put quality. The efficacy of Butterfly∗ is validated by extensive experiments on
both synthetic and real datasets.
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7.1.5 Privacy-Aware (Location) Data Management
We present a systematic study of the problem of protecting location privacy under
the network-constrained mobility model. We develop XStar, a general privacy-aware
mobile service model, which exhibits three distinct features compared with prior work:
(i) it supports road network specific and customizable privacy requirements on a per
request level; (ii) it provides a careful tradeoff between the metrics of anonymous
query processing cost and the attack resilience of users’ hidden location information;
(iii) it scales well to support a large number of mobile users with varying personalized
privacy requirements, through a star-based anonymization technique, powered by
multi-fold optimizations in implementation.
Our research will continue along several dimensions. First, we plan to develop
finer granularity cost models for location-based query execution and communication,
taking account of dynamic information, such as traffic condition, and complex road
network semantics. Second, we will continue to study other types of inference attacks
beyond the replay attack model, to evaluate and enhance the attack resilience of
the XStar model. Finally, we are interested in extending the current framework to
support continuous location-based queries, which are subjected to more complicated
inference attacks than one-shot queries.
7.2 Future Directions
The explosive popularity of social media, Web 2.0 technologies, and cloud computing
infrastructures are just a few examples that give a glimpse of the ever-increasing
demand for large-scale, context-rich data analytical systems. Our future research will
continue to address this demand by inventing new methods across the entire data
collection, processing and dissemination cycle to improve data analytical systems in
terms of analysis capability, system scalability and privacy preservation, from both
theoretical and system perspectives.
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7.2.1 Theoretical Models of Multi-Source Analytical Systems
While some fields of engineering have reached a level of maturity where there are
concrete design principles that ensure a level of correctness and effectiveness, we are
still lacking such a rubric for building data analytical systems. One of our research
directions is to develop general design models and formal frameworks that can help
system designer build multi-source data analytical systems with provable properties
and theoretical backing. In particular, we intend to address a set of critical questions
under different theoretical settings.
Model of Data Source
The locality and quality of the data from each source, and the correlation between
these sources interact with each other in an intricate manner for designing analytical
systems. For example, when injecting uncertainty at data sources according to their
correlation (one of the most important privacy-preserving techniques), it is necessary
to consider the inherent uncertainty (due to data quality issues) at each source. Thus,
we intend to explore models that can incorporate these elements in a unified manner,
and offer intuitive guidance for designing analytical systems.
Design of Analytical System
To ensure the correctness and effectiveness of analytical systems, it is imperative to
understand systems’ behavior under given conditions. For example, for given specifi-
cation of data quality and locality at each source and the correlation between these
sources, we intend to answer: What is the maximum achievable analyses accuracy?
More importantly, what is the optimal strategy approaching this accuracy? How
to construct systems that scale well with the number of data sources and the data
volume of each source? What is the optimal strategy for each source to protect its
privacy, while collaboratively achieving the maximum possible analyses accuracy for
given privacy requirements?
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Operation of Analytical System
The autonomous and dynamic nature of data sources make it necessary for analytical
systems to adapt to evolving condition of input data. we intend to study the optimal
adaptive strategies of analytical systems under various abruptiones. For example, in a
monitoring system that relies on sampling (to save bandwidth) from multiple sources,
in facing of the failure of specific sources, how to adaptively adjust the sampling rates
at correlated sources to ensure the analyses accuracy?
7.2.2 Domain-specific Multi-source Analytical Systems
Another direction of our future research will focus on addressing challenges in domain-
specific multi-source analytical systems in emerging contexts, including, for instance,
social computing, mobile Internet, cloud and crowd computing. The design of an-
alytical systems on these new platforms feature unique characteristics in terms of
analyses tasks, performance requirements, and users’ privacy needs. In the following
we give three concrete examples in the domain of communication networks.
Utility-driven Network Trace Analyses
In the concrete application of network trace analyses, we face a range of tasks, which
require different levels of detailed information, e.g., packet-level analyses to estimate
port distributions, flow-level analyses to detect stepping-stone attack, network-level
analysis to find anomaly phenomena. For such task variety, we desire the privacy-
preserving solutions to provide corresponding level of sanitization, while being opti-
mized for the intended task. we attempt to propose privacy solutions that achieve
multi-level anonymization matching with the required granularity of intended tasks,
and collusion resistance such that colluding data recipients cannot achieve any ad-
vantage.
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Crowd-based Network Failure Detection
Today’s network infrastructures still have difficulty to detect a large class of “silent”
failures due to configuration errors, routing anomalies, and router bugs. One possible
solution is to “outsource” the task of failure detection to the network ends where the
services are received. In this model, the network ends function as event data sources
as well as analytical systems. we intend to address the issues of accuracy/delay of
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